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RECOMMENDATIONS. 


From  Ca  plain  Dimmock,  of  the  Virginia  Public  Guard: 

Armory,  Richmond,  Va.,  January  S,  1S(51. 
.1.  W.   Ranpoi.pii — Drar  Sir  : 

T!ic  popular  works  upon  military  matter?,  now  befnro  the  i)ul)lic,  arc 
confined  to  ordinary  drills  and  parades.  What  is  now  wanted,  is  a  trea- 
tise {Toinj;  to  show  when  the  various  movements  of  Artillery,  Cavalry. 
Infantry  and  Rifle,  as  taught  in  their  respective  drills,  should  be  used 
in  presence  of  an  enemy;  what  grounds  should  be  sel.cted  for  battle 
and  encampment;  Avhat  precautions  to  be  taken  when  advancing  or 
retreating;  when  to  act  in  column;  when  in  line,  how  to  post  the  <lif- 
ferent  arms  to  act  the  most  favorably — information  most  essential  to 
success,  and  without  which,  no  matter  how  personally  l)rave  troops 
may  be,  they  are  exposed  to  almost  certain  disaster  in  i>resence  of  :»i 
equal  number  of  well  drilled  and  well  mana'uvred  trooi)s,  and  tliis  in- 
formation Capt.  15uckholtz  furnishes  in  his  work. 

I  have  no  hesitation  iu  recommending  it. 

Very  respectfully  yours, 

CHARLErA  DI.MMOCK,  Capt.,  &c..  &c. 

Col.  Tompkins,  (late  of  the  U.  S.  Jnny,)  says : 

I  have  examined  the  manuscript  of  Cajit.  Buckholtz,  and  consider  it 
a  valuable  compendium  of  military  maxims.  As  a  text  book  for  mili- 
tary students  or  as  a  condensed  epitome  of  principles  essential  to  the  art 
of  war,  the  work  of  Capt.  Buckholtz  should  be  consulted  and  under- 
stood by  every  citizen  wlio  hoMs  a  commission.  It  is  in  fact  "  multuni 
in  parvo."  C  Q.  TOiirKIXS. 

Richmond,  January  18, 18G1. 


T  A^  C  T  I  C  S 


OFFICERS 


INFANTRY,  CAVALRY  AND  ARTILLERY* 


ARRANGED    AXD    COMPILED    BY 


L.  V.  BUCKHOLTZ, 

AUTHOR  OF  INFANTRY  CAMP  DUTY,  FIELD  FOETIFICATION  AND  COAST 
DEFENSE. 


J.    W.    RANDOLPH, 

121  MAI\  STREET,  RICHMOND,  YA. 

]861. 


Entered  according  to  the  Act  of  Conj;ress,  in  tlie  year  18H1,  b} 

J.  W.  RANDOLPH, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Easterri 
District  of  Virginia. 


^■B9 
P^IEFACE. 

The  present  work  is  designed  to  impart  information 
to  Military  Sliulents.  I  submit  it  to  their  attention, 
and  trust  they  will  make  allowances  for  its  defects. 

There  are  many  reasons  why  an  officer  should  know 
something  on  tactics,  of  the  three  departments  of  an 
army,  even  though  he  may  never  have  the  supreme 
command,  he  may  often  be  called  on  to  give  his  opin- 
ion on  the  merits  of  plans  of  operations.  This  alone 
should  make  it  a  duty,  that  an  officer  should  be  tho- 
rougldy  acquainted  with  this  part  of  military  science. 


179017 


GRAND  TACTICS  FOR  OFFICERS 

0  F 

INFANTRY,  CAVALRY  AND  ARTILLERY. 


PART   FIRST. 

BASE    OF    MILITARY    OPERATIONS. 


OF    WAR. 

The  knowledge  of  War  is  acquired  by  practice, 
history  and  theory.    The  latter  will  here  be  considered. 

Theory  guided  by  practice  and  history  teaches  the 
nature  of  war,  or  applies  it  to  practical  use.  The 
mode  of  carrying  on  war  is  an  art,  and  not  alone  an 
abstract  science.  The  resources  of  genius,  combined 
with  courage,  are  infinite;  but  they  are  necessarily  re- 
strained by  the  means  at  hand,  nevertheless  these 
means  may  be  much  more  available  by  sound  tlieo- 
retical  knowledge. 

WHAT    IS    WAR.? 

War  is  an  action  by  force,  to  compel  an  enemy  to 
yield  to  his  adversary's  purposes.  Political  disagree- 
ments of  Governments  may  produce  a  war,  its  duration 

179017 


8  PURPOSE    AND    3IEANS    OF    WAR. 

is  governed  by  lliem,  and  the   resnlts  are  often  new- 
political  arrangements. 

Tlierefore  war  is  not  independent,  it  is  only  a  tool 
of  ]V)liti('.s,  without  any  nialliematical  (onndation,  a 
hazard  of  possibilities,  probabilities,  luck  anil  ill-lurk. 
The  theory  of  war  cannot  exclude  human  nature,  it 
has  to  admit  valor,  boldness,  and  even  temerity.  The 
science  of  war  has  to  employ  active  and  moral  forces, 
and  can  nowiiere  obtain  certainty;  a  large  field  is  for 
chance,  which  only  may  be  rendered  of  advantage  by 
the  noblest  valiant  virtues,  courage  and  self-reliance. 

PURPOSE     AND     MKAXS    OF    ^VAR. 

Tiie  purpose  of  war  is  as  changeable  as  the  politi- 
cal cause  that  provoked  it.  The  surest  success  is  to 
defeat  the  enemy,  but.even  that  condition  is  not  always 
necessary  to  make  peace,  mere  actions  may  often 
suifice,  they  may  render  the  expected  success  to  the 
enemy  either  impossible  or  loo  dear.  The  way  to 
obtffln  any  result  is,  therefore,  by  completely  routing 
the  enemy — down  to  the  mere  resistance. 

But  there  is  only  one  medium — '•'  it  is  battle."  What- 
ever is  to  be  done  in  war  will  be  done  by  troops.  The 
valiant  action  comprises  all  that  refers  to  it,  its  origin, 
preservation  and  employment. 

Employment  is  fight.  To  fight  at  the  proper  time 
and  at  the  proper  place  is  the  problem.  Destruction 
of  the  enemy's  forces  is  the  principal  aim. 


SCIENCE    OF    WAR.  V 

OF    THE    QUALITIES    REQUIRED    IN    A    SOLDIER. 

War  is  a  peculiar  activity,  and  demands  according 
to  it  wits  and  talents.  War  is  the  sphere  of  danger. 
Courage  is  consequently  the  first  condition  of  a  sol- 
dier. Courage  in  danger — courage  to  undertake  re- 
sponsibility. War  is  the  field  of  corporeal  exertions 
and  sufferings,  it  requires  therefore  energy  of  body 
and  mind.  War  is  a  field  of  uncertainty,  it  demands 
judgment  to  find  out  the  truth,  it  requires  firm  reso- 
lution and  unshaken  presence  of  mind.  To  these 
properties  belong  also  a  talent  for  localities  ;  the  ai)ility 
to  perceive  the  influence  of  the  ground  quickly  and 
correctly,  and  to  be  clear  in  the  dispositions  of  the 
troops.  War  is  therefore  an  action  which  can  be 
rendered  most  difficult  under  circumstances;  the  de- 
mands are  great  on  every  one,  but  the;y'  are  not  equal 
to  all,  they  increase  in  ratio  the  higher  the  position 
is,  and  the  General-in-Chief  should  be  perfect  in  all 
these  qualities. 

OF    THE     SCIENCE    OF    WAR. 

War  is  fight.  Fight  is  to  try  the  intellectual  and 
corporeal  strength  by  means  of  the  latter;  it  requires 
for  the  combatants  equipment  and  arms.  The  pro- 
perties of  these  additions  exert  influence  upon  the 
mode  of  conflict;  but  it  always  is  a  j)eculiar  activity, 
by  moving  in  a  most  appropriate  element  in  that  of 
danger.     Tiie  science  of  war  in  the  strictest  sense  is. 


10 


r     AVAR. 


ihe  art  of  employiiitr  to  the  best  advantajre  the  ijiven 
means  in  conibal;   it  is  the  lead  of  war.      In  a  more 

exteii(h'(l  .-ciise,  all  actions  l)(;lon<r  to  it  which  w  ill  he 
(lone  on  accdunt  of  war;  they  are  the  organization 
of  the  troops-,  the  equipment,  armament,  practice.  Sec. 

^^he  coinniand  of  war  is  tlun-efore  the  disj)osiiion 
and  lead  of  the  battle-  and  whilst  this  is  divided  in 
single  acticMis  for  themselves,  consequently  arises  bv 
them  the  most  diilerent  activity,  to  arrange  and  to  guide 
these  actions,  and  to  combine  them  to  the  purpose 
of  the  war. 

'I'lie  first  is  tactics,  the  second  strateiry.  'Tactics — 
the  employment  of  the  troops  in  condicts.  Strate<ry 
— the  science  of  rendering  the  conllicts  to  at! vantage 
to  the  object  of  the  war. 

Tactics  and  strategy  are  two  did'erent  activities,  in 
space  and  time  indissolubly  connected,  but  essentially 
different. 

This  part  of  the  art  of  war  considers  only  the  em- 
ployment of  the  troops.  ])esides  this  activity  are 
many  others  serving  to  the  purpose  of  war,  which 
belong-  nf)\v  to  tactics,  then  to  strategy. 

To  the  first  belong- :  marching-,  quarters  and  encamp- 
ment; tliey  belong  in  some  measui-e  to  battle  itself. 
To  the  latter  belong  the  supj)ort,  the  nursing-,  the  sup- 
ply of  arms  and  equipment ;  they  retuler  practicable  the 
preservation.  These  activities  attributed  to  the  war, 
(livitle  themselves  in  two  piincipal  parts;  the  prepa- 
ration for  war,  and  war  itself. 

To  the  knowledge  and  abilities  of  the  first  part, 


ACTIVE    FORCES.  11 

appertains  tlie  orfranizalion,  practice  and  preservation 
of  tlie  forces.  But  to  the  theory  of  war  appertains 
the  employment  of  skilled  forces.  This  is  the  art 
of  war  in  a  stricter  sense:  Tactics  or  Stratejjy.  The 
means  of  tactics  are  skilled  troops.  In  employin«r 
those  troops  locality,  ground,  soil,  the  time  of  day  and 
weather,  are  of  influence,  and  to  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration;  they  are  tactical  elements. 

THE    ACTIVE    FORCES. 

Active  forces  in  general,  refer  to  all  that  belong  to 
a  battle  ;  in  a  more  limited  sense  to  the  troops.  The 
troops  are  to  be  armed  and  equipped.  The  theory 
demands  in  this  reofard  active  forces,  renderiuir  the 
possibility  to  be  employed  every  where  easy;  active 
forces,  whose  efforts  in  battle  will  not  be  submitted  to 
too  great  diflicnlties ;  active  forces  which  excel  in 
skill  and  rapidity;  arms  well  constructed,  to  effect 
destruction  at  a  great  distance;  arms  to  be  nsed  as 
well  in  a  hand  to  hand  fight  as  in  a  general  attack. 

These  demands  fulfill  the  diiTerent  modes  of  fires 
and  weapons,  the  different  departments  of  arms,  in/an- 
try,  cavalry,  artillery  and  the  auxiliaries — the  engineer 
— troops. 

CHARACTERISTIC    FEATURES    OF    SINGLE    ARMS. 

Battle  consists  of  two  essentially  distinct  elements  : 
the  principle  of  destruction  by  fire  arms,  and  the  hand 
to  hand  fight,  either"  to  attack  or  to  defend. 


Iz  pm:atlrks  of   single   .\u:\is. 

Artillery  constitutes  ilmt  of  [hv  first.  Cavalry  the 
second,  Infantry  both  these  elements. 

In  a  hand  to  hand  lii^ht,  or  in  a  personal  conllict  is 
the  element  of  defense — in  position;  the  element  of 
attack — in(»veni(Mit.  Cavalry  is  entirely  in  want  of 
the  first  j)roperly.  ll  is  only  of  value  for  attack.  In- 
I'antry  has  both  ])roperties.  This  renders  Infantrv 
Superior  when  compared  to  either  of  the  other  depart- 
ments of  arms,  for  it  combines  all  three  active  elements 
in  itself. 

It  will  be  further  evident,  that  the  combination  of 
all  three  de])artments  of  arms  renders  the  most  ])erfect 
einjiloyni(Mil  possil)le.  In  re<Tard  t(^  iheir  jiriority  they 
are  classed — Infantry,  Cavalry,  Artillerv.  In  regard  to 
purpose  and  importance  in  most  cases,  the  destruction 
by  fire-arms  precedes  the  movements.  This  consid- 
(^ration  leads  to  the  following  results  : 

1st.  Infantry  is  the  most  independent  of  the  three 
arms. 

2m\.  Artillery  is  entirely  dependent. 
3rd.  Infantry  combined  with  other  departments  of 
arms  is  the  most  important, 
4*|h.  Cavalry  is  tlispensable. 

5th.  The  proper  combination  of  the  three  arms  gives 
the  greatest  strength. 

Considering  the  expense,  Infantry  is  in  the  first  rank. 
If  the  expenses  are  to  be  consid(;red,  we  lind  that  one 
squadron  of  150  horses;  one  battery  of  eight  b"  pdr. 
guns;  one  battalion  of  €00  men,  require  the  same 
amount  of  expense  for  armament,  equipment  and  sup- 
port. 


ORGANIZATION    OF    TROOPS.  ]3 

The  proportion  of  the  three  departments  of  arms 
exerts  influence  on  the  character  of  the  war. 

Abundance  of  Artillery  is  calculated  more  for  de- 
fense. Want  of  Artillery  will  cause  a  resort  to  the 
principle  of  manoBuvring;  war  becomes  more  com- 
plicated, more  active,  but  great  results  are  impossible. 
Large  numbers  of  Cavalry  leads  to  great  movements, 
— daring  assaults  in  the  rear,  diversions,  invasions,  and 
renders  easy  the  security  and  comfort  of  the  mass. 
With  a  Cavalry  force  inferior  in  number,  more  pre- 
caution, more  system,  more  defense  and  observation 
of  broken  country  is  required.  Th.at  considered  to- 
gether, leads  to  the  following  principles. 

1st.  Infantry  is  the  most  important,  both  the  others 
are  but  auxiliaries. 

2nd.  Artillery  is  less  dispensable  than  Cavalry. 
3rd.  Of  good  Infantry,  the   more  in  number  the 
better. 

Artillery  should  be  only  in  proper  proportion,  or  it 
is  an  impediment  and  a  disadvantage. 
Cavalry  not  more  than  is  necessary. 
In  general  the  proportion  is  :  Cavalry,  ^  to  |  of  In- 
fantry ;  Artillery,  2  to  4  cannons  for  every  thousand 
men.  These  are  the  principles  of  the  present  for- 
mation of  armies. 

Organization  must  render  the  troops  efficient;  to 
that  belong  equipment,  armament,  military  practice, 
discipline,  subordination,  exercise  of  strength,  arms, 
camp  (field)  duties.  It  depends  consequently  on 
the  administrative,  technical,  disciplinary  and  tac- 
2 


14  ORCAMZATIOX    OF    TROOl'S. 

lical  (leniaiuls.  lis  purpose  is  to  render  easy  the 
einployinent  of  the  troops  in  general,  and  the  co- 
operation of  ilieni.  Tiie  formation  contrihutes  to  the 
employment  of  tlic  troops.  F'ormaiious  of  decided 
orjranic  si<rnificance  are  :  the  compaiiv,  llie  scpiadron, 
the  hatiery,  for  individual  piaclice;  the  re<riment  for 
a  uniform  completion  ami  administration.  Formations 
of  tariiral  im{)()rtaiice  are  :  the  companies,  the  squad- 
rons, the  batteries,  and  their  sub-divisions;  the  bat- 
talion of  infantry,  the  cavalry  regiment,  the  brigade, 
the  division,  (simple  or  ctmibined  with  cavalry  or  ar- 
tillery), the  corps,  the  army.  Tactical  unities  are: 
the  battalion,  the  squadron,  the  battery.  The  organ- 
ised army  needs  a  medical  and  administrative  body, 
and  finally  trains  for  provisions.  The  General-in- 
Chief  commands  the  army,  his  organ  is  the  stafl'. 

Oriranization  has  in  view  the  inner  qualilication,  the 
fortuation,  ability  and  skill  in  movements,  the  prac- 
tice, the  employment,  and  all  that  relates  to  battle. 

IJaltle  consists  of  three  elements:  fire,  attack,  and 
hand  to  hand  light.  To  these  belong  position  and 
movements  beyond  the  battle-field,  but  constantly  pre- 
pared to  meet  any  attack.  Consequently  the  formation 
should  render  the  disposition,  the  movements,  and  the 
conflict  easy,  and  with  great  simplicity,  facility  and 
uniformity,  should  be  changed  from  one  to  another 
formation.  Finally  it  should  be,  if  possible,  executed 
even  under  the  immediate  influence  of  the  enemy's 
action.  The  practice  must  become  so  perfect  that  any 
evolution  can  be  performed  as  quickas  thought;  it  is 


RAPIDITY    OF    MOVEMENTS.  15 

a  double  one,  one  alliuling  to  the  meclianism  of 
formations  and  tlie  use  of  arms,  as  another  act  in  re- 
gard to  the  enemy  and  ground.  The  first  is  mechan- 
ical and  formal  practice,  also  elementary  tactics.  The 
second  is  intellectual — field  operations — manceuvring. 

The  science  of  war  can  not  be  in  the  same  state  of 
perfection  in  all  parts  of  an  army,  the  higher  the  posi- 
tion the  more  will  be  expected  ;  but  every  one  must 
know  so  much,  that  he  is  perfect  in  his  duties  when  he 
is  called  upon  for  action.  In  the  inferior  branches  this 
can  be  done  quite  methodically  by  practice  in  camp. 

The  officer  can  not  be  contented  with  methods,  he 
has  to  instruct  himself,  to  elevate  himself  above  the 
position  of  a  common  soldier,  to  be  enabled  to  make 
use  of  his  own  ideas,  to  be  "  an  artist  /"  He  should  be 
perfect  in  all  the  qualities  required  of  an  ofllcer  and 
soldier. 

RAPIDITY    OF    M0VE3IENTS. 

Pxapidity  is  of  great  importance,  in  some  regard,  the 
strategical  and  tactical  combinations  are  based  on  it. 
Its  degrees  must  be  known  ;  unfavorable  effects  upon 
it  must  be  avoided  by  armament,  equipment,  discipline  ; 
ground,  weather,  order  of  march,  and  the  mass  exert 
also  some  influence  upon  it.  In  this  regard  is  to  be 
considered  the  tactical  ra[)i(lity.  Infantry  (closed)  100— 
120  in  common  march;  140-160  in  double  quick 
time;  in  open  order  110-150;  in  double  quick  time 
150-200  paces  in  one  minute.  (2^  feet  to  one  pace.) 

The  march  in  double  quick  time  should  not  last  more 
than  two  minutes, 


16  EKIECT    OF    FIKE    ARMS, 

Cavalry  at  a  walk  130-150,  at  a  trot  140-160,  at  a 
gallop  400-500,  at  a  charge  500-600  paces. 

Artillery  on  foot,  (6  pdr.  guns,)  common  march, 
100-120,  at  a  trot  150-200  paces.. 

Flying  Artillery,  (6  pdr.  guns,)  at  a  walk  130- 
150,  at  a  trot  300-400  paces. 

Artillery  can  follow  Cavalry  or  Infantry  everywhere, 
according  to  their  own  manner.  Cavalry  is  4-5  times 
more  rapid  than  Infantry.  These  results  exert  inllu- 
ence  on  a  battle. 

EFFECT    OF    FIRE    ARMS. 

The  destrnctive  power  of  cannon  is  so  great,  that  a 
shot  in  its  full  force  penetrates  20-30  illes,  a  grenade 
disables  16-18  men ;  a  rifle  ball  kills  or  wounds  2-3 
men.  The  probability  of  hitting  and  the  real  eflectis 
<rreatly  diminished  by  various  circumstances — as  an 
uncertain  aim,  excitement,  isLC. 

Ranges  of  cannons:  6  pdr.  shots  700-1000,  12 
pdr.  shots  900-1200,  bounding  shots  about  1800, 
grape  shots  400-700,  grenades  to  2000,  shrai)nells 
from  200-2000  paces;  light  12  pdr.  howitzer  shells 
from  200-1000  paces  ;  rifle  balls  to  600,  musket  balls 
to  300,  caral)ines  to  150,  common  horse-pistols  to  50 
paces. 

Result:  Artillery  can  be  destructive  beyond  the 
range  of  other  arms.  Cavalry-fire  is  much  inferior  to 
Infantry-flre.  The  eflect  of  the  lire  can  be  diminished 
by  the  position  of  the  troops. 


ELEMENTARY  TACTICS.  17 


ELEMENTARY  TACTICS. 


Elementary  tactics  tletermine  the  mode  of  disposi- 
tion, movement  and  conflict;  the  mode  and  nature  of 
changing  from  one  movement  to  anotlier,  the  nso  ol' 
arms,  so  that  the  enemy's  fire  shall  be  less  destructive, 
and  that  the  enemy's  rapidity  will  not  find  the  troops 
unprepared.  The  problem  to  be  solved  is,  to  render 
the  regulations  with  the  arms  uniform,  simj)]e,  sure, 
sliort;  the  position  based  on  the  principle,  that  every 
soldier  can  make  use  of  his  arms,  and  can  he  employed 
according  to  his  capacity  •,  an  organization  to  change 
form  and  front  easy,  and  conformably  to  the  purpose  ; 
a  meclianism  of  the  movements  simple,  sure  and  (piick  ; 
the  words  of  command  and  designs  of  operations  infalli- 
ble and  undoubted  ;  and  finally  the  mass  enclosed  at 
the  flaidcs  by  reliable  elements. 

The  existing  regulations  and  tactics  do  not  answer 
the  demands.     They  require  essential  alterations. 

1st.  In  regard  to  the  words  of  command,  the  word 
inversion  might  be  omitted. 

2nd.  All  words  of  command  being  undoubted,  re- 
main unchanged. 

3rd.  Formations  executed  to  different  directions,  for 
instance:  '^forward  in  line,"  the  commandant  only 
designates  the  side  to  which  the  movement  is  to  be 
made. 

4th.  In  formations,  by  which  tlie  guiding  division 
(troop)  will  have  to  change   front,  the   commandant 


18 


IXFA.NTRV. 


designates  only  tlie  division  of  the  guide,  and  ihe  otliers 
liave  to  go  l)v  it. 

Olli.  In  forming  coliinins,  the  ciMuniandant  desig- 
nates tlie  division  which  shall  be  loreinost,  or  upon 
wliicli  the  column  shall  be  formed. 

6lh.  In  deploying  columns,  the  commandant  gives 
the  direction  in  which  the  division  have  to  deploy.  It 
will  be  conceded  that  one  troop  being  as  well  skilled 
as  another,  it  matters  little  whether  the  neighbour  is 
posted  to  its  right  or  to  its  left,  consequently  a  more 
simple  rule  should  be  adopted. 

INFANTRY 

Is  armed  with  rifle  or  musket  and  bayonet,  for  fire, 
attack  and  defense,  supplied  with  ammunition,  a  camp 
hatchet,  cooking  utensils,  and  is  uniformed.  The 
weight  for  every  man  is  about  50-60  pounds. 

The  properties  of  Infantry  are,  it  can  fight  wherever 
a  man  is  able  to  go,  it  is  able  to  fight  in  attack  and 
defense.  The  troops  are  classed  according  to  comple- 
tion. With  the  increase  of  the  mass  increases  also 
the  mode  of  combination. 

The  battalion  shall  be  independent,  easy  to  be  con- 
trolled, and  shall  be  commanded  by  tlie  voice.  Even 
after  some  days  march,  fighting  and  retreating,  its  order 
shall  not  be  lost.  It  shall  be  800-1000  men  strong, 
and  divided  in  four  to  eight  companies,  from  120  to 
220  men  per  company. 

The  number  of  officers  and  non-commissioned  ofli- 
cers  increases  in  small  companies,  they  form  the  moral 


INFANTRY.  19 

and  intellectual  part  of  the  mass.  Detachments  taken 
from  one  or  the  other  company  render  a  battalion 
not  dependent.  Without  considering  the  expense, 
smaller  companies,  in  regard  to  discipline  and  tactics 
are  preferable.  But  the  more  moral  confidence  and 
militarj^  completion  is  infused  in  the  companies  by 
experience  in  campaign,  or  else  by  long  service,  the 
larger  may  be  the  companies.  The  companies  are 
divided  into  two  equal  parts,  or  platoons,  and  these 
subdivided  into  lialf  platoons.  The  principle  of  in- 
dependence will  be  effectual  if  these  parties  are  enclosed 
at  the  flanks  by  most  competent  men. 

The  base  of  organization  is  2-3  ranks.  The  rear 
rank  covered  by  the  front  rank,  thus  forming  files. 
The  formation  of  the  line  is  the  base  of  all  formations. 

Opinions  differ  as  to  whether  two  or  three  ranks 
should  be  formed,  but  sure  it  is,  that  with  two  ranks, 
as  much  has  been  accomplished  as  with  three. 

The  armament  of  the  present  time  allows  the  use 
of  fire-arms  only  for  two  ranks,  the  third  rank  may 
be  ordered  to  reload  in  a  fire  attack,  but  such  services 
are  not  now  required  ;  the  present  construction  of  fire- 
arms facilitates  the  reloading,  without  loss  of  time,  it 
might  be  desirable  in  squares,  but  then  the  fire-arms 
have  to  be  of  the  same  bore. 

In  squares,  the  troops  in  general  are  posted  one  di- 
vision behind  the  other,  and  these  can  reload.  There- 
fore, considered  for  its  efficiency,  the  third  rank  is 
better  omitted ;  it  is  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy 


20 


rilOFCRTinS    OF    TIIR     I.IXR. 


iuul  is  of  lilile  or  no  advantairo.  In  iiKivenieiits,  three 
ranks  would  reiulcM*  more  stahilily  llian  Iwo;  if  inove- 
inents  in  lino  were  nsnal,  hut  tliey  arc  only  cxrcjjiional, 
and  are  replaced  by  tlie  more  conipacl  columns.  Con- 
sequently the  third  rank  is  heller  to  be  entirely 
abandoned. 

PROPERTIF.S    OF    THE     I.l.NE     (^CLOSED.) 


In  regard  to  formalion :  the  line  requires  mucli 
space  for  its  breadlli,  this  can  become  disadvantasreous  ; 
covered  ground  is  of  no  use  to  deploy  in  line,  and  ol'ien 
also  the  space  is  not  large  enough. 

In  regard  to  movements:  the  movements  upon  un- 
dulating ground  are  rendered  dillicuh,  often  impossi- 
ble, ami  if  of  any  duration,  slow. 

In  regard  to  battle  :  all  lire-arms  can  he  em])loye(l 
at  tbe  same  time. 

In  regard  to  the  enemy  :  llie  enc-my\s  balls  will  be 
of  less  efl'ecl  ;    the  llaid^s  and   ibe  rear  are  defenseless. 

I'his  latter  j)oint  is  in  all  tactical  formations,  and 
tberefore  tbis  princij)le  may  be  considered  in  any  con- 
flict:  front  against  (laidvs  or  rear:  superior  against 
inferior  jorces. 

The  line  may  be  chosen  j)articularily  in  lire-attack 
of  the  mass,  il"  llie  ilanks  are  protected  and  in  jxx-^ition. 
Consequently  it  is  nu)re  defensive. 

The  efTect  (lej)ends  upon  the  j)()wer  of  lire  and  tbe 
condition  of  tbe  trt)oj)s. 

The  dillerent  kinds  of  fires  are :  by  battalions,  by 


PROPERTIES    OF    THE    LINE.  21 

half-battalions,  by  companies,  by  platoons,  by  half- 
platoons,  by  ranks  and  files.  For  instance  in  mass, 
if  the  distance  be  200-250  paces,  in  one  minute  can 
be  fired  two  or  three  rounds,  therefore  at  an  advancino- 
enemy  can  be  fired  four  to  five  rounds. 

Fire  by  battalions  :  it  is  the  largest  force  which  can 
be  united  in  a  moment,  dependent  upon  the  command 
of  the  Chief,  he  has  the  troops  in  this  kind  of  fire 
completely  at  his  will,  but  the  troops  are  for  a  moment 
deprived  of  the  eflect  of  tlie  fire,  and  therefore  it  may 
be  best  applied  by  battalions  firing  in  succession,  and 
when  time  and  rapidity  sufiers  to  reload,  and  further, 
immediately  before  the  attack. 

Fire  by  half-battalions  is  of  less  efi^ect,  but  it  secures 
a  fire  in  reserve. 

Company-fire  has  a  diminished  effect,  less  con- 
formity in  the  actions  of  a  battalion,  and  is  difficult 
of  control,  is  best  applied  in  successive  formations. 

Fire  by  platoons  is  of  less  effect  than  fire  by  com- 
panies, and  consequently  not  to  be  recommended. 

Fire  by  ranks  in  regard  to  eflect,  is  equal  to  half- 
battalion  fire,  but  it  sets  the  whole  battalion  in  disor- 
der and  in  a  guideless  state;  it  may  be  resorted  to  in 
case  a  reserve  fire  is  necessary,  especially  against 
Cavalry. 

Fire  by  files  :  the  eflect  is  great,  owing  to  the  large 
number  of  balls  fired,  but  this  fire  causes  the  greatest 
disorder.  The  control  of  the  Chief  is  entirely  checked, 
it  is  of  great  effect  from  protected  positions  against  a 
retreating  enemy. 


oo 


rRortUTIES    OF    THE    I. INC. 


Tlie  effect  of  fne  i.s  more  in  tlie  mass  of  halls  than 
ill  the  direction  and  accuracy  in  takiiiir  aim;  aimed 
shots  are  impossihle.  Tlie  efiecl  is  greater  downwards 
than  upwards,  and  host  in  horizontal  line. 

C0LU31.\.s OPEN CLOSED, 

Are  formed,  if  the  suh-di visions  of  a  haltalion  are 
posted  one  after  tlie  oilier.  Tiie  troop  in  front  desig- 
nates the  name  of  the  columns;  ihev  are  formed  of  a 
company  in  line,  down  to  that  of  a  fde. 

PROrCRTIES    OF    THE    COLUMNS. 

In  reij^ard  to  position  :  the  mass  can  be  easily  con- 
centrated in  the  smallest  sj)ace,  ihey  render  easy  any 
position  on  any  ground,  and  admit  a  perfect  control. 

In  regard  to  movements  :  they  are  of  advantage  on 
account  of  their  suitable  extent  of  front  and  inner 
strength. 

In  battle  :  their  lire  is  inferior  and  reduced  to  the  ex- 
tent of  the  front. 

In  regard  to  the  enemy:  his  fire  is  destructive,  but 
the  flank  is  less  exposed  than  that  of  the  line. 

It  may  be  applied  :  if  a  mass  in  a  covered  position 
shall  be  concentrated,  in  movements,  and  in  attack 
with  the  bayonet,  which  latter  is  made  indtndjle  (piick 
time,  and  only  to  a  distance  of  about  100  paces.  The 
attacking  columns  are  better  not  closed,  the  nearer 
they  get  to  the  enemy  the  smaller  the  intervals  become 


PROPERTIES     OF     THE     LINE,  23 

between  themselves-,  during  the  hand  to  hand  fight 
they  shouhl  not  fire. 

Marcli  columns  have  a  small  front  for  their  own 
convenience,  best  double  files. 

Attacking  columns  may  be  best  in  company  or 
platoon-columns. 

THE    LINE    WITH    INTERVALS    BETWEEN   THE   FILES. 

This  manoeuvre  requires  the  largest  space,  and  re- 
quires the  occupation  of  favorable  ground  in  the  most 
extended  sense. 

In  regard  to  movements :  it  is  best,  especially  in 
broken  ground  and  woodland. 

In  battle  :  favorable  for  attack  and  defense,  the  fire 
is  of  good  effect,  but  not  destructive;  every  man  is  in- 
dependent; the  control  of  t'.ie  Chief  is  broken,  and 
consequently  requires  men  of  great  skill  and  confidence. 

In  regard  to  the  enemy:  it  presents  not  many 
points  to  be  aimed  at;  in  open  ground  it  is  weak  ; 
under  some  circumstances  tlie  oj)en  order  may  be  com- 
bined with  the  mass,  especially  with  columns,  if  move- 
ments and  fire  are  necessary,  and  if  impediments  are 
to  be  overcome  in  passing  woodland,  &.c.  If  single 
parts  of  a  battalion  are  ordered  to  succor  the  open-line, 
it  is  best  to  order  closed  companies  for  those  duties. 

THE    THREE   ORDERS  OF   FORMATIONS 

Will  answer  to  meet  any  eventualities  which  may 
occur,     hi   regard   to  their  properties,  they   are   the 


24  THiinK  OKI) r. us  of  formatiox. 

means  for  attack  \  attack  in  closed  order,  in  open  order, 
in  colnmn.  in  line,  and  hy  skirmishers.  T()  tiie  llrst 
belongs  the  sqnarc,  to  the  latter  the  mass,  botli  lorma- 
tions  are  the  mode  of  defense  ajrainst  cavalry. 

The  sqnare  is  the  only  formation  which  has  no 
weak  point  and  is  ft)rmed  in  the  quickest  time  from 
the  line  as  well  as  from  the  column  ;  it  sliould  have 
sufiicient  space  inside  to  admit  of  more  ranks  for  reserve 
fire.  The  simi)lesl  formation  is,  when  the  parts  (divi- 
sions) are  of  equal  extent;  the  formation  is  rendered  re- 
liable and  secure,  when  advanccil  troops  will  not  be 
required. 

The  increased  ranks  may  be  of  some  value,  if  they 
have  all  the  same  lire  arms  and  eqjial  ammunition  ;  four 
ranks  secure  the  reserve  fire;  short  fronts  are  prefer- 
able to  long  ones. 

The  results  :  1st,  in  forming  three  ranks,  they  are  to 
be  of  the  same  element;  2nd,  to  combine  closed  order 
with  open  order,  and  to  form  scpiarcs  with  security; 
five  companies  are  better  tluin  four  in  a  battalion  ;  IJrd, 
squares  with  company  front  will  fulfill  the  conditions. 

The  properties  of  the  square  are :  the  movements 
are  difficult,  but  the  firing  can  be  done  in  all  direc- 
tions, tliey  are  only  eflective  in  position,  and  are  of 
"•real  value  on  uncovered  ground  against  cavalry.  The 
formation  of  the  square  is  exceptional,  and  depends 
npon  the  condition  of  the  attacking  cavalry.  The 
square  is  more  secure,  less  complicated,  than  any  other 
tactical  formation. 

The  skirmisliers  rally  under  similar  circumstances 
in  mass,  to  render  greater  resistance. 


CHANGE  OF  FRONTS.  25 

FORMATIONS  AND  CHANGE  OF  FRONTS. 

The  organization  of  a  battalion  renders  the  means 
easy  of  meeting  any  emergency  which  may  occur; 
but  the  present  adopted  rule  of  having  the  first  rank 
under  all  circumstances  in  front,  exerts  a  disturbing 
influence  upon  it. 

No  good  reason  can  be  given  for  it;  a  soldier  of 
the  second  rank  is  of  as  much  value  as  one  in  the  first 
rank.  This  partiality  lies  only  in  the  order  of  num- 
bers. Should  this  be  abandoned  and  otlier  suitable 
terms  adopted,  many  movements,  by  simple  round- 
about will  be  shortened  and  more  quickly  and  easily  ex- 
ecuted; counter-march,  round-about-wheeling,  &c., 
should  be  abandoned.  Consequently  by  that  the  excep- 
tional inversion  of  the  movements  becomes  a  rule,  and 
tlie  elementary  tactics,  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
troops,  will  be  freed  from  all  complications.  Theory 
might  have  here  a  great  field  for  improvement. 

The  number  of  file-closers  should  be  reduced  to  the 
utmost,  and  also  the  whole  system  of  the  lead  should 
be  simplified. 

Finally,  in  regard  to  the  form,  by  wliicii  a  forma- 
tion of  order  of  battle  shall  be  executed,  the  columns  of 
files — flank-march — would  suit  that  purpose  the  least, 
if  the  march  is  of  some  duration;  therefore  this  mode 
of  mancEuvring  on  the  battle  field  is  to  be  rejected 

The  -column  of  double  files  is  best  on  march.  If 
under  certain  circumstances  a  weak  form  should  be 


26  CAVAI.KV. 

adopted,  it  must  he  strengthened  by  combination  with 
otlier  forms;  the  best  means  are  the  open-order. 

The  three  moch's  of  position  render  easy  and  vvoh- 
able  the  modes  for  actions;  every  one  lias  a  j)eculiar 
significance,  advantage  and  disadvantage;  top^ether 
they  combine  all  desirable  means  for  haitlc. 

The  form  must  be  directed  by  the  <rcnius  of  true 
conrafre,  which  Lnv(\s  life  to  the  wliole,  thron<rh  the 
power  of  knowledire.  which  i(Mi(hMs  the  siijierior  as  well 
as  the  inferior  con)])etent,  accordin^r  to  jiis  position. 

The  formations  of  infantry  in  a  concentrated  mass, 
do  not  nnile  hattalions  in  one  body.  The  unities  re- 
main inde])e!ident.  The  importance  of  ci>ncentration 
rests  only  in  combined  actions. 

CAA'ALRV. 

Horses  diflcr  in  tlieir  qualities,  size,  &c.,  tlierefore 
equal  qualities  will  be  class:ed,  and  thus  be  obtained — 
light — medium — heavy — cavalry. 

In  theory  any  oood  cavalry  is  serviceable,  but  it  can 
not  exist  without  light  cavalry;  it  C(Uisi(lers  the  horse 
not  a  beast  of  burden,  but  the  means  of  moving  \\  ilh 
rapiility  from  one  ])Iace  to  another.  Man  and  horse 
are  a  unity,  the  brute  force  submitted  to  the  rational 
will,  and  is  only  serviceable  aiul  true  to  its  nature. 

'I'he  horse's  power  is  effective  oidy  by  rapidity,  and 
therefore,  motion  is  the  true  element  of  cavalry.  It  is 
only  offensive,  and  depends  entirely  npon  the  contour 
of  the  ground  ;  it  is  invincible  on  level  ground,  but 


CAVALRY.  27 

useless  in  broken  obstructed  land.  Armament  and 
equipment  are  according  to  their  nature.  Equipment 
is  :  saddle,  bridle,  uniform,  ammunition,  cooking  pots, 
and  shoeing.  The  weight  for  a  horse  depends  upon 
its  size,  the  less  the  better.  Armament :  sword,  lance, 
carbine,  pistol;  the  sword,  curved  or  straight,  is  an 
excellent  weapon.  The  lance  is  visible  from  a  large 
distance,  its  use  requires  in  a  hand  to  hand  fight  much 
skill  for  man  and  horse;  it  is  of  great  value  in  an  at- 
tack. The  fire  arms  of  cavalry  are  considered  of  little 
value;  rifled  carabines  should  be  distributed  to  the 
most  skillful  men  ;  pistols  are  only  for  self-defense,  to 
give  sigiTals,  to  alarm  ;  it  is  important  not  to  encumber 
the  single  man  with  arms. 

THE   FORMATIONS. 

A  regiment  shall  have  only  one  kind  of  cavalry.  If 
single  troopers  are  armed  with  carabines,  they  may  be 
distributed  to  the  platoons. 

Every  squadron  and  platoon  is  subject  to  evcLy 
duty,  and  is  bound  to  do  it.  The  strength  of  a  regi- 
ment may  be  600  to  700  horses,  it  must  be  lead  by 
the  voice  and  independent  in  its  movements.  Cavalry 
is  arranged  in  two  ranks,  forming  files.  Horses  and 
men  are  not  of  equal  qualities,  consequently  the  best 
men  and  horses  should  be  in  the  first  rank. 

The  regiment  should  be  divided  into  four  squad- 
rons, these  into  platoons  and  half-platoons.  A  platoon 
shall  not  have  less  tliat  twelve  to  fourteen  files.     The 


28  CAVALUV. 

depth  of  llio  smallest  division  sliould  not  exceed  its 
breadili,  therefore  it  sliould  liave  more  lliaii  seven  tiles. 

Tiie  fundamental  position  is  tlie  line.  The  regi- 
ment, squa(h-on>  and  platoons,  arc  nmnhered  from  the 
right  to  left.  This  is  the  present  normal  organization 
of  cavalry;  cavalry  is  the  arm  of  movement,  a  very 
slight  impediment  can  cause  any  success  doubtful. 

The  manu3uvres  on  the  battle  field  should  only  be 
executed  by  platoons  or  half-platoons.  lialf-platoous 
whose  strength  is  8-9  files  have  this  disadvantage, 
that  both  wings  cannot  always  be  framed  with  skilled 
men,  and  the  platoon  for  mana3uvring  may  therefore 
be  preferred.  Theory  demaiuls  :  that  the  manunivres 
are  independent;  if  both  wings  of  tlie  half-platoons 
are  well  framed,  without  being  clumsy,  the  move- 
ments, by  the  loss  of  a  lew  files,  will  not  be  checked. 
If  by  any  accident  men  in  the  first  rank  are  lost,  the 
men  in  the  second  rank  fill  up  the  place  of  the  lost- 
ones.  A  platoon  shall  not  have  less  than  1:2-14 
files.  Cavalry,  like  infantry,  forms  line,  column,  open 
order. 

Peculiarities  of  the  line:  it  occupies  in  position 
much  space;  movements  with  large  bodies  are  ren- 
dered difilcull,  if  they  last  some  time;  but  they  allow 
greater  rapidity  than  columns;  the  fire  of  the  enemy 
is  less  efl^ective ;  with  the  increased  speed  of  the  move- 
ments the  flaidvs  become  weaker;  in  regard  to  action  : 
the  greatest  nuiuber  of  troopers  can  be  engaged. 

The  cohiniii  takes  less  space,  the  control  is  easy, 
ground  and  position  are  more  easily  chosen;    but  the 


CAVALRY. 


29 


enemy's  fire  is  more  destruclive,  particularly  in  posi- 
tion; only  few  troops  can  be  engaged;  the  movements 
are  somewhat  slow. 

The  open-order  requires  much  space,  the  control  is 
difficult;  the  enemy's  fire  of  little  efi'ect,  it  is  weak  in 
front  and  flanks,  allows  the  greatest  rapidity  and  em- 
ployment of  the  greatest  number  of  combatants. 

Result :  For  cavalry,  the  line  is  the  only  mode  for 
action.  Columns  and  open-order  are  the  auxiliary 
formations.  The  column  serves  to  concentrate  troops, 
and  to  mano3uvre  on  the  battle  field.  The  open-order 
is  of  little  value — it  may  be  employed  to  scout  in  the 
vicinity,  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  enemy,  to  pursue, 
if  no  closed  body  of  troops  can  be  engaged. 

The  elementary  tactics  of  cavalry  are  principally 
occupied  in  forming  and  deploying  columns.  In  the 
organization  of  a  regiment  are  the  means  for  any  for- 
mations and  change  of  front. 

Charge  is  increasing  rapidity  to  its  highest  point, 
and  giving  the  most  powerful  shock  which  can  be 
exerted  by  a  horse.  The  force  of  cavalry  is  concen- 
trated in  a  charge.  Cavalrv  in  attack  cannot  change 
its  front,  it  goes  straight  on;  great  relaxation  follows 
the  charge;  cavalry  exhausted  and  broken  down  by 
fatigue  is  powerless;  with  the  increasing  speed  are 
the  Hanks  weakened;  consequently  great  care  is  to  be 
taken  of  the  horses,  they  shall  be  properly  employed 
in  regard  to  their  strength. 

The  charge  shall  be  short,  and  the  flanks  protected.. 


30 


ARTILLERY 


It  is  a  jiriiicipal   jioiiit  to  perceive  ilie  proper  nioiiieiit 
for  allack.     Surprise  is  superior  to  aiiv  form. 

The  ladies  of  eavalry  are  most  simple.  The  com- 
maiKJ  is  very  (lidlctih,  in  it  rests  the  secret  of  success. 
Where  tJicrc  is  no  genius^  there  can  never  he  jnaslvr- 
ship, 

ARTILLERY. 

Batteries  are  org^anized  willi  six  or  eight  cannons 
(guns  or  liowitzers)  mostly  combined  -^-^  howitzers. 
Heavy  batteries  are  12  pdrs.,  light  batteries,  flying" 
or  mounted  batteries,  are  6  pdr.  The  12  pdr.  gun 
is  drawn  by  8  horses,  the  6  pdr.  by  6  liorses.  The 
limbered  cannon  is  4  paces  in  breadth.  18  paces 
deep;  to  every  cannon  belong  20  to  30  men;  a 
wagon  Avith  ammunition  is  drawn  by  4  horses. 

Properties  when  in  j)ositionare  :  extremely  destructive 
by  fire:  powerless  in  a  hand  to  hand  light;  its  Hanks 
much  exposed  to  fire.  Jn  motion  without  efiect,  and 
checked  in  some  deijree  by  tJie  ainniuMiiion  rollowino;-. 
In  general  defensive,  and  fullills  the  conditions  only 
satisfactory,  if  the  troops  are  perfectly  technically  in- 
structed. The  large  range  and  the  variety  of  tln^  j)ro- 
jectiles  facilitate  their  employment. 

The  batteries  are  divided  into  half-batteries;  platoons 
with  two  guns,  and  hall-platoons  with  one  gun. 

Artillery  forms  columns  to  concentrate  the  mass,  or 
for  movements  before  dej)loying  in  the  order  of  battle. 
The  intervals  in  position  between  the  guns  arc  12-24 


ARTILLERY.  31 

paces.  The  breadth  of  a  battery  is  consequently  120 
-200  paces. 

The  front  presents  to  the  enemy  but  few  points  to 
be  aimed  at,  the  flanks  more,  but  the  most,  when  the 
batteries  are  lo  be  limbered  up  and  unlimbered,  and 
that  is  therefore  the  weakest  moment  for  about  15- 
30  seconds. 

Artillery  is  not  bound  to  any  normal  position.  The 
various  projectiles  and  modes  of  firing  render  easy  the 
means  for  any  eventualities.  Its  defenseless  state  in 
conflict  with  other  arms  makes  it  necessary  to  be  sup- 
ported by  other  troops.  The  elementary  tactics  of 
artillery  are  the  simplest.  The  principal  problem  is 
to  move  quickly  and  surely,  and  to  be  ready  for  action 
in  the  shortest  time.  Proper  control  in  a  battle  will 
be  decisive. 

The  elementary  principles  here  considered  in  gen- 
eral, lead  to  the  following  points  to  be  observed  in  the 
battle : 

1st.  Ammunition  not  to  be  wasted  without  getting 
any  advantage  by  it ;  to  be  freely  used  if  a  great  result 
is  obtainable. 

2nd.  The  strength  of  every  troop  is  in  its  front ;  the 
weak  points  are  the  flanks  and  rear ;  consequently ; 
strength  against  weakness  ;  the  means — rapidity,  and 
surprise.  The  weakness  of  the  flanks  increases  in 
ratio  with  the  higher  degree  of  movements.  Artillery 
is  ineflicient  in  motion,  and  defenseless  in  a  hand  to 
hand  fight. 

3rd.  Infantry  has  three  modes  of  formations  for  at- 


32 


CAVA  I.  in 


tark.     Artillory  and  cavalry  oarh  only  onr.      Artillery 
lires  in  position;  cavalrv  attacks  in  line — it  follows: 

Infdnfni  aarains/  infantry  :  defensive  :  covered 
ijround;  jirolected  by  reserves ;  lire;  open  order  or 
line;  attack;  column;  nffensivp  :  fire;  the  enemy  en- 
jraired  ;  deceive;  attack  with  fire  supported  ;  attack  of 
the  flanks;  attack  in  the  rear;  the  three  forms  com- 
bined. 

Infanlnj  against  cavaJrjj :  drfensice  :  covered  by 
(Tround  ;  squares;  reserve  fire;  offensive  :  fire;  charge 
with  bayonet. 

Infintry  against  arliUerii :  defensive  :  covered  by 
ground;  open  order;  line  with  intervals;  according 
to  circumstances  open  columns;  offensive:  open 
order;   well  directed  fire;  hand  to  hand  iiirht. 

Cavalry  against  infantry:  defensive:  ifpr^ssible, 
posted  beyond  the  ranj^e  of  musketry;  offensive:  at 
short  intervals,  successive  charges — best  by  divisions 
IbllowiniT  each  other  at  small  intervals;  succored  by 
troops  in  the  flanks. 

Cavalry  against  cava'ry  :  the  llaid;s  ])r()le('lcd  ; 
the  flaidvs  attacked. 

Cavalry  against  artiUerji  :  defensive:  open  line; 
covered  by  ground;  posted  beyond  the  range  of 
fire;  ojfensive  :  open  order;  charge;  hand  to  hand 
fiirht. 


BATTLE.  33 

ARTILLERY  AGAINST  LNFANTRY  AND   CAVALRY. 

Defensive  and  offensive  :  fire  ;  supported  by  suc- 
cor. 

JlrliUery  against  artillery:  covered  by  ground; 
intrenched  position  ;  heavy  ordnance ;  flanking  posi- 
tion. 

BATTLE. 

Fight  is  battle ;  bloody  and  destructive  actions  to 
break  the  physical  and  moral  forces  of  the  adversary. 
Whatever  may  be  the  real  cause  of  a  battle,  the  de- 
struction of  the  enemy  are  the  means  to  succeed. 
Destruction  is  the  tactical  purpose  of  a  battle.  De- 
struction is  not  only  the  loss  of  men  in  a  battle,  but  it 
also  exerts  a  depressing  influence  upon  the  moral 
courage  of  the  survivors.  Principally  in  the  latter  is 
found  the  decision. 

The  loss  of  a  batUe  will  be  perceived  by  the  lost 
ground,  by  the  diminished  reserves,  botli  cause  the 
retreat. 

The  loss  of  moral  power  continues  to  increase  after 
a  lost  batde,  until  the  defeated  troops  have  recovered 
sufficiently  to  resume  the  offensive.  This  moment  of 
extreme  weakness  the  victor  should  take  advantage  of. 
The  losses  in  a  battle  are  the  killed  and  wounded; 
their  number  differs  on  both  sides  not  much.  The 
losses  after  a  battle  are  prisoners  and  cannons  taken 


ol  i!Ai'ii.i:   OF   'J  11!:    ri:r.M:.NT   ti.mi:. 

from  llie  defoatcd  parlies — lliov  are  llio  tropliic.*:  of  the 
victory,  and  the  only  means  of  estimatiiiir  it. 

Tlic  moral  elU'cl  of  a  victory  increases  wiih  tlie 
mass  of  the  forces,  wliich  have  been  entraiicd  in  the 
battle.  This  is  least  in  partial  conllicts,  most  in 
j)itclu'(l  battles,  it  ellecis  not  only  the  army,  but  also 
the  very  existence  of  the  belligerent  connlry  ;  it  is  of 
importance  in  regard  to  tactics,  strategy,  and  politics. 
Those  trophies,  representing  the  victory,  are  to  be 
obtained  on  the  return  from  the  battle  field.  The 
disposition  should  be  chosen  with  the  view  of  getting 
in  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  the  success  will  be  more 
probable  and  more  decided.  The  tactical  and  strat- 
egical  maiKenvres  aim  to  cover  or  to  attack    the  rear. 

Three  elements  are  combined  in  the  victory. 

1st.  The  loss  of  i)hysical  j)ower. 

2iid.  The  loss  of  moral  ])()wer. 

.3rd.  The  confession  of  these  losses  and  the  discon- 
tinuance of  the  war.  This  latter  is  often  the  (jnly 
proof  of  tlie  coiupiest. 

The  loss  of  moral  power  can  cause  tlie  defeat;  the 
contrary  will  animate  to  the  highest  degree  a  victory. 
From  the  simple  retreat  to  the  complete  defeat  are 
maiiv  degrees  of  victory  ;  every  one  is  ol'  imj^ortance 
lor  strategy. 

(JUAUACTF.R  OF   TUF     BATTI.F.    OF   THF.    PRliSEN'r   TIME. 

The  losses  in  a  battle  are  perceived  by  "the  dimin- 
ished successive  engaged  reserves."     In  battles  of  the 


BATTLE    OF    THE    TRESE-NT    TIME.  35 

present  time  large  masses  of  troops  are  formed  in  line, 
and  one  after  the  other;  a  proportional  small  part  of 
them  are  engaged,  they  are  replaced  by  another  sim- 
ihir  force.  Darkness  having  closed  the  conflict,  it 
will  then  be  considered  what  has  been  gained,  what 
lost,  and  by  that  determined  eitiier  to  clear  the  field  of 
battle,  or  to  resume  the  battle  the  following  ihw. 
Tills  character  of  the  battle  is  not  accidental,  because 
the  armies  opposed  to  each  other  are  generally  equal 
in  armament,  equipment  and  skill,  and  often  comprise 
the  whole  force  of  a  country,  and  therefore  a  defeat 
would  be  irreparable ;  they  should  not  be  hazarded 
at  once,  only  tlie  necessary  forces.  The  disposable 
forces,  (tiie  reserves,)  exert  a  continual  influence  in  a 
battle:  they  will  render  ffreat  a(]"'dntao['e  airainst  an 
independent  tactical  body.  By  these  means  are  de- 
termined the  order  of  battle  of  the  present  time,  the 
mechanism  and  the  lead  of  the  battle. 

The  order  of  battle  disposes  of  the  forces  at  the 
will  of  the  commander  to  an  unlimited  extent.  The 
progress  of  the  battle  is  by  successive  engagements, 
and  a  slow  consuming  of  the  forces  on  each  otlier  in 
their  efforts  to  exhaust  the  adversary.  The  one,  whicli 
at  the  end  of  the  battle  has  still  strength  and  disposable 
reserves,  is  the  victor.  The  success  of  battle  at  the 
present  time  is  consequendy  dependent  upon  the  re- 
serves. 

This  characteristic  feature  is  better  expressed  in 
pitched  battles,  than  in  partial  conflicts,  and  still  less, 
if  the  destruction  of  the  enemy  is  not  aimed  at. 


'A6  liATTr-E. 


Sir.NIFICANCn   OF    nA'lTI.E, 


^^■,u•  at  the  present  time  is  seldom  eixied  hy  one 
pitched  battle;  it  consists  mostly  of  several  battles, 
separated  by  space  and  time,  whose  intentions  are 
based  on  variojis  pnrposcs;  they  may  be: 

1st.  The  destruction  of  the  enemy's  forces. 

2nd.  Conquest  or  defense  of  any  locality. 

3rd.  Conquest  or  defense  of  some  object. 

4ili.  Sliam-baltle,  to  entice  the  enemy  to  imj^roper 
dispositions  and  movements. 

The  importance  of  these  purposes  decreases  in  the 
above  mentioned  classiliration.  Battles  of  the  second 
and  third  kind  are;  neirative  for  the  defender,  they 
will  only  he  of  value  if  tliey  facilitate  some  jiurpose 
positive — some  great  success.  It  is  a  bad  sign  if 
negative  battles  are  often  fouirlit.  The  ifiiportance  of 
the  object  to  be  ol)tained  rules  the  battle,  and  conse- 
quently belongs  to  .strategy. 

DURATION    OF    A     HATTLF. 

Duration,  depending  on  relative  resistance,  on  gain 
of  time,  is  important,  and  leads  to  success.  The  du- 
ration of  a  battle  depends  upon  essential  circumstances, 
upon  the  troops  opposed  to  each  other,  u[)on  the  ar- 
mament and  battle-field,  it  has  principally  strategical 
importance.  This  inllnence  exerts  itself  in  tactics,  in 
determining  the  intervals  between  the  tro()])s  and  the 
reserves. 


CATTLE VICTORY.  37 

DECISIOV    OF    A     BATTLE. 

No  battle  of  any  importance  will  be  ended  in  a 
moment,  bnt  in  every  battle  there  is  a  mpiijent  from 
which  it  may  be  considered  as  either  gained  or  lost. 

1st.  If  a  movable  object  whose  possession  has  been 
purposed,  is  lost. 

2nd.  If  an  important  locality,  whose  occupation  has 
been  purposed,  is  lost. 

3rd.  In  pitched  battles,  if  no  ne\v  reserves  will  be  re- 
quired for  succor. 

The  disposition  of  ihe  reserves  is  therefore  of  infin- 
ence  at  the  decisive  moment.  The  events  of  a  battle 
must  determine  the  proper  intervals  between  troops, 
beinir  desisned  for  combined  actions. 


Is  a  strategical  element,  that  renders  success  tlie 
greatest  possible  advantage. 

The  question  arises  here,  what  is  to  be  done  with 
the  victory  ?  The  arms  opposed  to  each  other,  the 
nature  of  the  ground,  the  tactical  form  will  have  to 
solve  it.  Great  success  is  only  gained  by  pitchcf! 
battles^  they  are  tlie  first  means  for  superior,  and  the 
last  means  for  inferior  forces. 

The  pitched  battle  is  superior  in  importance  to  any 
other  event  in  war.  The  highest  qualities  of  the 
Chief  will  be  perceived  in  the  arrangements  of  tlie 
■the  means,  in  proper  dispositions,  in  regard  to  localiiv, 
time  and  troops. 
4 


JS  Ri:iiii:Ai — NUiin    u.vitlk. 

Tlie  only  means  are  tlie  piirs^iiit  of  llie  deftatcd  Tor- 
res, ii  lias  also  its  degrees  of  eiieriry  ;  either  the  troops 
i'oljow  or  press  on,  or  endeavor  to  cnl  oil  the  retreal- 
m(r  enemy.  The  success  is  the  greater,  the  (luicker 
the  enemy  retreats,  the  more  he  is  completely  r<Mited. 

Continued  marches  in  the  nitrht  exert  a  most  de- 
structive eflect  on  rctrealinij  troops. 

KE'i  ul:at. 

It  is  the  most  difficnlt  prohlem  to  be  solved  in  war. 
quick  movements,  scatterini^  of  the  troops  cause  ruin. 
Losses  are  inevitable,  but  they  decrease  in  ratio  if  the 
power  of  resistance  of  the  defeated  trooj)s  is  not  en- 
tirely lost.     Success  rests  in  the  power  of  soul. 

THE     MCIIT    BATTLE. 

The  efiect  of  a  night  battle  is  great,  the  greater,  the 
less  the  enemy  is  prepared  for  it.  The  lead  is  ex- 
tremely diflicult ;  it  is  piefcrahh',  that  only  small  forces 
shoidd  be  engaged,  and  under  the  following  circum- 
stances :  If  the  enemy  is  careless  or  too  daring;  if  the 
moral  power  of  the  enemy  is  broken  ;  if  the  enemy's 
line  is  broken  ;  linally,  under  desperate  circumstances  ; 
but  only  under  the  coiuHlion,  thai  the  enemy's  mass 
is  not  posted  near  antl  succor  cannot  be  ordered  timely 
enough  to  support  the  attacked  forces. 

•fIC.MFlCANCE    OF    NlMERICyVL    SUPKRIORITV. 

The  more  the  forces  equal  each  other  in  corporeal 


RESERVES.  39 

Strength,  and  the  less  the  influence  exerted  by  tlie 
genius  of  the  Chief,  the  more  important  is  superiority 
in  number.  If  it  is  large  enough,  it  will  overcome 
counteracting  circumstances,  and  will  secure  the  vic- 
tory. Its  presence  alone  often  leads  to  success,  with- 
out action.  Consequently  the  maxim  is  to  be  ob- 
served, to  deploy  on  a  battle-field  superior  forces.  If, 
according  to  circumstances,  an  absolute  superiority 
caanot  be  had,  (which  it  is  not  in  the  Chief's  power) 
a  relative  superiority  must  be  resorted  to.  Conse- 
quently superiority  at  the  proper  place.  That's  science 
— correct  estimation  of  the  enemy  and  of  the  battle- 
field;  to  distract  the  enemy's  attention  by  false  move- 
ments, quick  attacks,  animated  activity;  surprise  is 
most  sure  against  superiority.  Consequently:  it  is 
an  evil  to  divide  the  forces  which  renders  any  uniform 
action  in  a  battle  impossible,  and  may  only  be  excused, 
if  demanded,  by  unavoidable  circumstances.  Strategy 
knows  no  reserves,  but  the  more  a  battle  becomes  par- 
tial, and  no  groat  aim  is  in  view,  the  easier  can  be  esti- 
mated tlie  force  which  would  be  required  to  secure 
success. 

RESERVES. 

They  have  two  designs:  to  prolong — to  renew  the 
battle,  and  to  be  employed  against  unexpected  casual i- 
ties.  By  their  support  they  allow  the  troops  to  con- 
tinue the  conflict  with  more  security^  without  being  in 
danger  of  being  cut  ofl^";  to  meet  any  approach  of  the 
enemy,  and  to  correct  any  mishap  in  a  battle,  which 


40  HAT  II.  i: (;R0I  M) SOIL. 

call  never  he  lorsecii.  Tliey  an^  tlic  iiu'aiis  of  injlii- 
enrini:  a  battle.  Heserves  are  iiuli-speiisahle  for  llie  iVee 
will  of  the  Chief,  without  theni.  he  is  eiilircly  cliecked 
in  his  j/laii  of  operations. 

OUDKR    OF     n.MTLE, 

Is  the  arrangement  and  conibinatioti  of  single  parts 
of  the  mass.  Formerly  it  consisted  of  one  mass. 
Modern  limes  broke  these  forms  and  divided  the  mass 
into  parts.  An  army  shonid  not  have  too  few  nor 
too  many  parts — eight  parts  are  to  be  preferred,  divi- 
sions from  10  to  :20,000  men;  divisions  with  4.-0 
brigades,  best  brigades  with  t2,000  to  -5,000  men  each. 

The  cond)i:iali<)n  of  the  three  (l('j)arlments  oi"  arms 
is  represented  in  tlie  })arts  oi'  every  army,  which  are 
designed  to  act  independently,  in  divisions  or  corps 
but  seldom  in  fjrigades.  Tlie  disj)osiiion  of  these 
parts  in  regard  to  eacli  other,  is  not  submitted  to  any 
restraint. 

The  order  of  battle  of  the  j)resent  lime  is  conse- 
quently the  organization  ami  disj)osilion  of  an  army 
in  one  co-operaling  mass  for  battle.  The  parts  are 
so  cond)ined,  that  their  (MUploymenl  is  rendered  pos- 
sible and  completely  at  the  will  of  the  Chief. 

GUOl'.NO    A.M)    SOIL. 

Ground  in  its  general  appeaianct-  is  eill'.er  level  or 
broken,  I'ree   from   obstacles,  or   overgrown,  or  coin- 


ELEVATED    POSITIONS.  41 

posed  of  all  these  kinds.  These  properties  have  a 
most  decided  influence  on  a  battle,  in  regard  to  move- 
ments, free  view,  and  cover  against  fire.  By  this 
influence  the  battle  becomes  more  complex,  and  there- 
fore requiring  more  skill. 

In  undulating  and  covered  ground,  Cavalry  is  more 
or  less  ineflicient;  Artillery  less  on  account  of  the 
great  range  of  its  fire. 

The  superiority  of  Infantry  over  Cavalry  and  Artil- 
lery, is  evident  on  ground,  which  renders  movements 
diflicult. 

IMPORTANCE    OF    ELEVATED    POSITIONS. 

The  attack  is  more  powerful  from  above  than  from 
below,  and  the  effect  of  fire  greater;  the  troops  on 
elevated  positions  observe  better.  The  particulari- 
ties of  ground  render  it  easy  to  cover  the  troops, 
to  deceive  and  to  surprise.  Obstacles  to  any  ap- 
proach hinder  the  employment  of  large  forces.  Some 
formations  of  ground  cover  against  fire,  without  di- 
minishing the  effect  of  fire  at  the  enemy.  The  ground 
makes  tactics  an  art.  That  party  being  in  possession 
of  the  ground  will  have  the  advantage.  Tiie  groinid 
is  the  base  of  life  for  the  weak.  But  it  is  only  the 
means  of  attaining  some  purpose,  the  principal  aim 
is  battle  and  victory.  The  ground  can  be  turned  to 
great  advantage  by  art.  The  auxiliary  means  to  tac- 
tics, particularly  for  defense,  are  the  field-fortification  : 

they  are   indispensable  and  of   decided    importance. 
4* 


42 


nF.FENSR     A\D     ATTACK. 


The  p^roiind  leriiitheiis  llie  duration  of  ihc  halllr,  faciii- 
laies  a  surrcssivo  riii|)l«)\  nient  of  tlie  forces,  and  com- 
pels to  greater  preeaniioi). 

DEFENSi:    A.\D   ATIACK, 

Defense  is  to  resist  and  to  be  prepared  for  at  lark, 
based  on  proper  measures.  'Vhv  l)e<rinning  of  .iciions 
is  attack.  Defense  is  to  maintain,  attack  to  <rain.  In 
general  it  is  easier  to  preserve  than  to  jiain.  Defense 
takes  ailvanta^e  of  localities  u\u\  of  the  contour  of  the 
ground.  Ground  particularly  renders  defense  supe- 
rior in  strength,  even  against  a  far  superior  mass.  The 
defense  is  therefore  considered  the  stronger  form  of 
actions  of  war.  Confined  to  localities  it  can  only 
have  a  nesjcative  pmpose;  if  the  defense  can  free  itself 
from  these  chains,  and  become  morally  and  numeri- 
cally superior  to  the  adversary,  it  can  prosecute 
positive  purposes — it  can  attack  and  ijuin.  Ihil  even 
the  defense  can  obtain  a  negative  purp«)se  by  actions  •. 
and  not  by  remaining  in  a  j)assive  condition.  Any 
lalioiial  ojieralion  of  war  will  reject  pure  j)assiveness. 
The  means  of  aciicMi  for  defense  are  to  fue  froui 
covered  positions. 

If  the  idea  |)redominates,  as  it  has  often  happened, 
that  the  (pialilies  of  the  ground  render  success  easy, 
which  can  oidy  be  obtained  by  troops,  then  a  dispro- 
j)()rlion  of  actions  of  war  aiiscs,  which  results  in  scat- 
tering the  forces,  line  and  cordon,  aiul  a  less  powerful 
attack  will  cause  destruction.     A  defense,  lost  in  self- 


PLAN  AND  LEADING  TO  BATTLE.        43 

delusion,  builds — with  the  qiialiiies  of  the  ground — the 
enemy  a  o-olden  bridge. 

Tlie  attack  is  considered  the  weaker  form  of  war, 
but  wiilj  a  positive  aim.  The  attack  depends  upon 
ground,  if  it  gives  more  than  a  cover  it  is  an  obstacle ; 
its  advantage  rests  in  the  numerical  superiority,  in  sur- 
prise, in  well  selected  points  for  attack. 

The  nature  of  defense  and  attack  compared  wiiii 
the  previous  named  elements  of  conflicts,  shows,  that 
fire-arms  have  the  superiority  for  defense,  and  are  the 
only  means  to  render  defense  possible. 

Hand  to  hand  fight  corresponds  with  attack  ;  the 
latter  will  have  greater  success  if  the  enemy  has  lost 
in  strengtii  and  number;  the  destructive  eflect  rests 
principally  in  lire  arms  ;  the  preparatory  means  of  he- 
ginning  a  battle  are  fire-arms. 

Attack  and  defense  each  has  two  moments,  the  ac- 
tion of  destruction,  and  the  action  of  decision.  The 
first  learns  also  the  position  of  the  enemy,  in  order  to 
take  proper  measures,  and  to  make  the  disposition  for 
furtlier  action,  and  changes  from  the  deploy  to  the 
most  vigorous  attack  of  fire-arms.  This  is  the  pre- 
lude to  the  second  act,  the  decision,  by  hand  to  hand 
fight.     This,  in  general,  is  the  progress  of  a  battle. 

PLAN  AND  LEADING  TO  BATTLE. 

To  concentrate  a  superiority  of  forces  at  the  deci- 
sive point,  must  be  the  principle  purpose  ;  tliis  point  is 
in  the  fianks,  or  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  it  can  be  in 


44  n ATI  Li: — oi  1  i:.\siVE. 

front  only  by  an  improper  disposition  of  the  enemy, 
and  by  scatt('rin«r  liis  forces.  A  direet  attack  at  the 
decisive  point  will  seldom  fiul  of  success ;  the  enemy 
would  direct  his  forces  to  tluit  point,  and  chansre  his 
iVont.  Consequently  the  enemy's  attention  must  be 
distracted,  that  he  may  become  uncertain  about  the 
designs,  and  may  not   coiuiteract  by  proper  measmes. 

The  j)lan  of  a  batilc  contemplates  the  purpose  of, 
and  what  is  to  be  observed  du rini:  its  projrress. 

The  leading  into  battle  unfolds  the  plan,  with  re- 
gard to  reciprocal  actions  of  the  enemy,  which  may 
frustrate  the  plan,  but  then  another  plan  may  be  sub- 
stituted ;  these  possibilities  are  to  be  considered 
beforehand  in  the  dispositions.  I'he  successive  em- 
ployment of  the  forces  are  the  only  means  to  secure 
free  action, — consequently  reserves  and  columns  are 
necessary. 

RTLES    rori   PLANS   OF    I?ATT[.r.. OITKN  SI  V  I-. 


1st.  The  attack  with  tlu;  whole  i'orce  against  the 
enemy's  flanks;  generally  only  to  be  executed  uiuler 
j)eculiar  circiuustances. 

'2m\.  Oblique  and  echelon  formations  allord  chance 
for  success. 

3rd.   I^lrallel  formations  arc  the  worst. 

TIh;  oblique  position  is  of  value,  if  it  ojiposes  to 
the  enemy  superior  forces;  that  position  oidy  is  in- 
deed rejectable,  which  neglects  the  principle  of  supe- 
riority in  forces ;  the  attack  is  only  to  be  given  up 


BATTLE OFFE.NSIVE. 


45 


wlien  the  gToniul  renders  it  inadinisable,  or  wlien  the 
position  of  the  enemy  is  too  strong. 

The  advaiitaoe  of  a  flaidv  attack  seems  to  be  doubled 

o 

if  botli  flanks  be  attacked  at  the  same  time;  but  not 
so,  if  tlie  forces  have  to  be  divided,  unless  every  part 
should  be  strong-  euouirh  to  succeed  indepeudentlv, 
then  it  may  be  attacked  in  any  way;  maxim  is  to  gain 
the  flanks,  to  attack  the  flap.ks.  Exceptions' can  be 
made  if  the  superiority  in  forces  renders  any  success 
probable,  but  also  the  success  becomes  more  decisive 
and  cheaper,  if  the  troops  are  guided  and  engaged  ac- 
cording to  tlie  adopted  maxims. 

The  flank-attack  will  have  a  chance  of  success,  if 
proper  measures  are  taken,  and  if  the  enemy  does  not 
change  his  position  ;  to  prevent  this  : — 

1st.  The  design  is  to  be  concealed  from  the  enemy 
as  long  as  possible. 

2nd.  The  attack  is  to  be  commenced  and  ended  with 
the  utmost  energy. 

The  means  for  both  these  maxims  are  :  movement 
covered  by  ground,  or  in  the  night;  false-attack,  delu- 
sion, menace,  &c. 

Whatever  may  be  the  proportion  of  the  troops  on 
both  sides,  the  rear  is  to  be  gained  to  secure  victory. 

Moral  influence  will  animate  physical  strengtli.and 
may  increase  the  power  immeasurably,  even  in  forces 
of  inferior  numbers;  movements — marcli — :\re  the 
means  to  action,  and  consequently  :  to  know  how  to 
march,  is  a  chief  point  in  the  lead  of  v>ar.  Equip- 
ment— armament,  exert  an  influence,  besides  activity. 


46  n  A 1 1 1.  K — n  f,  f  i:  n  s  i  \  e  . 

The  coiulilions  of  war  are  to  be  conssidrred  with 
tliose  of  ()r<raiiizalion  ;  and  only  a  complete  kiiowl- 
ed<,^e  of  the  dciiiaiids  of  war  can  solve  these  questions  ; 
if  they  are  solved   contrary  to  the   rides  of  war,  it  is 

DEFKNSIVE. 

Defense  is  not  oidy  niiidc  hy  troops,  but  sustained 
by  nature  and  art;  it  should  not  he  passive;  it  must 
allow  of  any  niovi'uiciit.  ^Vllat  a  sham-light  is  tt)  a 
battle,  a  proper  selected  ground  is  for  defense ;  it  en- 
tices the  enemy  to  advance  to  localities,  which  will 
render  his  approaching  most  destructive ;  the  design 
must  be  to  have  the  enemy's  forces  divided,  and  to 
render  impossible  uniform  action  by  his  troc.ps.  Ii;- 
trcnchcd  positions  combined  with  natural  obstacles 
are  best  for  tiiose  purposes,  they  renth-r  dilllcidt  any 
attack,  facilitate  the  movements,  and  protect  the  Hanks. 

ill  ii'gard  to  tlic  (lis|)osiiion  of  balllc,  the  d('fensi\e 
lorccs  should  oiler  the  strongest  resistance  at  the 
j)oint,  where  liie  fight  is  holiest;  this  is  generally  not 
in  their  jiower,  oflen  nol  until  towards  the  close  of 
the  battle. 

Groimd  .-liotdd  be  prolecled  bv  lire,  and  lire  should 
be  covered  b\-  <rroun(l  ;  to  obtain  that,  will  recpiire  in- 
trenc  hmeiit,  which  is  tlu;  true  element  of  defense. 
The  Held-fortilication  is  its  lu-rve.  The  artificial 
groinid  renders  defense  less  dependent  than  ilie  natural, 


MAXIMS DEFENSE ATTACK.  47 

it  is  therefore  superior,  and  best  for  the  positive  part 
of  defense,  for  the  act  of  decision  ;  the  defense  then 
becomes  attack. 

TACTICAL  MAXIMS. DEFEXSE. 

1st.  Co^'ered  positions  for  the  troops. 
2nd.  Not  to  be  surprised. 

3rd.  The  troops  should  be  successively  engaged. 
4th.  The  battle  order  should  have  more  deplli  than 
frontal  breadth. 

5th.   Reserves  should  be  posted  sidewards. 

6th.  There  should  be  no  inattention. 

7th.  Intrenclied  where  no  action  will  be  desired. 

8lh.  In  the  engagements  the  utmost  enerofv  is  to  be 

DO  0» 

exerted. 

9th.  Perseverance  and  energy  in  execution. 
lOtii.  Great  risk  for  a  great  object. 


ATTACK. 

1st.  Sham-manoeuvres,  surprise. 

2nd.  To  deceive  with  few  men,  and  to  attack  the 
point  of  decision  witli  a  large  force. 

3rd.  Flank  attack  w-ith  combined  forces. 

4th.  Long  lines  to  be  avoided. 

oih.  Reserves  ready  for  action. 

6th.  Principal  point  to  drive  the  enemy  from  the 
battle  field. 


JS  KMn.oV.Mr.M     v)I-    TROOPS GROI  .\P. 

7ili.  Tlio  lead  of  ilif  batile  should  not  be  checked 
by  llic  plan  of  operation.  -   ^ 

Sill.  To  prosecute  a  j^rcat  aim,  > 

0;h.   Energy  and  system  in  tiie  execution. 

L>iri.(i\  .m::nt  or  tkoops. 

1st.  T!i(!  fire-anack  precedes  the  hand  lo  hand  fiiiht. 
Arlillei-y  is  for  this  juirjiosc  concentrated  at  the  nioj^t 
imj)orlanl  p<»ints,  suj)p()rte(l  by  infantry;  cavalry  is 
posted  in  the  rear  of  infantry.  Artillery  op(Mis  fire, 
infantry  tleplovs  in  open  order  and  line  and  advances; 
fire  at  the  mass,  finally  attack  by  columns;  cavalry 
follows  closely. 

'2nd.  This  mechanism  of  battle  gives  the  rides  also 
for  liie  order  of  march  of  combined  lrooj)s. 

.'3rd.  If  a  large  mass  is  concentrated,  artillery  and 
cavalry  reserves  will  be  formed. 

•llli.  If  the  mass  designed  for  action  is  ordered  to 
advance  at  the  decisive  moment,  it  must  be  animated 
with  the  utmost  courage. 

f5:h.  Horse  artillery  and  cavalry  are  best  to  attack 
the  rear  and  to  pursue. 

GROUND. 

1st.  The  ground  often  is  an  obstacle  to  approach, 
and  covers  positions  and  movements;  this  is  particu- 
larly important;  the  first  ([uality  renders  easy  only 
defense,  the  second,  defense  and  attack. 


EMPLOYMENT    OF    TROOPS GROUND.  49 

2ii(l.  Obstacles  to  any  ap[)roach  are  important :  (a)^ 
to  cover  flanks;  (b)^  to  strengthen  fronts;  flanks  can 
be  perfectly  protected  by  impassable  ground,  by  rivers, 
swamps,  lakes,  etc.;  any  ground  which  is  not  impass- 
able will  not  give  suflicient  security,  it  requires  troops, 
reserves;  intrenched  positions  will  be  essentially  ef- 
fective. Any  obstacle  in  front  is  of  value,  if  it  renders 
defense  easy  and  approach  difficult. 

Declivities  (or  slopes)  may  be  considered  as  ob- 
stacles;  the  first  line  will  be  posted  at  the  first  height; 
or  this  shall  be  posted  with  skirmishers,  and  the  first 
line  posted  so  far  back,  that  the  enemv,  the  moment 
he  approaches  the  height,  will  be  in  the  most  destruc- 
tive fire. 

Obstacles — rivers,  creeks,  narrow-passes,  etc.,  will 
cause  the  enemy  to  break  his  front,  he  will  have  to 
re-order  his  front,  which  will  check  his  advance.  Con- 
sequently, they  must  be  occupied  in  the  range  of  fire ; 
artillery  400  to  600  paces  distant,  infantry  about  200 
paces.  But  the  resistance  rests  not  alone  upon  the 
fire,  columns  are  in  readiness  for  action  on  a  distance 
from  600-800  paces. 

An  applicable  method  is  also,  that  artillery  occu- 
pies the  ground  in  the  range  of  its  fire,  1000-1500 
paces  from  the  obstacles;  but  this  needs  only  to  be 
done  when  the  obstacles  are  of  some  magnitude. 

Isolated  obstacles  may  be :  (a)^  steep  hills ;  (they 
must  be  intrenched;)  (b),  defiles,  bridges,  dams,  ra- 
vines, by  which  the  enemy  can  approach  only  at  one 
point.     If  the   enemy  should   be  compelled  to  pass 


OU  cHoiNns — vir.i,Aui:s — low  .\s. 

ilnoii^h  a  certain  dt'lllc,  ihe  whole  force  is  jxislcd  at 
the  poiiii  wlieie  the  fire  is  mosi  deslriiclive  ;  a  con- 
.si(lcral)k'  lorcc  slioiild  he  posted  in  the  real  lor  support, 
in  case  the  eiiemv  may  have  sn-ceeded  in  jjassiiijr 
niiohserved  at  some  j)hic('.  and  is  aliaclxi;i<r  from  the 
rear. 

vir.T.AHF.s.  'l•()^^^■s. 

\l  the  forces  arc  to  he  icdicd  upon,  and  ihey  cairy 
oti  tlie  war  with  enthusiasm,  tlie  defense  in  houses  of 
a  few  men  airainsl  far  superior  forces  is  ofien  possihie. 

1st.  It  is  in  <reneral  l)etter  to  occupy  j^ardens  and 
houses  with  skirmishers,  the  approaches  widi  arliUery, 
and  to  post  the  hirirpr  j)art  ol'  the  forces,  foimed  in 
(•(diimiis,  in  the  place,  or  in  the  rear  of  it.  covered  l)y 
some  means,  lint  in  rcachness  for  aciion,  if  the  encmv 
enters. 

•Jiid.  If  those  points  are  desitrued  for  oreal  operations, 
liie  troops  shouhl  he  constantly  on  their  ijuard,  anil 
prcj)ared  lo  support  relrcatiuii  troops,  'riii-se  jxtints 
should  h(^  defended  lo  the  last  exiremity. 

.'^rd.  rndnlalin^-  i;ronnd,  overflown  land,  houses, 
e!c.,  cover  positions  and  moMinenls;  the  troops  are 
formed  in  colunms  lo  Ijicilitate  these  movements. 

The  attackinir  li<K)])s  have  more  dilliculiies  in  cover- 
nii;  iheir  m<irch  than  the  lrooj)s  have  in  difendino-  their 
j)usition. 

•4ih.    I /I   Idhinii  piisilioii  nunj  he  oh.scrml  : 

(I,  One  or  hoth  Hanks  shall  rest  on  im])assable 
•rround. 


GROrxns ATTACK RKTRLa  i'.         Ol 

Z/,  Free  view  in  front  and  flanks. 

f,  The  approaoli  in  front  obstructed. 

r/,  Covered  pof?ition  of  llie  troops. 

r,  Favoralilc  L'Tound  for  retreat ;  it  maybe  nmhi- 
latin<r;   but  the  deliles  not  too  near. 

5.   For  atlack  is  obserced  : 

r/.  To  march  to  the  battle  fiehl  throngli  ijround 
wbicli  renders  (bfFicnlt  any  observation. 

hn  For  atlack,  a  point  should  be  selected,  \vhos(> 
formation  does  not  ren(!er  too  dillicidt  the  movements 
of  the  troops. 

(i.  Too  much  confidence  must  not  be  placed  in  the 
strenijih  of  the  groimd  ;  it  should  never  inckice  to  pas- 
sive defense.  Inaccessible  ground  should  be  avoided, 
and  is  therefore  of  no  value. 

Ground  which  is  an  obstacle  sliould  be  only  occu- 
pied for  partial  defense,  in  order  to  resist  with  an  in- 
ferior, a  projiortional  superior  force;  to  gain  lime — to 
resume  the  ofTensive;  the  victory  may  be  gained  under 
favorable  ciicumsiances,  and  by  pro])er  measures. 


PART  SECOND. 

EMPLOYMENT    OF    THE    TROOPS. 


EATTLCS  O.V  LEVEL UXCOVEREIJ NOT    UXDLLATING 

GROU.ND. 

This  kind  of  ground  does  not  cover  nor  protect 
against  fire,  and  does  not  check  the  movements;  for 
attack  these  properties  are  ftivorable,  they  are  the  true 
elements  for  cavalrv.  The  employment  of  troops  on 
level  ground  is  elementary.  Superiority  in  number  is 
of  predominating  significance,  if  strong  enough,  it  will 
overcome  valor  and  skill.  It  lias  only  to  conquer  the 
intensive  power  which  exists  in  every  troop.  This 
power  increases  geoiuetrically  with  the  increa.-e  of 
the  mass. 

ELEMENTARY    BATTLES. 

Infantry  against  Infantry — in  general. — The  bat- 
tle of  Infantry  has  mostly  three  moments,  dis])Osition. 
deployment,  decision. 

In  disposing  the  forces  we  should  endeavor  to  get 
perfectly  acquainted  witli  the  movements  and  position 
of  the  enemy^bv  forced  reconnoisance. 
5* 


54  EI.EMKMARV    BATTLES. 

Deployment  is  iho  action  of  (Icstniriion,  tlic  tiir- 
atlack;  it  lasts  till  the  intensive  force  of  the  enemv  is 
broken.  Tlieoretirally,  its  duralion  rnnnnt  be  deter- 
mined; besides  nnnierical  slrenijtb,  the  condition  of 
the  troops  has  inllnence. 

It  may  be  observed  :  a  combined  briiradc  can  resist  a 
troop  hall'  superior  in  slrcnijth  for  1  to  1  .\  hours,  a 
division  '2  to  3  hours;  three  or  four  divisions  double 
this  time,  (4-6  liours,)  and  8-10  divisions  four-fold 
iliis  lime,  (16-24  hours). 

The  decision  aims  at  the  final  expulsion  of  the 
enemy  from  the  battle-field,  by  a  hand  to  hand  fiirhl. 
These  tiiree  moments  are  not  expressed  in  all  battles. 
In  conflicts  of  small  |)arties  the  second  moment  is 
often  omitted  ;  the  third  moment  is  not  forced  to  the 
utmost. 

Tiiese  three  moments  are  most  distiiicilv  «'X|)resse(l 
in  battle  of  large  forces,  which  nearly  ecpial  in  com- 
pletion and  number;  in  this  case  also,  a  hand  to  hand 
flight  will  he  avoided,  and  the  field  left  by  one  or  the 
other  j)arty,  before  it  comes  to  a  decision. 

One  parly  may  perceive  in  time,  that  in  the  battle 
nolliinir  will  be  irained,  and  theri^fore  the  battle  will 
be  disconliniied.  Wlialever  the  cnciimsiances  mav 
he,  these  three  njomenls  shoidd  be  carefully  consid- 
ered. Fresh  troops  are  required  for  every  moment, 
and  the  rule  is  therefore  to  have  the  order  of  battle 
divided  into  three;  j)ar!s.  'i'he  stren>rth  of  the  troops 
for  every  pari  dej)ends  u|)on  the  importance  of  these 
m(»meiils.     The  disposition  reipiires  the  least  number 


EI,E3IE\TARY    BATTLES.  55 

of  troops,  the  deployment  the  most.  This  leads  to  a 
certain  rule  in  regard  to  the  numerical  proportion  of 
the  parts,  ^  at  the  utmost  for  the  preliminary  engage- 
ment— advanced  troops  ;  ^  at  the  utmost — deployment 
— mass  ;   \  at  the  least  for  decision — reserves. 

Smaller  parties  have  no  reserves;  in  large  bodies 
the  reserves  are  reinforced.  The  open  order  is  the 
element  of  the  preliminary  engagement — the  line,  that 
of  deployment — the  column,  that  of  decision. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  battle,  the  distance  of  these 
parts  from  each  other  is  determined  by  their  strength  ; 
it  may  be,  from  the  range  of  a  rifle  shot  to  a  half  a 
day's  march  ;  if  the  advanced  troops  are  not  independ- 
ent enough  in  themselves,  they  have  to  be  posted  in 
front  of  the  main  body,  not  farther  off  than  from  300 
to  400  paces;  in  this  positon  |-  to  ;^  of  them  form 
open  order,  the  rest  is  about  80-100  paces  either  be- 
hind the  centre  or  behind  both  wings  of  the  chain  ; 
this  mode  renders  easy  relief,  reinforcement  and  suc- 
cor; the  chain  is  extended  to  the  right  and  left,  to 
cover  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  main  body.  If  the 
main  body  consists  of  some  battalions,  it  may,  accord- 
ing to  circumstances,  be  divided  into  two  battle  lines, 
posted  one  behind  the  other,  with  about  80-120  paces 
interval  between  each  other;  they  are  designed  to  re- 
lieve and  support  each  other  mutually;  therefore  the 
distance  should  not  be  greater  than  is  required  for  regu- 
lar movements. 

The  mass  is  in  line  or  in  columns  ;  the  line  is  rather 


56  r.AirLES  of  si.xr.i.n   hattai.io.x-. 

r«)r  defence,  the  coliiinii  for  allack  ;  tltc  line  is  noi  al- 
\\a\s  cloijed,  if  llie  reserves  are  near,  it  may  have 
some  iniervals.  The  enemy^'s  fire  is  thus  n  iiilered 
less  efleciive,  iis  own  (ire  more  deslrueii\i  . 

The  reserves  should  be  in  columns,  iheir  distance 
from  the  main  hody  should  depend  upon  ihe  mntiial 
streno^th  :  if  the  lrooj)s  are  inferior  in  strengdi.  it  should 
he  200  to  300  paces,  they  are  either  behuui  thecentic 
or  the  flanks  of  the  main  hody. 

With  ihi'se  piineiples  any  fundamental  order  of  bat- 
tle can  be  formed  wiihonl  re;^ard*to  the  ground. 

Tiiis  order  of  battle  is  based  upon  tiie  following 
maxims : 

(a.)  Columns. 

(b.)  Successive  employment  of  the  li-oops. 

(c.)  The  Chief  not  to  be  checked  in  thr"  lead  (hir- 
ing the  progress  of  the  battle. 

(d.)  Tlie  forces  which  are  not  eniraircd  shall  he 
covered  against  the  enemy's  hre. 

f:XAMl'I.ES. 

TtdlfJes  of  Sivglc  BiiffdJimis — dcfcnac^  pnsilinn. 
— ff,  reserves  are  tiol  required;  /»,  the  main  body  may 
be  in  line  or  in  column,  in  order  to  meet  the  enemy's 
ailack, 

i.  7V/r  .Main  Jiodi/  furmrd  in  Line. — 'i'lic  greatest 
ellect  results  from  the  lire  <>f  the  mass.  An  ojicn  chain 
of  skirmishers  at  a  distance  of  300  paces  covers  the 
line;  80  to  100  ])aces  behind  each  wing  of  the  chain 
IS  a  reserve. 


BATTLES RETREAT.  57 

Progress  of  the  Bat'Je. — The  skirmishers  are  en- 
gaged ;  they  are  supported  by  reserves,  they  fall  slowly 
back.  The  front  of  the  mass  will  be  unmasked  as 
soon  as  the  enemy  approaches  witliin  the  ranj^e  of 
fire,  the  skirmishers  rally  on  the  flanks  of  the  mass, 
if  they  are  still  in  condition  to  render  assistance  in 
the  conflict.  The  line  delivers  its  fire  at  the  command 
of  the  Chief,  and  continues  the  (ire  until  the  enemy  is 
about  fifty  paces  distant;  then  charg-e  with  the  bayonet 
or  retreat,  according  to  circumstances  ;  fire  at  the  files 
c  €JJf  the  retreating  enemy;  skirmishers  deploy  and  pur- 
sue; the  first  position  of  battle  line  is  reformed;  in 
this  position  the  battle  line  remains  or  pursues  accord- 
ing to  circumstances.  The  offensive  is  t!ie  last  means 
for  the  defender;  the  strength  and  condition  of  the 
enemy  determine  the  moment,  and  whether  it  shall 
be  resorted  to.  A  battle  can  only  be  discontinued  if  the 
strength  is  not  broken;  the  enemy  must  be  opposed 
by  new  imposing  forces. 

2.  The  Main  'Body  is  formed  in  CoJinnns. — The 
most  stress  is  laid  upon  the  fire  of  the  skirmishers, 
which  is  continued  with  energy;  closed  columns  fol- 
low ;  the  exhausted  are  relieved;  finally  attack  before 
the  troops  are  too  much  fatigued. 

RETREAT. 

The  enemy  cannot  pursue  with  rapidity,  it  is  there- 
fore not  diflicult  to  retreat.    The  main  body  is  covered 


Ob!  i:aiili.s  of   sf:vi:hal   n.vTrAi.KtNs. 

hy  the  cliaiii  df  sikiniiisliiMs,  all  at  ur.cv  rclreat  in 
order. 

.lilac/: — ])osil}on  :  open  order  and  coiuniiis. 

The  8l;iinii:s!iers  engaged  a.id  reinforced;  ilio  ail- 
vanced  troops  of  the  enemy  ."should  be  repwlj^ed  and  re- 
strained l)y  /ire  and  alarm. 

The  main  bodij  :  lire,  if  rccpiired  ;  atiaclv  snpj)orled 
by  the  skirmishers. 

Pursuit  (ir  rclrcnl  :  in  ihc  latter  ea-o  ihe  troops 
fall  back  beyond  the  range  of  the  eiiemv's  lire. 

BAITI.KS    OF     SEVHIIAL     15  ATT  A  I.  ION  S. 

Defense  :   two  ballle-Iines  and  or.e  reserv(>. 

Proirress  of  ihe  Balile.  (lispusiliou. — Thi  advanced 
troops  are  engaged;  they  coniinue  liring  and  lorce  the 
enemy  to  dejiloy,  the  front  will  be  nnmasked ;  llic 
ijiaiji  h.xlij  will  \ni  engaged:  fire,  partial  allacks;  tlie 
balile-lines  have  to  be  relieved,  thi.s  shall  be  ihnie 
at  a  panse  (hiring  the  eniragement,  o"r  in  eond)ination 
with  a  bayonet  eluuge;  ihc  IVt)nt  battle-line  falls  back 
ihnjujrh  the  middle  l)altle-line  ;  irreat  caution  is  to  be 
observed. 

JJulies  if  llie  reserve — They  cover  and  .snj)port  the 
liaidcs;  relieve  the  main  body;  ciiarL^e  with  the  bayo- 
net;  jjursiiii;  relical  in  Ut\\n  of  eciielon^s  or  sncces- 
>ively  in  battle-lines. 

'i'iiis  (Mily  is  to  be  done  if  the  em  my  is  hotly 
})i-essing.  The  intervals  beiweeii  the  batlli'-lines  are 
sniaM.     As    soon  as   circumstances   will  allow,    fresh 


IXl'ANTRY  AGAINST   AND    WITH    CAVAI.RV.  59 

troops  are  ordfred  lo  support  the  nuiin  b()(]y ;  a  rear 
guard  is  to  be  ordered  also. 

AUack — position  :  chain,  support,  columns. 

Disposition  :  forced  reconnoissance ;  dej^loy;  skir- 
mishers; sliam-maiKPuvres ;  the  mass  secretly  to  be 
concentrated  against  the  principal  point  of  attack; 
company  columns  will  render  movements  and  sham- 
niancKuvres  easy;  they  should  be  concentrated  in  pro- 
per time  and  in  readiness  for  attack  in  the  flanks;  fire 
by  the  mass. 

Decision  :  attack  of  the  whole  force,  pursuit  or  re- 
treat. C;ival:y  and  artillery  must  not  be  wanting  in 
the  co-o])eia!i(^n,  if  success  is  to  be  expected. 

IXFANTKY    AGAINST    AND    AYITH    CAVAI.r.Y. 

Level  ground  is  the  element  for  cavalry,  and  that  it 
can  make  gomplcte  use  of  its  rapidity.  Cavalry  is 
four  to  five  times  quicker  than  inOintry,  it  passes  the 
most  favorable  range  of  fire-arms  in  15  to  20  seconds. 
The  fire  of  cavalry  is  inefiective,  its  power  is  the 
charcre  and  tlie  hand  to  hand  fioht.  Infantry  ao-ainst 
cavalry  must  be  defensive  ;  if  cavalry  can  be  preventerl 
jrom  cliarging,  idl  is  gained,  this  only  can  be  done  by 
well  directed  volleys. 

The  formation  of  the  mass  is  of  importance  in  at- 
tack ;  every  weak  point  should  be  reinforced,  no  flanks, 
no  rear,  (ul  all  sides  must  be  strength  and  front;  if 
the  ground  aflbrds  not  protection. 

The  form  in  which  infantry  fights  and  protects  it- 


00  INFANTRY    AGAINST   AND    WITH    CAVAI.RV. 

self  against  ravaliy  is,  tlie  scpiare  and  mass;  nn  con- 
(lilioii  that  this  forniatioM  can  he  done  in  the  quickest 
linio  ;  the  posiiion  uIdhc  rciKh-rs  any  success  favorable  ; 
the  fi-onts  of  the  square  sliouhl  be  shorter,  than  those 
of  the  attacking  columns.  Battalions  form  best  tlie 
squares  of  the  breadih  of  a  couqiaiiy,  or  ol'  that  of  a 
platoon;  companies  may  form  squares  o!  the  breadth 
of  platoons  or  half-j)laIoons ;  smaller  sections  and 
skirmishers  lorm  irregular  masses;  lamer  bodies  than 
battalions  form  l)attalion  scpiares ;  tiiese  s(|uares  in 
position  of  echelons  will  render  mutual  assistance 
possible. 

Tlie  squares  mav  bo  so  combined  that  oiu^  corner 
rests  on  that  of  anollier  s(|uare,  aiul  forms  an  iuuue- 
diale  connection.  This  fornuition  is  of  inq)ortance. 
if  the  enemy's  line  shall  be  broken.  Advanced  skir- 
mishers fall  back  to  the  corners  of  the  s([uares,  or  in 
ihe  centres  of  them. 

Prlnci [ilrs  :  not  to  be  su!j)rised  durinii^  formations 
or  ill  movements  ;  the  mass  ordered  for  action  shall  be 
comj)lelelv  closed  and  united  in  whatever  form  they 
mav  attack;  self-jiossession  ;  supported  by  skirmishers 
as  long  as  j)ossible  ;    the  (ire  as  iwar  as  j)ossi!)l(\ 

Cara/ri/  :  its  ellorts  should  be  to  surj)rise  infantry 
in  its  movements  and  during  its  formations.  No  mat- 
ter by  what  means  this  may  be  done. 

If  this  fails,  infantry  must  be  engaged  in  some  way 
anil  caused  to  fire  at  improper  distances,  and  then  is 
the  moment  lor  charge;  open  order  may  render  easy 


CAVALRY    AGAINST    INFANTRY.  61 

an  attack;  an  unfailing  but  a  dear  metliod  is  quickly 
repeated  charges,  to  prevent  reloading. 

Attack  is  best  against  one  and  the  same  point.  IT 
several  squares  are  formed,  that  square  will  be  at- 
tacked which  can  be  the  least  supported  by  others; 
the  attack  is  executed  in  open  platoons  or  open  squad- 
ron-columns. 

Remarks  :  1st.  Cavalry  attacks  rarely  in  closed  col- 
umns; this  form  has  sometimes  been  applied  in  battles 
of  the  present  time  with  heavy  cavalry  at  decisive 
moments. 

2ud.  Cavalry  should  not  expose  skirmishers  to  trie 
fire  of  infantry,  except  to  entice  or  to  provoke  it; 
alarm,  smoke,  may  often  be  applied  with  some  success. 

3rd.  Rapidity  is  superior  to  fire;  against  an  inferior 
enemy  any  form  is  strong. 

Infantry  attacks  cavalry  very  seldom,  and  requires 
no  further  explanation. 

If  cavalry  alone  or  combined  with  other  arms,  is 
opposed  to  infantry,  it  will  force  upon  it  the  following 
considerations  : 

1st.  Greater  precaution. 

Und.  The  open  order  near  to  the  mass. 

3rd.  The  movements  are  in  some  way  checked. 

4th.  Order  of  batile  is  unfavorably  exposed. 

5th.  The  initiative  actions  are  lost. 

This  result  is  important  in  the  battles  of  infantry, 

if  cavalry  on  one  or  the  other  side  is  the   auxiliary 

troop.     Cavalry  takes  advantage  of  all  weak  points  of 

the  enemy,  and  is  best  for  a  successful  pursuit  or  to 

6 


(V3  INFANTKV    AGAINST   AND   Wl'lH    A  li  I  1 1.I.F,  liV. 

cover  a  rftirat.  Cavaliy,  the  auxiliary  of  iiifantrv, 
shoiilil  be  near  it.  Cavalrv  opjioscd  to  far  superior 
forces  should  be  posted  williiti  squares  of  infantry. 


INFANTRY     AGAINST     ANP     WITH     Ainil.I.F.IlV. 

Artillery  can  only  he  of  value  hv  iir(>  in  position. 
Its  rani:e  of  i'wv  is  from  five  to  six  limes  trreater  than 
the  ranoe  ol"  other  fire-arms  ;  its  irieatesi  elleet  isairainst 
the  mass.  Artillery  is  to  be  j)rotecte(l  by  troops,  which 
are  jjariicularily  ordereci-to  su|)jiort  it.  consisiin>r  in 
jreneral  of  one-hall  t(^  one  s{|tia{lron  of  c:i\alrv.  or 
o!ie-half  to  one  comjianv  of  iiilimirv.  in  this  case  we 
will  consiiler  infantr\'  in  an  oll'ensixc  state  against  ar- 
tillery. 

Inlantrv  will  haxc  to  li^ht  two  enemies,  ilie  cannons 
and  the  support;  the  puri)ose  of  attack  may  be  to 
drive  the  artillery  from  its  position.  The  capture  of 
the  cannons  can  he  ell'ected  only  under  jx'culiar  cir- 
cumsiances. 

^Ma.ri//ts  :  the  skirmishers  advance,  lirint,'-  aL'^ainsi 
men  and  horses,  the  support  follows  in  such  loi-m  and 
direction  as  to  be  the  least  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
lire;  the  support  observes  well  all  the  movements  of 
the  t?nem\''s  sup[)oii,  and  endeavors  to  irain  tiuMlaidvs, 
or  better  still,  to  trc't  between  the  siij)j)orland  thei,'-ims  ; 
if  this  cannot  be  prevented,  and  the  enemy's  skir- 
mishers are  repidsed,  his  artillery  will  limber  up  and 
fall  back.     Artillery  will  have  to  observe  :  fire  aj^ainst 


INFANTRY,  CAVALRY  AND  ARTILLERY.      63 

mass  ;  its  support  is  not  posted  behind  ilie  position  of 
the  guns,  and  shall  not  be  in  the  way  to  check  its 
movements  or  its  line  of  lire;  if  the  enemy's  skir- 
misliers  get  too  tr(MibIesome,  artillery  falls  back;  ar- 
tillery combined  with  infantry  observes  : 

Defense  :  1st.  Well  selected  positions  for  a  destruc- 
tive file. 

2nd.  Not  to  be  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire. 

3rd.   If  the  enemy  attacks,  to  fall  back. 

4th.   Fire  against  the  mass. 

5th.  Not  to  be  separated  without  good  reasons. 

Attack  :  1st.  Positions  which  do  not  check  the  for- 
ward movements. 

2nd.  Not  exposed. 

3rd.  Not  to  approach  within  range  of  fire. 

4th.   Fire  against  artillery. 

0th.  Artillery  concentrated. 

If  artillery  is  combined  with  infantry,  the  fire  con- 
flict is  generally  more  intense,  and  the  duration  of 
the  battle  prolonged,  particularly  in  the  beginning. 

Artillery  and  cavalry  are  of  great  value,  both  in  pur- 
suit and  in  retreat. 

The  security  of  artillery,  in  combination  with  other 
arms,  can  lead  to  unfavorable  positions;  if  posted  in 
the  centre,  it  renders  ditlicult  any  control,  command 
and  movements;  the  position  is  best  on  tjie  wings 
and  supported  by  companies  or  a  battalion. 

The  Batteries  should  not  be  separated,  exceptions 
may  be,  it  long  fronts  and  squares  are  formed,  the  divi- 


G4  ARIII.I.KIiV     A(;AI.NsT     AKIILLCIIV. 

sion   in   platoons  may  then  he  best ;   in   the   roar  of 
halleries  no  troops  sliould  be  posted. 

AUriI,I,i:ilV     AfJAINST     AKTILLKIIV. 

Battles,  in  wliich  ai-iiilt'iy  is  rulinix,  are  not  in  open 
Held;  it  is  the  anxiliary  of  the  oilier  troops;  ibis  ex- 
cludes not  the  maxims  A^r  its  employment ;  these  are, 

1st,  inenieienl  in  movements. 

2nd.   Vulneral)le  in  the  Ihmks. 

3r(l.  l^nfavorably  expostnl  al  the  moment  of  limbcr- 
inir  and  unlimherinir  tlie  i,Mins. 

The  llanks  shall  not  he  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
lire,  but  the  enemy's  Hank  siionld  be  fired  at,  to  force 
the  eneniy  lo  change  his  position  ;  and  to  lire  at  the 
moment  of  limberin<r;  the  position  of  artillery  shall  be 
covered  by  any  obstacles  in  front,  without  being  hin- 
dered in  its  lire;  the  most  favorai)l('  nioniciit  for  lire- 
attack  is  al  a  distance  of  about  -lOO  jiacts.  llic  range 
of  ^rape  shots.  A  greater  number  of  cannons,  heavier 
ordnance,  raj)idity  in  liring,  are  of  imjjortance  ;  if  one 
})arl  is  superior  to  die  other  in  oims  and  calibre,  ihe 
inferior  part  must  manti'iivrc  wilii  skill  and  j)r('caulion 
lo  overcome  the  disadvantage. 

Of  great  value  is  rapidity  in  movements;  Hying  and 
nioiiiiled  arlilleiy  will  have  ihcrcfore  some  advantage 
over  heavy  artillery  ;  by  their  movements  their  ability 
to  lire  (piicker,  to  approach  nearer;  they  are  sullicienl- 
ly  recouij)eiise(l  for  the  latd;  of  heavier  ordnance. 


CAVALRY ARTILLERY.  65 

111  clianginir  positions,  the  guns  may  be  divided  in 
two  parts,  one  continues  firing-,  tlie  other  falls  back, 
takes  position,  and  begins  fire,  then  the  one  in  front 
falls  back,  and  so  on  alternately. 

ARTILLERY    AGAIXST    AND    ^\lTll    CAVALRY. 

Cavalry  against  artillery  is  in  a  decidedly  unfjivorable 
position  as  long  as  it  cannot  get  into  a  hand  to  hand 
figlit ;  its  fire  is  of  no  value  •,  its  rapidity  alone  will  ren- 
der the  accomplishment  of  its  purpose  easy.  An  un- 
expected attack  in  open  order,  supported  by  a  reserve 
which  observes  the  movements  of  the  supportingtroops 
of  the  enemy's  artillery,  is  of  great  importance.  The 
weak  moments  of  artillery  are  rendered  to  advantaue. 

Cavalry  combined  with  artillery,  is  rapidity  with 
the  greatest  eflect  of  fire  ;  notwithstanding  if  op])osed  to 
cavalry,  it  requires  favorable  circumstances,  and  great 
skill  to  turn  it  to  advantage;  the  reason  is,  cavalry 
rarely  halts  in  position,  and  therefore  artillery  will 
have  to  fire  at  cavalry  in  motion. 

Artillery  commences  attack,  and  covers  the  retreat; 
posted  in  the  centre  of  a  battle-line,  it  will  check  its 
movements.  Artillery  opposed  to  infantry,  is  an  ex- 
cellent support  to  break  the  squares,  and  to  loosen  their 
compactness. 

CAVALRY    AGAINST    CAVALRY. 

It  is  most  difficult  to  give  rules  which  cavalry  against 
cavalrv  will  have  to  observe. 
'  6* 


66  CAVAi.ifV  ai;ai.nst  cavalry. 

\>\.    Its  rapidity  is  jrieat. 

*Jii(l.  lis  wcaknoss  in  the  llanks  iunrascs  in  ratio  as- 
its  iVoiilal  sirciiL^lli  increases. 

'3r(l.  Tlie  rliarire  jroes  stiaii^lit  on,  and  the  dircclion 
cannot  be  clian<red  (liirin«r  its  forward  movements. 

4tli.  In  one  moment  extremely  powerful,  in  the 
other  totally  e.xhaiisted. 

Therefore,  it  may  l)e  observed  : 

Isl.  'Vo  sii!j)ri>e  in  a  moment,  when  the  least  re- 
sistance can  he  maile. 

2nd.  Front  attacks  are  t(^  he  avoided,  principally 
those  with  sliorl  fronts. 

3rd.  Tlie  llanks  constantlv  covered  hy  tro(>j)s  hein«^ 
ordered  for  these  duties. 

4th.  The  moment  for  char^re  properly  selected. 

5ih.  The  troops  as  litth'  fatiufued  as  possible. 

All  this  is  at  the  will  of  the  connnandiuij olVicer,  but 
the  moments  change  <[uickly  ;  it  is  more  dillicull  to 
lead  cavalry  than  any  other  arm  ;  on  level  irround, 
tj'oops  of  (Mpial  excellence,  and  the  Ciiiefs  jiossessins:^ 
e(}ual  intelligence,  the  chance  of  success  will  he  on 
that  side  which  is  superior  i;i   number. 

Cavalry  can  l)e  emjiloNcd  to  attack  at  the  same 
time,  front  and  Hanks. 

Res(M"ves  follow  at  a  |u-ope;-  distance  to  support  the 
llanks  ;  (laiiking  att;ick  is  ol'  great  advantage,  tiie  eche- 
lon-form leads  to  it;  if  the  grouml  is  not  favorable 
for  flanking  movements,  movements  in  echelons  must 
be  resorted  to.  The  formation  in  line  is  best  for 
attack ;  rule  is  to  spare  the  strength  of  the  troops  for 


I 


INFAXTRY,  CAVALRY  AND  AKTILLERV.      67 

Uie  proper  moment-,  sham  attacks  will  cause  the  enemy 
lo  take  wrong  measures;  in  pursuit,  precaution  ;  all 
movements  most  simple;  cavalry  must  be  perfectly 
skilled  in  performinij  its  duties,  i[  it  is  to  be  of  value. 

Attacks  of  cavalry  have  two  moments  :  disposition 
and  decision — beginning  and  ending  ;  a  proper  disposi- 
tion will  secure  success;  the  enemy  should  be  enticed 
to  improper  movements ;  whilst  the  real  designs  are 
concealed  ;  liglit  cavalry  and  open  order  are  tlie  best 
ineans  for  this. 

Cavalry  attacks  quick;  and  tlie  quicker  the  most 
complete  the  success;  larger  bodies  have  to  mantjeuvre 
with  a  front  and  a  rear  battle-line  in  conformity  with 
mutual  movements  and  actions. 

INFANTRY CAYALRY ARTILLERY. 

These  three  arms  combined,  are  the  strongest  and 
m<^st  independent. 

Cavalry  and  arlillery  combined  mith  iiifonlry  :  1st. 
5f  the  parts  of  infantry  (for  instance  divisions)  are 
independent. 

':hu\.  If  smaller  forces  receive  orders  of  suel^  impor- 
tance that  it  is  necessary  to  strengthen  them. 

In  both  cases,  one  squadron  of  cavalry  is  ordered 
Co  a  battalion;  for  larger  bodies  the  slrenglh  of  cav- 
alry Vv'iil  not  exceed  otie  regiment;  artillery  is  rarelv 
ordered  more  than  one-half  or  one  battery. 

Both  these  arms  are  in  the  capacity  of  auxili- 
aries of  inf\\ntry  ;   their  duty  is  to  assist  infantry  in 


68 


CAV.M.iiv — AU1  ir.i.r:KV, 


«'l)lainiriir  '>•''  •'liiu  '>>'  aiiin-k  ;  in  rases  whcro  iiifantrv 
is  not  sti()n<r  cnoijfj^h  to  snccocil  by  its  own  stioiiglli; 
the  point  o\'  (lopcndcncf  shall  be  sliicllv  ob^icrved ; 
the  duties  ()f  llic  auxiliaries  are: 

AUncI: — cavulni :  to  scout,  to  support  ibe  skirmish- 
ers and  the  attaekinir  colunnis;  under  certain  circum- 
stances, it  may  maiueiivre  in  the  llanks;  it  covers 
retreat  and  j)iusues. 

^■irtillcnj :  the  enemy's  ariillcrv  lired  at;  theaftack 
prepared;  in  the  pursuit  assisiinir;  tiie  retreat  cov- 
ered. 

DcfrnbC — cavalnj  :  it  will  cover  the  llaidvs.atid  will 
take  advanta<^e  of  imj)rojH'r  measures  or  weak  mo- 
ments of  the  enemy;  the  atlackini^  columns  shall  be 
su])portod  ;   the  j>ursuit  resisted;  the  retreat  covered. 

.IrllUcri/:  lli<>  allackinir  mass  of  the  enemy  lired 
at;    the  pursuit  resisted;   the  retreat  covered. 

In  general  :  the  auxiliaries  shoidd  not  be  too  jnucb 
fatigued  before  tlie  batlle  beconx's  decisiAc;  the  am- 
munition of  artiller\'  shall  not  be  wasted  without 
having  some  pm-pose  in  view.  A  further  advaiitai^^e  of 
combined  arms  is,  that  ihe  fnc  is  more  destructive ; 
the  reconnoisance  is  rendered  easier;  the  llanks 
are  belter  protected;  tl)e  llanks  can  he.  more  easily 
turned;  iidanlry  in  a  slale  of  great  relaxation  can 
be  easily  siij)porte(l ;  mutually  greater  j)recaution  can 
be  observed;  the  retreat  and  jiursuit  will  be  done  by 
luiiform  action,  and  will  he  essentially  sujiporled. 


MECHANISM  OF   THE   ORDER  OF   BATTLE.  69 

RULES    OF    DISPOSITION DEFENSE    AND    ATTACK. 

Infantry:  mass  formed  in  line  or  C(:»lumns  wilh  ad- 
vanced troops;  artillery  (in  the  rear  of  this  mass  in 
column)  covered  in  rear  of  tlie  mass;  cavalry  covered 
in  rear  of  artillery. 

Meduinism  of  the  order  of  bailie  ;  defense  : 
Artillery  commences  firing  as  soon  as  the  enemy 
advances  within  the  range  of  its  fire;  its  position  is 
in  the  battle-line,  on  some  point  from  where  its  fire 
will  be  most  destructive ;  it  is  of  value  to  change  the 
position  as  little  as  possible;  and  to  remain  concen- 
trated. The  front  of  the  first  battle-line  should  be  pro- 
tected by  grape  shots;  if  the  battle-line  extends  itself 
more  than  500  paces,  the  artillery  should  be  divided  in 
unequal  parts;  the  positions  are  better  on  the  wings 
than  in  the  middle ;  cover  by  ground  is  most  import- 
ant; the  intensity  of  the  fire  depends  upon  the  critical 
moment  of  the  battle. 

Cavalry  in  general  is  in  reserve  and  in  readiness  for 
attack  ;  smaller  troops  scout  on  tlie  flanks  ;  the  enemy's 
cavalry  is  rarely  attacked  ;  the  infantry  should  be  sup- 
ported to  the  utmost;  the  enemy's  infantry  will  be 
attacked  (successively)  at  proper  moments;  for  in- 
stance if  an  advancing  column  halts  or  deploys  for  fire 
action,  or  retreat;  the  enemy's  troops  must  be  pre- 
vented from  turning  the  flanks;  the  retreating  troops 
should  be  pursued  ;  your  own  retreat  covered  ;  in  all 
these  cases  the  auxiliaries  are  to  support. 


70         Mi:(  iiAMs.M  OF  I  in:  ounr.K  of  nATii.n. 

./illach'. — Cavalrv  reromioitrriiiL^ ;  thf^  cnoniyV  ;nl- 
vanccd  troops  should  hv  it'|nils(Ml  l)y  ligl»l  iroops,  sup- 
ported hy  cavalry;  artillery  will  sil'.Mice  the  (Miciny's 
artillery  ;  the  main  body  advances  for  attack,  accom- 
panied l>y  artillery  to  the  range  of  grape-shols ;  lire 
at  the  niMss ;  it  repulses  open  and  closed  lines;  skir- 
mishers deploy  supported  hy  columns ;  the  attack 
hecomes  partial;  cavalry  is  near,  and  lakes  advanlajre 
of  (avorahle  accidents  ;  if  the  mass  of  tlu^  enemy  falls 
l)ack,  cavalry  pursues;  during  these  actions  the  other 
forces  occupy  the  enemy\s  position.  If  the  attack 
should  he  repulsed,  cavalry  will  delay  the  enemy  in 
his  attacks,  that  the  repulsed  troops  may  restore  their 
order.  If.  with  the  attack  on  the  front,  the  Hank  can 
he  attacked,  then  for  tliis  purpose  one-fnurlh  t)f  the 
streu^lh  of  forces  is  ordered. 

:sio\ I'. M  i: N  r s   i  \    i; a  i  1 1 . i: . 

JMd.r'iDis  :  The  trooj>s  heini;  comj)l('tely  ready  for 
aclioH,  will  lake  the  shortest  route  to  the  hallle-licld  ; 
the  colunms  and  maiui-uvi-es  with  single  ])arts  will 
render  easy  the  j)urpose  ;  tlie  dilK'renl  arms  will  sup- 
port each  other,  if  one  h)iius  a  sironir  j)osiiion,  the 
other  will  resort  lo  a  weak  form,  as  necessity  recpiires. 

m:THEAT. 

The  retreat  is  llie  imxt  (hllicult  problem  afteralost 
battle;   besides  the  uiifavoiable  siiualion  in   regard   to 


RETREAT PURSUIT.  71; 

the  enemy,  tlie  (lepressed  state  of  the  troops  is  aggravat-- 
ing;  the  troops  must  be  animated  to  self-confidence  by 
anv  means;  the  enemy  mnst  be  resisted  to  the  utmost. 

Consequently:  the  troops  must  ntit  be  separated,  and 
in  no  way  checked  in  their  retreat;  infantry  formed 
in  columns;  skirmishers  in  the  intervals  ;  the  artillery- 
manoeuvring.  Cavalry  attacks  according  to  circum- 
stances; if  the  enemy  pursues  hotly,  the  retreat  willi 
be  in  batile-Iines,  artillery  combined  and  supporting  iui 
the  successive  retreat,  it  takes  po«:ition  on  the  right  or- 
left  llank  of  the  second  or  middle  battle-line,  (or  ar- 
tillery may  be  divided  and  a  part  ordered  to  each  bat-- 
tle-line.) 

Tiie  rear  guard  wiliaflord  the  security  if  the  ground 
is  favorable  ;  the  enemy  in  his  pursuit  must  be  checked, 
that  the  main  body  may  gain  time  toi  retreat  in  such 
order  as  circumstances  will  allow  ;  and  to  have  the 
communications  with  the  different  troops  unintersected. 
Movements  and  resistance  must  be  done  at  proper  mo- 
ments; troops  shall  be  placed  in  ambush;  the  lead 
becomes  most  important,  it  requires  particular  caj)aci-- 
ties  of  genius  and  heart;  best  to  retreat  in  the  night. 

PURSUIT. 

The  enemy  must  be  constantly  alarmed  in  rear  and' 
flanks,  he  will  thereby  he  forced  to  greater  haste  in 
his  retreat,  and  be  thrown  into  greater  disorder,  which 
produces  great  physical  and  moral  weakness. 


iKPUisi:    AM)   AM  nrscADr.. 


BRKAKI.XC;  THKOrCill    1  M  i:   r..M:MV 


1.1  m: 


Confidence  niiisi  not,  even  in  the  most  (listressiMf:^ 
situations,  he  h)sl,  ilie  utmost  must  he  done. 

Infuntrv  eohimns  eonrentiale  themselves  into  wedjje 
form;  aitilU'rv  joins  the  troops  at  projicr  jxiinls,  the 
wagons  will  he  taken  in  the  middh;;  eavalry  ojiens 
the  way  for  the  van-fruaids  ;  if  cavaliy  is  not  slrong^ 
enougii,  it  must  he  taken  in  \\\o  middle  of  the  ci^lumns  ; 
no  precipitation  ;  ail  must  he  well  considered;  night 
is  best  to  succeed. 

SIRPRISE    AM)    AMIirsCADE. 


On  level  ground  a  surprise  is  only  possible  in  ihe 
night;  surprise  will  render  advanlaiie,  because,  the  at- 
tacked troops  are  in  a  weaker  tactical  and  m  a  weakei- 
moral  state;  if  any  success  can  he  exj)ecte(i,  the  sur- 
l)rise  must  be  kept  secretly  ;  the  main  attack  is  against 
llanks  and  rear;  sham-attacks,  by  (•ond)inati()n  of  all 
the  troops,  may  be  important.  Tiie  lead  of  a  night 
battle  is  somewhat  dilllcidt;  therefore  oidy  propor- 
tionally small  forces  will  be  employed. 

Jlmbuscadcs  are  excellent  means  in  retreat,  to  ren- 
der the  pursuing  enemy  more  cautious;  they  are  of 
value,  if  the  enemy  is  careless,  or  the  ground  too 
rough,  to  allow  him  a  careful  reconnoissance  and  a 
quick  deployment. 


BATTLES GROUND.  73 

BATTLES  IN  COMRINATION  WITH  GROUND. 

Ground  changes  from  the  j^entle  slope  to  the  inac- 
cessible bluff,  either  covered  or  intersected,  or  both ; 
these  peculiarities  designate  the  character  of  the  coun- 
try or  ground;  they  are  :  rolling  huid,  hilly-land, 
mountains,  flat-land,  etc. 

These  peculiarities  of  ground  have  influence  on  the 
employment  of  troops,  they  render  the  movements 
difficult,  they  conceal,  they  cover  against  fire.  The 
effect  is  not  the  same  for  the  different  arms;  artillery 
and  cavalry  have  more  difficulties,  infantry  less. 

Undulating  and  covered  ground  is  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent the  theatre  for  infantry,  whereas  cavalry  and 
artillery  are  entirely  checked  in  their  actions;  the 
three  arms  combined  have  the  greatest  strength,  and 
it  must  therefore  be  considered,  which  ground  may  he 
selected  for  employment  of  the  combination  ;  but  such 
a  choice  is  seldom  allowed  by  the  prevailing  circum- 
stances; the  problem  is  to  employ  only  those  troops 
which  best  suit  the  present  battle  ground,  and  the 
others  to  be  posted  in  reserve ;  but  in  such  a  position 
and  state  of  readiness,  that,  if  in  the  progress  of  the 
battle,  the  ground  changes,  and  will  admit  their  em- 
ployment, that  it  can  be  done  without  loss  of  time — 
tliaVs  tactical  art. 

The  peculiarities  of  ground  render  the  inferior 
forces  strong,  if  they  understand  how  to  use  them 
properly ;  but  it  is  only  of  value,  if  the  space  is  in 
proportion  to  the  forces ;  any  disproportion  turns  to 


74  ItATlLK^ GROUND. 

(lisa(lvaiilao[P ;  a  disproportion  will  exist,  for  instance: 
if  llie  prinri|i!('  of  l)atile-or(!er,  the  roliunn  forma- 
tioii  is  sacrificed  to  the  line  formation.  It  iuis 
also  essential  influence  on  the  lead  and  control  of 
the  battle;  the  uniformity  of  actions  is  more  or  less 
lost,  by  the  aggravated  control  and  the  aj^gravaled 
movements.  The  single  parts  heconje  more  or  less 
independent.  The  accidents  and  cliances  of  the  bat- 
tle are  entirely  in  their  power;  trilling  eventualities 
often  cause  decided  consequences.  The  leader  can 
only  exert  an  influence  on  the  progress  of  the  battle, 
if  he  can  employ  new  forces;  but  their  employment 
may  also  involve  difliculties.  Under  such  changing 
circumstances  the  numerical  superiority  loses  to  a 
certain  extent  its  importance;  the  efliciency  of  the 
troops  and  moral  power  will  excel;  with  perfectly 
reliable  troops,  that  can  be  executed  on  ground  pro- 
perly rendered  to  advantage,  which  never  could  be 
expected  even  on  level  ground;  it  follows — that  the 
efliciency  of  the  troops  forms  the  base  of  the  com- 
binations of  battles. 

For  battle  order,  on  grounil  ol"  peculiar  formation. 
is  to  be  considered  : 

Defeiis". — The  shortest  fronts  possible;  the  flanks 
resting  on  inaccessible  ground ;  the  approaches  ob- 
structed ;  tiie  position  covered  ;  the  movements  in  the 
rear  in  no  way  checked;  the  positions  intrenched; 
the  single  parts  in(le])endent ;  artillery  protects  the 
approaches;  strong  reserves;  proper  measures  to  be 
taken  to  prevent  any  attack  in  the  retx 


BATTLES BROKEN  GROUND.  75 

Jlttack. — Light  infantry  and  artillery  deploy  ;  heavy 
fire  against  the  approaches ;  important  positions  of 
artillery  are  to  ihe  utmost  defended  ;  if  the  enemy  can 
be  repulsed  from  positions  of  importance,  they  are  to 
be  occupied;  cavalry  supported  by  infantry;  sham- 
manoeuvres;  attack  in  the  rear;  the  route  for  retreat 
should  be  secured. 

If  the  peculiarities  of  the  ground  are  considerable, 
it  may  be  observed  : 

Attack. — Open-order  in  undulating  ground  ;  the  re- 
serves are  drawn  near  the  columns,  the  nearer  the 
troops  approach  open-land ;  the  approaches  will  be 
protected  by  artillery;  cavalry  ordered  in  front  for 
action ;  artillery  and  infantry  will  force  the  approaches 
to  undulatino-  orround. 

o    o 

Defense. — The  approaches  to  undulating  ground 
will  be  occupied;  cavalry  and  artillery  will  have  to 
support  in  open-land ;  the  positions  intrenched ;  the 
roads  rendered  impassable;  communications  betvveen 
the  troops  established  ;  ground  changing  considerably 
in  its  contour  requires  another  mode  of  attack ;  the 
duties  to  be  performed  by  each  part  are  therefore  to 
be  changed  ;  during  these  moments  the  troops  are  in  a 
state  of  weakness,  the  defending  party  must  prolong 
this  moment  as  far  as  possible,  to  check  the  assailants. 

BATTLE  ON  BROKEN  GROUND. 

Gently  undulating  ground  checks  the  movements 
of  the  troops  very  little,  or  not  at  all ;  it  renders  easy 


/b  HATILKS — HltOKE.N     GRfJl.ND, 

rover  lo  llie  posting  of  troops  in  irscrvp  sonic  tlistanci 
in  rear,  and  to  arlillL'ry  in  taking  position  ;  the  move' 
nienls  can  be  executed  without  being  observed,  and 
renders  surprise  easy.  In  general  tlie  em|)Ioynient  of 
the  troops  is  elementary.  On  both  sides  are  advantage 
and  disadvantage  etjiially  ;  tlie  superiority  in  ninnber 
will  prevail  at  the  impending  nn^menl.  Attack  is 
superior  to  defense;  tlial's  not  tlie  case  in  cavalry 
battles,  tlie  peculiarities  of  cover  can  be  luiiied  to  ad- 
vantage.     Activity  leads  to  victory. 

Isolated  hills  can  l)e  turned  to  advantage  only  by 
intrenchment ;  they  comj)rise  a  small  space  with  an 
extending  Iront,  which  must  be  attackeil. 

Slopes  render  movements  di/Ticult,  particularly  lor 
large  and  closed  bodies  of  cavalry  and  artillery.  A 
sudden  unexpected  attack  becomes  impossible,  they 
are  therefore  only  of  defensive  value. 

If  the  inclination  of  the  slope  allows  troops  to 
march  up  the  hill  in  closed  order,  or  so  that  it  can  be 
fired  at  with  efTect,  the  iire-line  may  be  posted  on  the 
crest  of  the  slojie,  and  therefrom  the  lire  commenced; 
if  the  inclination  is  too  sleep,  and  it  caniiol  be  iired  at 
with  effect,  the  skirmishers  will  form  a  chain  along 
the  crest,  and  the  fne-line  takes  position  some  distance 
in  rear,  that  llie  enemy,  the  moment  he  aj)j)i()aclies  in 
the  range  of  musketry,  will  be  received  with  an 
overwhelming  volley,  "^riie  position  of  infantry  may 
be  in  this  case  about  1:20-2U0  paces,  artillery  400-600 
j)aces  in  rear  of  the  crest;  columns  are  in  reserve  to  at- 
tack the  enemy  ;  the  pursuit  should  be  made  very  cau- 


BATTLES COVERED  GROUND.  77 

tioiisly  and  should  not  go  farther  than  to  the  crest  of 
the  slope.  The  enemy  may  attempt  by  a  false  retreat 
to  turn  suddenly  upon  the  pursuing  troops,  and  by 
this  manoeuvre  gain  the  top  of  the  hill ;  cavalry  under 
certain  circumstances  may  be  employed  to  support 
infantry;  roads  for  retreat  must  be  rendered  practi- 
cable. 

Attack — Attack  from  the  rear;  tlie  crest  of  the 
slope  should  be  occupied  by  skirmishers  ;  columns  fol- 
low ;  sham-attacks  by  skirmishers ;  the  enemy  will  be 
enticed  to  pursue,  and  by  turning  suddenly  upon  him, 
tiie  top  of  the  hill  may  be  gained;  how  far  artillery 
and  cavalry  may  be  effective  depends  upon  circum- 
stances. 

If  the  height  is  gained  and  the  enemy  repulsed,  his 
return  may  be  expected — great  effort  should  be  made 
to  occupy  the  crest;  perhaps  a  quick  and  vigorous 
attack  to  a  greater  distance  may  be  risked,  to  frustrate 
the  enemy's  aim  to  retake  the  height. 

BATTLES  ON  COVERED  GROUND. 

Woodland. — It  covers  and  protects  against  fire,  it 
renders  movements  difficult,  intercepts  communica- 
tions, checks  free  view,  control,  impedes  cavalry  and 
artillery,  and  aggravates  the  lead  of  the  battle.  The 
greater  or  less  significance  of  the  influence  depends 
upon  the  special  condition  of  the  woodland ;  rough, 
thickly  grown  woodland  without  roads  is  favorable 
7* 


78 


PR  K  PARA  I  IONS    K«)R   DF.FE.NSE. 


for  retrpat;  iho  dcfeiise  is  ronlined  in  tliis  case  to  the 
approaches.  LaijLJcr  hochcs  of  troops  may  take  posi- 
tion ill  the  rear  of  ihe  woodland  and  attack  the  enemy 
if  he  deploys  from  the  woods  ;  they  are  in  this  regard 
an  ohstacle  to  approach  ;  open  woods,  as  ihev  are  in 
cultivated  countries  inleicejjicd  w  iih  roads,  are  of  im- 
portance in  the  haltles  of  the  present  time.  Those 
troops  wliich  are  in  possession  of  the  woodland  will 
have  the  advantaye  ;  this  is  important  for  tiie  defender; 
he  should  have  the  woods  in  his  rear,  or  he  sjioukl 
avoiil  it  entirely. 

Properties  of  t lie  iroodland. — Ground:  level  and 
cleared;  the  enemy  cannot  approach  unoI)S('rvi  il. 

Borders  of  woodland. — Their  form,  either  j)rojecl- 
inir  or  re-enleriniT  angles;  thickly  and  heavily  lim- 
bered; some  bushy;  impenetrable  parts;  fences, 
ditches. 

Williin  the  woods. —  Hard  ground;  j)iaetiea!)le  roads, 
open  timber,  undergrovvlii. 

PRKPAUA'IIONS    FOR   DF.FF.NSE. 

The  ;ij)i)roaches  rendered  impassable;  j)arapets  for 
artillery;  weak  positions  intrenched;  salient  j)arts 
obstructed,  at  pioper  ])oints  the  woods  cleared  ;  roads 
rendered  practicable  for  artillery  and  oilier  tro()j)s. 

Disposition  of  the  trooj)s. — The  bordcns  of  wood- 
land are  the  j)rincij)al  points,  and  should  be  defended  to 
the  utmost;  cavalry  cannot  be  enii)l()yc(l,  and  should 
therefore  be  posted  in  rear,  or  should  guard  the  Hanks. 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  DEFENSE.  79 

Jlrtillpry. — Posted  at  the  entrances,  and  so  that  it 
can  sweep  all  along  the  borders ;  cross-fire  on  tiie  sa- 
lient-angles. 

Iiifantry. — A  covered  chain  of  skirmishers;  the 
salient-angles  and  entrances  deserve  particular  atten- 
tion ;  snj)ports  and  reserves  of  closed  companies,  and 
at  hand.  The  main  reserve,  concentrated  or  divided, 
in  or  behind  the  woods ;  the  reserves  are  ^-\  of  the 
whole  foice,  according  to  the  extent  of  woodland  ; 
upon  this  depends  the  strength  of  the  chain.  The 
front  is  divided  into  independent  parts;  turnpikes  and 
cross-roads  are  strictly  guarded. 

Battle. —  Reserves  have  to  support ;  tlie  troops  on 
the  fire-line  should  not  support  eacl»  other  ;  the  borders 
unmasked  ;  charge  with  bayonet  against  the  entering 
enemy;  he  should  be  driven  out;  no  pursuit  in  the 
open-field  ;   the  first  fire-line  of  defense  reformed. 

Retreat. — Care  is  to  be  taken  to  get  the  artillery 
in  the  rear;  within  the  woods  the  resistance  is  to  be 
continued,  if  possible,  under  tlie  cover  of  the  woods; 
the  communication  of  the  troops  should  not  be  inter- 
cepted;  no  haste;  ambuscades;  in  the  rear  of  the 
woodland  artillery  and  cavalry  is  posted,  to  support 
the  retreating  troops ;  the  enemy  must  be  prevented 
from  debouching  from  the  borders;  fire  willi  grenades. 

Attack. — Reconnoissance;  attack  in  the  rear ;  well 
selected  points  for  attack,  the  salient  parts  are  prefer- 
rable,  also  openings;  the  approach  by  all  means  to 
be  covered  ;  chain  of  skirmishers,  sudden  attack  or 
alternate  advance;  reserves   ready  to   succor  in   the 


80 


PRF  PA  RATIONS    FOR    PEFE.VSE. 


shortest  lime;  company-columns  actinjr  simultane- 
ously for  the  same  purpose;  sliam-figlit ;  vijrorous 
bayonet  charge  of  all  troops. 

If  artillery  can  he  employed,  it  fires  at  the  enemy's 
artillery,  particularly  ajjainst  that,  which  protects  the 
position,  selected  for  attack  ;  irronades,  irrapc-shots 
will  be  fired  against  the  borders ;  the  borders  occu- 
pied;  the  columns  concentrated  near;  systematical 
advance;  the  troops  deploy  on  the  borders,  and  ad- 
vance in  complete  order;  the  most  passable  roads 
will  be  occupied,  the  troops  not  intercepted ;  precau- 
tion ;  artillery  in  front  of  the  columns  on  the  main 
roads;  before  leaving  the  woods  the  troops  are  to  be 
concentrated  and  re-formed  for  further  action. 

Houses. — If  the  troops  are  brave  and  fi<jht  with  en- 
thusiasm, a  few  can  defend  themselves  in  houses 
against  a  far  superior  force. 

If  the  men  cannot  be  relied  upon,  it  is  better  to 
occupy  the  houses  and  gardens  with  skirmishers,  and 
the  approaches  wiili  ariiMery;  the  greater  part  «if  the 
troops  \  to  ^  will  be  posted  in  columns  within  the 
place  or  in  the  rear  of  it,  in  order  to  charge  with  the 
bayonet,  if  tiie  enemy  enters.  Houses  of  soliil  struc- 
ture, are  of  importance  in  an  attack;  those  built  of 
lijrht  and  combustible  materials  are  of  no  value. 

Siliialinn  nf  houses. —  Isolated  positions  should  not 
be  suHered  to  be  attacked  in  the  rear;  the  position 
must  render  easy  uniform  action.  The  best  position 
is  at  the  foot  of  a  gentle  sloping  hill,  on  roads  near 
intersected  ground,  on  rivers,  creeks,  &c.,  &c. 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  DEFENSE.  81 

Singh  houses. — Preparations  for  defense;  tlie  de- 
fense may  be  absolute  or  relative.  The  absolute  de- 
fense demands  houses  and  rows  of  houses  of  solid 
structure;  the  doors  and  windows  in  the  lower  stories 
obstructed;  any  approach  rendered  dilTicult;  in  ibe 
upper  stories  walls  and  windows  loop-holed  for  fire ; 
the  wood  work  of  the  roof  may  be  used  for  obstruc- 
tions. Inside  between  the  stories  and  also  between 
the  houses  a  communication  is  to  be  established ;  the 
access  in  the  rear;  means  in  readiness  to  extinguish 
hre;  provisions  and  water;  bandages;  ammunition; 
the  surrounding  trees  within  the  range  of  musketry 
are  to  be  cut  down,  in  order  to  render  the  view  unob- 
structed. 

Em])loijmcnt  of  the  troops. — Tlie  fire  line  with  re- 
lief; each  story  rendered  independent;  the  reserves 
will  be  posted  in  the  lower  stories ;  fire ;  bayonet 
charge  against  the  attacking  troops ;  the  breaches  will 
be  repaired  ;  retreat  to  the  upper  stories,  or  abandon' 
the  house. 

Attack. — Attack  from  the  rear;  artillery  will  set 
the  houses  on  fire;  battering  breaches  through  doors 
and  corners  ;  skirmishers  (  eploy  in  open  order;  every 
man  must  be  strictly  informed  as  to  his  duties;  storm 
with  all  troops.  The  necessary  tools  to  break  in, 
and  remove  the  obstructions  ready  for  use. 

Farms. — The  bouses  barricaded,  and  connected  by 
barricades;  preparations  should  be  made  for  flanking 
fire  ;  obstacles  which  hinder  the  free  view  should  be  re- 


82  PRFPARATIONS  FOR  DEFENSE. 

nioved  ;  rc(]()iil)ts  may  be  coiLsiruclcd,  if  nccesFary  ; 
preparations  for  retreat. 

Emplnyrucnf  of  Iraops. — Tlie  simple  iiitreiirhed  ])o- 
sitioiis  independent;  fire  line  and  sujiport  j)r(>perly 
posted,  if  possible  a  main  reserve. 

Progress  of  the  haltlr. — Fire;  bayonet  rl\ar<(e  ;  no 
pursnit;  successive  retreats  systematically  ordered. 

Allack. — The  same  to  be  observed,  as  in  attack  of 
houses;  the  conquered  houses  occupied;  the  troops 
concentrated,  and  measures  taken  accordinjr  lo  cir- 
cumstances. 

Villages — If  they  are  surrounded  by  fenced  gar- 
dens, the  gardens  will  be  occupied  by  skirmishers  and 
form  the  Hrsl  line  for  defense;  a  second  line  will  occupy 
the  outer  row  of  houses;  if  the  village  can  be  divided 
in  sections  for  defense,  the  belter.  SiiiLde  houses  of 
solid  structure  on  the  main  streets  or  w  ithin  the  place 
will  be  intersected  l)y  intrenchments  and  occujiied. 

Prcpdralions  for  dcfensr. — The  first  line  for  de- 
fense will  l)e  j)oste(l,  covered  and  connected  together 
as  much  as  possible;  obstacles  which  obstruct  the 
view  and  aflbrd  cover  lor  the  enemy,  will  be  removed  ; 
the  entrances  obstructed;  the  cannons  posted  behind 
parapets  ;  the  gardens  divided  itito  sections,  and  posted 
with  a  sufhcient  force  to  be  indc])endent ;  materials 
in  readiness  to  obstruct  the  entrances;  the  retreat  for 
every  section  is  to  be  secured.  Second  line,  the  com- 
munication establisiied,  the  sections  put  in  a  proper 
slate  of  defense;  materials  on  hand  to  obstruct  the 
entrances ;  the  roads  for  retreat  rendered  practicable. 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  DEFENSE.         83 

In  {he  interior. — The  sections  and  intrenched 
places  prepared  for  defense. 

Employment  of  the  troops. — As  long  as  the  first 
line  occupies  its  position,  matters  stand  well;  if  the 
enemy  enters  by  force,  he  may  be  repulsed  in  the  first 
moment;  hut  if  he  has  succeeded  in  occupying  a  po- 
sition, it  will  be  difficult  to  drive  him  out ;  all  these 
points  must  be  well  considered  in  the  employment  of 
the  troops;  cavalry  if  it  cannot  be  of  immediate  ser- 
vice, may  prevent  any  attack  in  the  rear;  sometimes 
it  may  check  the  enemy  in  its  advance. 

Artillery  will  be  posted  in  the  flanks  of  the  village, 
in  order  to  sweep  the  ground  in  front ;  the  cannons 
are  posted  behind  parapets. 

Platoons  are  posted  in  positions  to  defend  the  en- 
trances, they  fire  at  the  attacking  columns  at  a  short 
distance. 

If  a  redoubt  can  be  constructed,  to  defend  the  main 
roads,  it  should  be  occupied  by  artillery,  but  its  retreat 
must  be  secured. 

Infantry. — First  line;  an  independent  position  of 
the  principal  points  on  the  fire  line  and  reserve;  to 
every  two  or  three  succors  will  be  ordered  companies 
as  reserves ;  the  main  body  is  posted  in  the  interior 
or  in  the  rear  of  the  village;  the  communication 
should  be  so  arranged  that  it  cannot  be  interrupted; 
the  place  not  too  much  crowded  with  troops ;  if  a 
second  line  is  posted,  new  forces  are  ordered  for  it, 
they  must  support  the  retreat  of  the  first  line. 

Engagement. — Artillery  posted  on  the  flanks  com- 


84  rnnPA  RATIONS     FOR    PF.FF.VSK. 

mences  firing;  llie  skirmishers  advance  and  fire  ;  <runs 
postt^!  at  ihf  enlraiK-es  will  fire  at  the  storminij  mass; 
hilt  not  ;»<rainst  ar.illeiy;  the  assailants  will  he  met 
with  the  hay«)npt  and  repnlsed  ;  or  retreat  in  the  in- 
terior, without  preveiitin<r  the  second  li.ie  from  fire; 
the  houses  occupied  and  defended;  cohunns  which 
attempt  t«"/  attack,  the  flanks  should  he  repulsed. 

Rclrrnl. — As  loiicj  as  the  enemy  mav  not  have 
occupied  positions  within  the  phu^e,  he  may  he  re- 
pulsed and  the  place  retaken.  'I'hose  moments  are 
to  he  chosen  for  attack,  in  wliich  the  enemy  cannot 
make  use  of  his  concentrated  troops;  the  pursuit  siiould 
not  he  farther  than  to  the  (irst  line. 

Attack. — Thf  rear  attacked ;  the  eiuMiiy\s  artil- 
lery silenced  ;  in  general  the  same  to  be  observeil  as 
for  attack  in  woodland.  If  the  first  line  is  repulsed 
the  troo()s  will  be  conceiilrated  and  re-lormed  ;  the 
troops  storm  the  village  with  vigor,  but  with  precau- 
tion ;  the  colmnns  are  on  both  fianks  supported  by 
skirmishers;  the  whole  vilhiLie  or  |)art  of  it  should  be 
ill  rear  of  the  trooj)s  ;  they  occupy  the  plac(!  and  take 
position  for  defense;  they  concentrate  and  will  be  re- 
formed; the  returning  troops  of  the  enemy  to  be 
resisted  and  repulsed  ;   the  retreat  provideil  for. 

Remarks. — Closed  places  belong  rather  to  the  class 
of  intrenched  positions;  the  principal  purpose  is  to 
enter  by  force  in  someway;  the  necessary  prepara- 
tions will  be  conducted  secretly;  the  defender's  at- 
tention is  distracted  ;  sham-attacks,  storm,  position, 
rally,  re-form,  advance. 


I 


I 


BATTLES  ON  UXDULATLNG  GROUND.      85 

Atlack  of  barricades. — Tliev  will  be  fired  at  by 
artillery,  the  nearest  houses  slioiiid  be  stormed,  and 
occupied  ;  the  skirmishers  will  keep  up  firing  on  the 
(h^fenchnir  troops;  attack  from  the  rear;  storm;  in 
villaires  or  towns,  where  the  inhabitants  are  revoltinjr, 
the  tr<io[)S  shouhl  b(3  concentrated  ;  the  main  points  oc- 
cupied ;  the  main  roads  kept  in  a  passable  condition  ; 
single  hotiscs  of  the  place  should  be  separated  by  in- 
trenchments ;  severe  measures  must  be  applied;  no 
quarters  given. 

BATTLES  ON  UNDULATING  GROUND. 

Any  fbstacles  in  front,  which  check  tlie  communi- 
cation to  the  approach,  serve  to  break  the  front  of  the 
enemy,  and  force  him  to  reform  the  troops  for  attack, 
and  thereby  delay  him;  tlie  (fefenders  must  t  lere- 
fore  take  position,  from  wjience  the  fire  will  be  most 
destructive;  the  distance  of  artillery  fiom  those  points 
is  for  grape-shot  400-600  paces;  for  infantry  only 
150-200  paces,  if  artillery  camiot  be  engaged  in 
sulficient  strength  ;  but  the  resistance  should  not  rest 
alone  on  this  fire,  reserves  |  to  ^  of  the  mass  must  be 
in  readiness  to  atlack. 

If  the  troops  are  inferior  in  strength,  tlie  skirmishers 
and  artillery  are  posted  very  near,  and  fire  at  the  de- 
ploying mass  ;  the  other  troops  will  be  posted  600- 
800  paces  in  the  rear,  and  if  possible  covered. 

If  the  troops  are  too  much  exposed  to  the  enemy's 
artillery-fire,  they  may  be  posted    1000-1500   paces 


OO  SWAMPS     AND    DAMS. 

back,  and  will  attack  the  enemy  from  all  sides  if  he 
deploys;  at  all  events,  if  any  attack  from  the  rear  is 
possible,  strong  reserves  must  be  ready  for  support. 

SWAMPS    AND    DAMS. 

Swamps  are  frequently  along  rivers,  their  breadth 
and  lenjiih  is  of  imporlance;  the  condition  of  the 
cumuiuniraiions  and  whether  the  lire  may  be  edective 
from  one  side  to  the  other  side  is  of  value;  the  move- 
ments in  large  fronts  are  principally  checked;  the 
passage  is  limited.     Two  points  are  considered  : 

1st.  If  a  passage  is  to  be  established,  it  will  be  most 
didicull;  dams  can  only  be  constructed  slowly,  and 
the  work  cannot  be  defended  by  advanced  troops; 
sometimes  a  passage  may  be  eOected  by  joining  tim- 
bers together;  shouTd  a  swamp  ix'  intercepted  by  a 
creek,  the  obstacle  may  with  chlliculty  be  surmounted, 
or  not  at  all. 

2nd.  Dams  cannot  be  removed  like  bridges;  the  de- 
jender  must  occtipy  them,  he  is  bound  to  the  locality 
and  to  passiveness;  if  one  passage  is  hist,  it  cannot 
be  regained,  and  the  defense  must  be  given  up.  If  the 
breadth  of  the  swamp  is  of  such  extent  that  die  fire 
will  not  have  any  effect  from  one  side  to  the  other 
side,  and  if  only  a  few  passages  are  through  the 
swamj),  the  defense  of  such  points  will  be  very  strong. 
\U\i  in  regard  to  this  there  should  be  no  mistake;  it 
is  most  dangerous  to  defend  a  swamp,  which  is  not 
absolutely  impassable,  except  by  a  few  known  pass- 


DAMS RAVI.NES    A!VD    DEFILES.  87 

ages,  it  cannot  be  much  relied  upon.  Surprise,  par- 
ticularly in  the  night  are  rendered  easy;  llie  weather 
has  also  great  influence. 

DAMS. 

Dams  are  not  to  be  defended  in  front;  but  if  cir- 
cumstances demand  it,  redoubts  will  be  constructed 
to  render  them  strong.  This  is  a  rule  for  the  defense 
of  all  defiles.  The  defense  in  the  rear  may  be  imme- 
diate or  mediate. 

Preparalions  for  defense. — The  bridges  will  be 
rendered  impassable,  the  dams  cut  through,  parapets 
for  artillery  constructed;  breastworks  for  infantry; 
pit-Jioles  lor  skirmishers. 

Employment  of  ike  troops. — Artillery  must  fire  along 
the  dams;  infantry  in  a  defensive  position  ;  fire  of  the 
skirmishers  and  closed  troops;  charge  with  the  bayo- 
net; cavalry  attacks, — no  advance — no  pursuit. 

Attack. — Attack  from  the  rear;  surprise;  passages 
established  ;  false-attacks ;  storm ;  fascines  ready  tor 
sto'-ming. 

RAVINES    AxND    DEFILES. 

Their  tactical  value  consists  in  the  degiee  to  which 
they  render  diflicult  the  movements.  Jf  movements 
are  confined  to  a  few  points,  or  entirely  checked,  the 
defensive  value  will  be  the  more  increased  The  de- 
fense will  be  made  immediate  or  mediate  according  to 
circumstances. 


88 


rtlVEUS.  CREF.KS. 


Jii(aiilry  may  oflcn  be  j'avorahly  pasted  in  dc/ilcs, 
if  an  elll'Ciivc  iiie  is  possible  in  froiil  and  ihe  retreat 
is  seemed.     The  reserves  and  cavalry  are  in  llie  rear. 

Redoubts  connected  with  deliies  slrengilieii  the  posi- 
tions; under  these  circunislanci's  ramj.s  may  be  cut 
for  saMies. 

Deliles  and  obstacles  to  approach  are  of  {^reat  im- 
portance to  iiderior  troops,  if  attacked  by  cavalry  on 
level  ;jroiind.  Valleys  are  often  lavorable  for  com- 
bined j)(>siii(>ns  on  both  sides  and  in  tiie  centre.  Po- 
sitions may  be  taken  on  this  side,  in  the  centre  and 
on  the  opj)osite  side, as  the  jx'culiarities  of  ihe  irnumd, 
such  as  midergrowtii,  houses,  creeks,  rouirh  contour 
and  so  fortli  will  admit;  btil  mider  all  circiimstar.ces 
it  must  be  observed,  that  the  retreat  is  so  secured  and 
protected,  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  comini^  uj) 
with  the  defender  on  this  side. 

In  all  kinds  of  deiiles,  tlie  defense,  besides  the 
ground,  depends  upon  the  mass  of  the  trooj)s  ;  what 
may  be  e.\j)edient  lor  one  part,  may  be  im  xpedienl 
for  another;  therefore  the  mass  in  the  rear,  smaller 
forces,  according  to  circmnstances,  in  front. 


Aie  of  no  importance,  unless  they  are  (!ee|i,  s\vamj)y 
and  banks  high  and  ^teejx  If  they  are  overgrown, 
they  become  important;  for  instance  they  oiler  a 
verv  limiled   ])assage,  on   accoimt  of   their  (!e])th  ;   the 


I 


PASSAGE    OF    A    RIVER. 


89 


contour  of  ilieir  banks,  whether  brid<re(]  or  not;  these 
circiimslances  are  to  be  considered. 

Walcr-cou.rse. — If  the  stream  is  very  crooked  and 
Ihe  cnrrent  strong,  the  defense  is  unfavorable  ;  a  salient 
angle  renders  the  attack  easy;  are-entering  iacilitates 
the  defense;  a  straiglit  course  is  in(hfFerent;  lliis  to 
be  considered  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  course; 
it  will  be  of  value  in  tiie  arrangements  for  defense  of 
a  bridge  or  ford ;  and  in  the  choice  of  a  point  for  an 
artificial  passage. 

JVidl/i — It  is  of  value  in  regard  to  an  efll'ctive  lire, 
the  less  available  to  the  enemy  the  better. 

High  Banks. — The  height  of  a  bank  is  important, 
when  the  width  renders  eflective  the  fire  from  one 
side  to  the  other;  in  addition,  the  condition  of  the 
adjacent  ground  is  of  value,  as  it  renders  a  position 
strong,  if  overgrown  with  woods;  it  is  an  impediment 
if  the  view  and  the  movements  are  obstructed. 

PASSAGE    OF    A    RIVER. 

1st.  Bridge. — The  destruction  of  a  bridge  is  the 
surest  way  for  the  defender;  but  it  is  not  always  pos- 
sible ;  if  only  a  partial  destruction  can  be  eliected,  it 
should  be  done  on  that  side  furthest  from  the  enemy; 
if  it  is  necessary  to  preserve  the  bridge,  the  approach  to 
the  bridge,  and  the  adjacent  ground  must  be  intrenched  ; 
but  best  if  the  fire  can  be  effective  from  this  side;  if 
the  bridge  is  located  on  a  sharp  re-entering  angle, 
favored  bv  the  contour  of  ground  and  the  width  of 
8* 


90 


PASSAGE    OF    A     UIVF.R. 


the  sliTaii).  \\  siirli  a  jioiiil  is  sclcclcd,  the  ncressary 
arms  and  Hoops  will  he  j)(islc(l  ;  ihe  troops  not  being 
eniploved  will  he  ordered  in  the  rear.  The  utmost 
precision  niiisi  he  observed  in  the  lead  of  the  battle, 
and  j)ncauli()n  in  tiie  attack. 

Defense  ail  this  Side — innnrdlale — If  the  circum- 
stances demand  it,  or  time  will  admit  of  j^roper  meas- 
ures being  taken  for  defense. 

Prejxtrations. — The  approach  to  the  bridge  on  the 
enemy's  side  must  be  under  cross-fire  of  artillery. 
The  l)ridge  shall  be  fired  at  length-wise  by  artillery, 
which  is  covered  by  parapets;  infantry  will  be  posted 
in  pits  or  ditches  on  points  from  which  the  bridge  can 
be  best  iired  at;  if  the  Qm\  of  the  hridire  on  this  side 
cannot  he  j)rotected  by  lire,  barricades  should  be  con- 
structed. 

Proirirss  of  the.  Jltlach. — Fire  anil  attack  ;  cavalry 
will  he  of  service. 

'I'he  enemy  should  not  be  alloweil  to  occuj)y 
ground  on  this  side. 

JSIediale. —  If  circumstances  demand  it,  the  defense 
will  be  conducted  with  great  vigor,  the  most  favorable 
moment  is,  if  the  enemy  will  have  the  obstacles  of 
the  ground  closely  in  his  rear,  and  is  prevented  from 
deployinir,  and  from  retreating  quickly,  aiul  his  sup- 
])ort  cannot  render  assistance  in  time,  he  will  be  in 
regard  to  strength,  form  and  locality,  in  a  most  difli- 
cult  situation,  in  all  events,  a  pursuit  should  not  go 
further  than  to  the  bridge. 


I 


PASSAGE    OF    A    RIVER. 


91 


J3llack. — If  rivers  and  creeks  can  be  crossed  on  foot, 
the  main  attack  will  be  directed  at  a  salient  angle,  and 
from  thence  pressed  forwards.  If  the  fire  from  one 
side  to  the  other  is  eflective,  the  surest  success  will 
be  obtained  by  a  superiority  in  number. 

If  bridges  cannot  be  avoided  or  taken  by  surprise, 
an  effort  must  be  made  to  get  troops,  unobserved  by 
the  enemy,  on  the  other  side,  to  support  the  attack. 
If  the  defender  is  posted  on  this  side,  by  a  vigorous 
attack,  tlie  crossing  the  bridge  may  be  effected  at  tlie 
same  time  with  the  enemy.  In  a  well  conducted  at- 
tack, the  fire  of  artillery  and  skirmishers  is  important. 
Infantry  will  be  ordered  to  storm  ;  under  particular 
circumstances  cavalry  may  precede.  Infantry  having 
passed  the  bridge  will  form  with  the  utmost  valor  a 
live  bridge  head.  Artillery  and  cavalry  follow  the 
first  battalions,  the  reserves  also  without  losing  time  \ 
then  vigorous  attack. 

"  The  maxims  for  retreat  over  bridges  may  be  derived 
from  the  foregoing :  they  are  to  mask  and  to  select 
favorable  points  for  retreat,  protected  by  artillery ;  the 
enemy's  pursuit  should  be  checked  to  gain  time  to 
retreat. 

2nd.  Shallow  fords  render  the  passage  of  one  or  the 
other  of  the  arms  easy,  tlieir  defense  is  analogous  to 
that  of  a  bridge  with  modifications;  the  tr(»ops  will 
not  be  posted  on  the  other  side ;  if  the  ford  will  not 
be  used,  it  should  be  rendered  impassable;  the  attack^ 
is  like  that  of  a  bridge,  with  this  exception,  that  cav- 
alry will  precede  if  possible. 


92 


A  in  I  FI C I A  L    P  A  S  S  A  G  E H  E  POT  MTS. 


AirnriciAL  passage. 


The  tcclmiral  roiistniriioii  of  hridirr's  will  not  i)e 
roiisidcrcd  licrc.  The  main  j>(»int  is.  to  have  iho  liridi^e 
(inislied  al  tlie  proper  time.  'I'lie  best  chance  for  suc- 
cess is  siirj)ii>e ;  troops  should  he  carried  over  the  river 
in  order  to  resist  ilie  eii('mv''s  appri»ach.  The  de- 
fender's duty  is  to  j)revenl  the  comj)h'tion  of  llie  bridge, 
and  to  hustrale  surprise;  theeuemy"'s  troops  which 
may  iiave  crossed  the    river,   slionid    ix^  driven   back. 

In  rc^rard  to  the  emph>\nienl  of  iroops  :  liiey  shouki 
atlack  with  eneri:\-  ;  the  conlliel  should  be  ended  before 
tiie  brid^M'  conM  be  rendered  passable. 

KEnoiirrs. 

Field-works  are  essential  to  render  jjround  for  de- 
fense strouij;.  P.n-apets  ant!  redoubts  are  constructed 
i'or  these  purposes.  Breast-works  for  infantry,  com- 
bined with  redoubis,  principally  to  establish  a  bridge 
head,  and  lor  ai  tillcrv  lo  have  a  covered  position  within 
the  ranije  ol  fiic.  Open-works  are  inelhcient.  Oidy 
closed  works,  redoubts.  Sec,  are  indej)endent.  Ifar- 
tillei\-  is  posted  in  redoubts,  ihev  have  to  lire  airainst 
the  eiu'iny's  artillery  and  the  mass.  Infantry  will  be 
posted  Ixdiind  the  interior  slope  of  the  breast-works, 
and  will  lire  airainsi  the  assailants  ;  on  each  side  of  the  I 
#breasi-woik  is  a  second  and  a  third  rank  ready  to  ■ 
support.     The  main  reserve  is  inside. 

if  the  (ire  does  not  prevent  the  enemy  from  scaling 


ARTIFICIAL     PASSAGE REDOUBTS.  93 

the  breast-work,  lie  will  be  met  upon  it  wiili  the  bayo- 
net and  repulsed  by  a  hand  to  hand  tight;  if  the  de- 
fenders siicceed,  tiiey  lake  their  former  position  and 
commence  tiring. 

Allack. — The  redoubts  fired  at  with  grenades;  the 
enemy's  guns  silenced;  attack  from  the  rear;  skir- 
mishers combined  with  closed  forces  get  possession  of 
the  (htch,  scale  the  parapet,  and  enter  by  force  the  re- 
doubts; support  follows  closely. 

The  maxims  for  troops  to  be  observed  in  these 
varieties  of  ground  are  considered.  These  peculiarities 
are  seldom  separated;  they  are  often  times  combined. 
This  renders  war  more  complicated  and  more  artful. 
Not  in  regard  to  the  effect  of  the  troops,  but  in  regard 
to  the  plan  of  the  order  of  battle,  to  apprehend  quickly 
advantages  and  disadvantages,  and  to  employ  the  troops 
according  to  mass,  arm  and  order.  The  new  battle 
order,  the  open  order,  the  columns,  the  deep  position, 
the  reserves,  render  advantage  easy. 

EXAMPLES    "WITH    VARIETIES    OF     GROUND. 

Positions  in  regard  to  the  ground,  attack  or  de- 
fense, have  been  fully  considered  ;  positions  are  not 
upon  the  hill,  but  beliind  the  hill ;  not  in  front  of  wood- 
land, but  wiihin  or  in  the  rear  of  it,  if  the  woodland 
will  admit  of  it.  The  troops  are  formed  in  columns, 
to  be  more  easily  covered  in  position;  villages,  wood- 
land, rolling  land,  are  selected  for  cover.  Even  in 
cultivated  countries  it  will  seldom  happen,  that  ground 


94 


r.XAMiM.F.s   \virn   vauik'uks  of   groind. 


ran  he  foinnl  upon  wliicli  I)V  projior  mrasnrcs  troops 
raiiiiot  be  covered;  but  the  (]isj)()silioii  must  be  in 
ronfonniiy  wilb  purpose  and  the  desijrn  of  combina- 
tion; the  |)reservation  of  the  baltle  order  j)rincipally 
is  lo  be  observed. 

A  position  is  therefore,  a  l)atde-li('ld,  wliirli  in  recjard 
to  lenL^lli.  brea(hh,  and  peeuliariiics  of  irronnd,  renders 
most  favorable  tlie  purpose  aimed  at  bv  the  troops, 
accorthnj^  lo  streiiirtir  and  nature  of  the  troops. 

It  follows  that  there  are  certain  forms  of  ground, 
widcii,  lo  I)(^  in  a  slate  of  defejise,  demand  a  certain 
strenj^ih  of  troops;  otliers  which  demand  a  certain 
armament.     In  tiiis  regard  prevails  the  greatest  variety. 

But  in  reirard  to  the  employment  of  the  troops,  the 
lead  of  war  at  llie  present  time  is  entirely  indejjendent, 
and  this  variety  is  a  decided  advantage.  liatties  occur 
every  where,  and  demand  for  the  inferior  only  that 
the  superior  in  strength  shall  he  eliectked  in  en)ploy- 
nient  and  movements  ol'  his  irooj)s. 

7V/C  ]>j'incip/('s  arc  : 

(a.)  In  regard  lo  s/rafari/  :  favorahh^  condiiion  for 
their  own  line  of  retreat  as  well  as  lor  llaidving  j)osi- 
tion  in  n'gard  to  the  enemy's  retreat. 

(h.)  In  regard  lo  fac/ics  : 

1st.  Extension    of   the    troops    according   to   their 

strength;  that  is,  the  front  batlle-line  slundd  not  make 

u^e  of  the  reserves  (in  the  beginning  of  the  battle)  too 

soon.      The  order  of  battle-line  shall   be   preserved. 

2iid.  One  or  both  flaidis  shall  have  resting  points. 


EXAMPLES    WITH    VARIETIES    OF     GROUXD.        95 

Only  insunnountable  ground,  rivers,  creeks,  swamps, 
lakes,  valleys  with  blu(fs,  rarely  mountains,  render  se- 
cure resting  points.  Sucii  obstacles  will  rarely  be 
found,  in  most  cases  the  ground  is  to  be  intrenched, 
and  occupied  by  troops. 

Jn  selecting  resting  points  for  the  flanks,  it  will  be 
observed:  (a)  not  to  rely  upon  their  security;  (h) 
both  flanks  shall  not  rest  on  impassable  ground,  thev 
would  compel  to  a  mere  passive  position.  The  less 
the  flanks  are  protected,  the  more  reserves  will  be  re- 
quired ;  it  is  preferable  to  have  redoubts  combined 
with  those  obstacles.  Ground  intersected  is  better 
than  overgrown  ground,  to  cover  the  flanks  ;  woodland 
is  dangerous.  The  more  or  less  flanks  are  protected, 
the  greater  influence  they  exert  in  regard  to  strateo-y 
and  to  the  proportion  of  arms,  (cavalrv.) 
3rd.  Unobstructed  view  in  front  and  flanks. 
4th.  A  covered  position  of  the  troops  without  being 
checked  in  their  movements,  if  they  can  be  executed 
unobserved  by  the  enemy,  the  better. 

5th.  A  front-line  without  interruption;  the  contour 
of  the  ground  rendering  easy  the  Are  in  front;  there- 
fore, best  gently  sloping;  the  manoeuvres  on  this  point 
from  which  the  rear  of  the  enemy  can  be  best  attacked. 
Defensive  positions,  ditches,  hedges,  walls,  woods, 
farms,  villages,  redoubts,  which  render  easy  the  com- 
bat of  a  few  against  a  far  superior  strength  ;  the  open 
order  supporting  each  other  without  checking  the 
necessary  movements. 


96 


EXAMPi.Ks  Willi   VAinF/nns  of   c.iioiNn. 


Oili.  Tlic  .ipproarhes  in  front  should  \w  ohstriicted, 
llial  llie  (Miciny  may  he  conipelUMl  to  have  his  troops 
roiiijilaiiily  separated,  hut  posted  so  far  oil'  that  thev 
are  within  the  range  ofeU'eclive  lire.  Where  this  can-, 
not  he  done,  open  re(h)ni)ts  may  he  ronstrueled  for  ar- 
tillery son)('\vh;it  in  advancr,  within  the  ranj^c  of  lire. 

7tl).  .Movements  in  front  not  checked,  particularly 
where  the  enemy  njay  he  encountered. 

8ih.  Cironnd  is  to  he  selected  which  renders  retreat 
in  the  rear  easy  ;  it  may  Ite  partly  covered,  j)ardy  in- 
tersected ;   the  deliles  not  too  near. 

These  advantatres  are  rarely  IduuvI  in  every  position 
in  war;  nor  are  all  jiosiiions  of  the  same  value; 
they  are  ihe  more  important  the  more  the  prohahility 
j)revails  ilial  tliev  in.iv  l>e  attacked.  These  advantaii[es 
are  only  demanded  hy  the  most  iniiXMiaiii  posiiioiis. 

The  nuixims  in  rei^ard  to  the  delense  of  a  position 
are:  a,  tiiat  advantage  from  the  locality  iiself  shouhl 
he  attained. 

/>,  That  ill  this  position  tiie  troops  should  act  with 
energy. 

These   maxims   di<j)ose  of  the  emjiloyment  of  the 

troops,  ami  <»f  the  necessarv  arlilicial  works;   at   lirst 

"  •  .      .  . 

the  formation  and  position  of  the  troojjs  in  Iroiil;   m 

the  hegimiiiiii  the  most  important  is,  the  ellbcl  of  lire; 

then  follows  the  engairement,  if  it  siic(;eeds.  it  hecomes 

olfensive;   if  the  tr<)ops  have  to  retreat    tney   ohserve 

the  rules  considered  in  former  chapters. 

The  strength  of  the  ground,  which  might  mislead  to 

a  passive  defense,  should  not  he  too  muca  relied  upon. 


MOUNTAINS.  97 

The  assailants  will  have  to  observe  : 

1st.  Ground  wilh  loo  many  difliculties  siioukl  not  be 
selected  for  attack. 

2nd.  To  advance  through  ground  which  entirely 
covers  the  movements. 

The  employment  of  the  troops  should  be,  according 
to  the  rules  for  a  proper  selected  attack  :  the  retreat 
to  be  secured  ;  mass  against  one  flank  ;  to  break  the 
line  with  the  mass,  if  the  flank  cannot  be  attacked,  or 
if  the  front  of  the  enemy  is  weak.  The  lead  of  a 
battle  is  uniform,  and  the  plan  is  based  upon  this,  that 
every  employed  force  exerts  all  its  energy  ;  relying 
with  all  self-denial  and  with  the  greatest  confidence 
upon  the  Chief. 

MOUNTAINS. 

In  no  kind  of  ground  are  defensive  properties  so 
clearly  expressed,  as  in  mountains.  They  have  long 
been  considered  of  o-reat  value  for  defense.  Extended 
chains  of  mountains  combined  with  redoubts  have  been 
defended  and  resisted  with  success.  The  attacking 
troops  respected  them. 

The  lead  of  war  at  the  present  time,  differs  in  this 
view;  it  condemns  any  passiveness,  where  the  defense 
attempts  to  attain  a  favorable  final  decision  ;  and  also 
it  condemns  any  scattering  of  troops.  The  troops 
should  not  be  checked  in  their  movements.  Moun- 
tains rendering  tliese  conditions  easy  are  exceptions, 
and  they  may  therefore  be  considered  unfavorable  for 
masses.      But   the   more  the   troops   are   inferior    in 


yo  MOINTAINS. 

streiit^lli,  and  the  iiKue  passivrno^s  of  siiit^le  detnrli- 
inenls  is  (Io^irable  lor  the  common  pnrpose,  the  more 
thai  mode  of  defence  mav  l)e  resorted  to.  Mountains 
are  a  refuge  for  inferior  troo])s,  and  favorable  of  ijain- 
inir  time. 

To  he  observed — Defense  :  the  mass  to  be  posted 
in  the  rear;  ilie  positions  in  the  valleys  in  front  in- 
trenched ;  the  main  posts  on  important  points  of  rom- 
munications;  security  ajrainst  attack  in  the  rear;  tiie 
advancing  enemy  is  to  be  met  and  attacked,  or  Ins 
flanks  are  to  be  turned  and  atlacketi  in  the  rear,  if  lie 
is  in  a  defile. 

Attack. — To  turn  the  Hanks;  false  attack  ;  to  attack 
with  energy  on  the  main  line  ;  the  enemy  to  be  routed  ; 
small  detachments  of  the  enemy  may  be  turned  and 
repulsed;  infantry  forms  the  main  body;  litrjit  howit- 
zers will  be  most  useful. 

Finally,  an  iinjjortanl  rule  is  :  He  moves  in  war  with 
security,  who  is  guided  by  rules  derived  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  troops  and  the  character  of  battle  ;  and  who 
considers  form  and  ground  as  auxiliary  means,  and 
who  relies  upon  the  praciical  and  theoretical  elliciency 
of  the  troops,  and  upon  their  employment  accord- 
intr  to  their  nature. 


APPENDIX. 


LA    PETITE     GUERRE. 


War  cannot  be  imagined  without  a  battle-field, 
without  a  base  and  line  of  communications.  The 
army,  the  base  and  line  of  communications  form  an 
organic  unity.  The  base  comprises  a  piece  of  land 
upon  which  those  provisions  and  materials  of  war  are 
magazined,  which  are  designed  to  supply  the  wants  of 
the  army,  implements  of  war  which  an  army  cannot 
get  from  the  theatre  of  war;  being  troops,  arms,  am- 
munition. The  base,  therefore,  is  the  condition  of 
existence,  and  its  possibility  of  continuing  operations. 
The  army  depends  upon  the  base,  it  is  compelled  to 
have  an  uninterrupted  communication;  a  line  of  posts 
will  render  possible  the  line  of  communications.  Not 
every  route  from  the  army  to  the  base  is  a  line  for 
communications,  only  that  particularly  established  for 
those  transactions. 

Supplies  of  all  kinds,  as  ammunition,  transports, 
detachments,  posts,  couriers,  hospitals,  depots,  spare 
ammunition,  officers  of  the  administration  are  con- 
stantly upon  this  route;  whose  total  value  is  of  deci- 
ded importance ;  this  line  of  communication  is  the 
channel  of  life  which  never  should  be  intercepted  for 


100  I.A     PETITE     GUEHRE. 

a  long  lime.  The  duty  of  the  army  is  llierefore,  to 
protect  this  line;  ihe  enemy's  purpose  is  to  have  it 
intercepted  and  the  communications  cut  oil". 

if  tliese  (hities  he  {\nue  widi  the  whole  streni^lh  of 
the  army,  they  desijrnate  the  kind  of  war.  If  t!iey 
are  (^nly  done  hy  small  parts  of  tiic  army,  or  l)y  troops 
which  are  not  immediately  cond)ined  with  the  army, 
as  volunteers  and  militia,  then  these  dulies  belong  lo 
la  pe/i/c  if/zc/vc,  and  form  an  irrciiulariy  organised  kiiul 
of  war:  the  j)arlis(ifi''siuu\  national  war;  it  is  principally 
a  means  for  defense;  it  serves  the  war  only  partially, 
by  rendering  itscll'  obnoxious  to  the  enemy,  its  attacks 
are  directed  to  the  strategical  rear  of  the  enemy,  it 
avoids  his  forces,  and  will  attain  success  by  their 
knowledge  of  localities,  popularity,  ability  and  rapidi- 
ty in  movements,  cunning,  surprise,  valor  and  reso- 
luteness. 

Another  kind  of  la  pclUe  guerre^  originating  also 
IVom  the  strategical  necessities  of  the  army,  comprises 
llie  regular  organised  duties  for  security. 

A  war  will  not  be  commenced  and  ended  in  one 
battle  ;  there  may  be  several  battles,  separated  by 
loralilics  and  lime;  in  the  meanwhile  the  army  is  in 
camp,  (jnarlers,  or  on  march  ;  in  these  situations  an 
army  cannot  be  completely  prejiared  for  action,  it  is 
more  (^r  less  in  a  degree  of  laclical  weakness;  and  the 
necessity  therefore  demands  seeurity  against  the 
enemy's  influence.  The  activity  orginated  from  these 
demands  belong  to  la  pe/ilc  guerre^  ami  ct)mprises  the 
duties  in  field  for  security. 


DUTIES    FOR    SECURITY.  101 

Straleg-y  demaiuls  furlher,  to  render  possible  its 
combinations,  most  exact  reports  in  regard  to  enemy 
and  ground  ;  these  duties  demand  patrols. 

And,  finally,  the  army  must  have  provisions,  they 
should  be  received  by  the  line  of  communications  and 
from  the  vicinity  ;  tliis  leads  to  transports  and  foraging. 

Tliese  different  activities  are  in  tlie  most  immediate 
connection  witii  ihe  war;  they  are  the  conditions  of 
its  existence.  Their  duly  is  not  to  fight,  but  in  realiz- 
ing their  purposes,  they  may  have  to  meet  some  con- 
flicts, and  therefore  the  possibility  of  being  complicated 
in  conflicts  gives  tliem  a  tactical  character. 

Such  is  the  meaning  of  la  pelile  guerre. 

DUTIES    FOR     SECURITY. 

Tntn'  purpose  is  to  protect  the  army  in  camp,  quar- 
ters, or  on  march.  The  purpose  is  obtained,  if  the 
army  has  gained  time,  to  be  completely  prepared  for 
action. 

Time  may  be  gained  :  a,  by  being  in  time  informed 
of  the  enemy's  plan;  Z*,  by  checking  the  enemy's 
advance ;  these  rules  properly  observed,  alone  wdl 
give  guaranty. 

The  enemy's  movements  observed  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible, must  be  checked,  if  tlie  ground  will  admit,  by 
advanced  detachments,  van-guards  and  patrols. 

Van-guards  and  advanced  posts  have  various  degrees 
of  strength,  they  may  be,  a  combined  corps,  or  an  in- 
9* 


10-J 


lUTIKS    OF    ADVANCKD    COUPS. 


trenrlied  lino  of  {Icft'iise,  oronlv  small  cavalrv  troops, 
pickets  and  ritld-frnanls.  Tho  condition  of  the  army 
determines  their  sirencrth,  it  is  in  inverse  jjroportion 
to  the  forces  re^ly  (or  action. 

The  distance  of  the  troops  in  advance,  wliich  are 
ordered  for  resistance,  depends  upon  liie  detrree  of 
their  independence  and  w])on  the  contour  of  the  coun- 
try, and  may  be  from  the  ranije  of  musketry  to  a  dayV 
march. 

The  arrangements  of  the  duties  for  security  ditfcr 
also.  The  shorter  time  the  troops  are  resiin<r,  the 
less  precaution  is  demanded;  the  longer  time  they 
camp,  the  greater  precaution  is  demanded.  The  extent 
of  the  front  which  sliall  be  prv)tected,  is  also  of  im- 
portance ;  suHlcient  protection  may  be  rcuth'red  i)y  a 
closed  hotly  or  by  several  j)osts,  according  to  circum- 
stances. 

nUTli:S    OF     ADVANCED    CORPS. 

Tlu'V  have  to  observe  tliQenemv's  movcintMits,  they 
will  not  absolutely  check  them,  but  delay  them.  'JMiey 
are,  compared  with  tlie  forces  of  the  enemy,  inferior 
in  strength;  it  is  therefore,  their  duty  to  know  how 
to  act. 

The  enemy  is  protected  al<o;  the  lirst  conflict  is 
therefore,  not  disproportional.  The  enemy's  ignorance 
of  the  distance  of  the  o])poser\s  mass,  compels  him  to 
precaution,  and  to  slow  action;  by  that  and  the  resis- 
tance, time  will  be  gained.  The  retreat  under  the  cover 
of  ground  will  be  done  as  slowly  as  their  own  secu- 


MODE    OF     SECURITY. 


103 


rity  will  admit.  The  single  conflicts  being  of  short 
duration,  should  be  quickly  and  often  repeated. 

The  result  of  such  resistance  depends  upon  the 
strength  of  the  troops,  upon  the  character  of  the  coun- 
try, the  length  of  the  march,  support  and  day-time. 

In  general :  it  may  be  observed,  that  at  least,  double 
tlie  ordinary  time  is  required  for  troops  to  march  a 
certain  (hstance. 

Cavalry  will  be  best  to  support  advanced  troops. 

Advanced  corps  effect  more  by  their  presence  than 
by  their  efforts,  more  by  the  possibility  of  conflicts  than 
by  a  battle.  By  resistance,  time  will  be  gained,  and 
the  enemy  is  compelled  to  show  his  strength  and 
purpose. 

MODE    OF    SECURITY. 

The  arvuj  may  he  campings  quartered  or  inarching  : 
Camp  :  At  the  present  time,  the  troops  camp  in  open 
air,  or  in  tents  or  huts,  if  lime  will  admit,  and  material 
can  be  had.  without  any  regard  to  weather,  season  and 
ground,  and  even  purpose  and  plan  of  operation,  may 
render  it  necessary. 

Such  bivouacs  will  not  render  troops  less  prepared 
for  action,  but  they  are  most  obnoxious  to  the  health 
of  men  and  horses;  therefore  they  will  only  be  chosen 
if  the  enemy  is  near,  or  if  time  and  the  want  of  mate- 
rials will  not  admit  other  preparations  for  camping. 

But  war  at  the  present  time,  is  conducted  so  rapidly, 
that  this  manner  of  camping  has  become  almost  a  rule  ; 
it  causes  an  uncommon  loss  of  physical  strength,  and 


104 


Moni:   or   skc. run  v. 


an  uiiroiiiiiion  (Icslrnrlioii  orirromul ;  on  accouiil  of  ilie 
latter  reason,  this  manner  ofcampinijf  will  only  be  re- 
sorletl  to.  wiien  the  localities  are  (piickly  i'han;rpil  or 
the  operations  demand  it. 

QiKirlcrs  are  :  to  have  the  troops  housed  and  siij)- 
plicd  by  the  inhabitants;  thev  are  either  marrh-(pjar- 
ters  or  cantonments.  The  lirst  are  ol' short  (htration, 
the  latter  may  last  some  time. 

T/ie  fnarcli-qun7'/ers  are  confined  to  a  limiit'd  space, 
they  check  verv  litih^  tht;  rcacHness  of  the  tr()0|)s  {"or 
action;  they  render  easy  the  supply  of  j)rovisions  lor 
the  troops,  and  preserve  the  health  of  men  and  horses ; 
they  are  chosen  when  circumstances  ailniit,  and  olten 
resorted  to,  for  single  detachments  and  arms,  whilst 
others  are  camping. 

In  regard  to  readiness  for  action  of  the  tro(»ps,  and 
iheir  secm-ity,  cam])s  and  march-ipiariers  belong  to 
one  class. 

Cantonments  serve  to  relVesii  the  troops,  they  de- 
mand a  lari^e  space;  thev  are  exceptions  in  the  wars 
of  the  present  time.  (Jiound  will  l)e  chosen  (or  them, 
if  possibly  obstructed  by  nature  in  front  and  llanks  ; 
but  notwithstanding  that,  llie  troops  are  scattered  in 
iheir  (piarlcrs  and  less  j);(>j)ar{'d  for  unl'orsecn  events; 
therefore  j)erl"ect  measures  of  security  are  to  be  taken, 
according  to  their  extent  and  form  of  the  ground. 

Marches,  in  time  of  wj.r, are  oidy  transitions  from  one 
position  to  another;  they  demand  cond'orl  i'or  troops ; 
regularity  in  movements;  njarch-discipline ;  conve- 
nient uniform  ;  light  weight  for  each  man  ;  in  order  to 


MODE    OF     SECURITY.  105 

render  these  conditions  satisfactory,  the  mass  must  be 
divided  into  columns;  each  one  must  be  independent ; 
and  therefore  must  be  combined  witli  all  arms ;  each 
one  must  have  intensive  strength  to  a  certain  degree. 
The  mode  of  dividing  a  mass,  is  ruled  by  the  forma- 
tion of  the  order  of  battle  of  tiie  present  time.  Those 
parts  march  next  to  one  another,  and  one  after  the  other 
at  intervals,  according  to  their  strength,  and  so  ren- 
dering easy  support  and  the  camping  of  the  troops. 

For  instance  :  The  depth  of  a  column  of  a  com- 
bined division  of  8000  men,  is  about  iwo-and-a-half 
miles,  a  common  day  march  for  troops  is  fifteen  miles. 
A  division  of  8000  men  marches  this  distance  in  eight 
to  ten  hours,  and  in  a  mountainous  country,  in  ten  to 
twelve  hours.  The  greatest  march  in  a  day  is  twenty- 
five  miles,  to  the  utmost,  thirty  miles;  if  the  march 
lasts  several  days,  only  twenty  miles  can  be  made. 
To  twenty-five  miles  are  required  sixteen  hours.  Long 
continued  marches  exert  a  most  destructive  influence 
upon  men  and  horses. 

The  march,  in  regard  to  enemy,  is  either  advance, 
retreat,  or  fiank-march  ;  the  latter  demands  greater 
precaution,  on  account  of  its  exposed  flanks.  March 
and  camp  security,  demand  van  and  rear-guards. 

Quartered  troops  are  guarded  by  a  line  of  posts. 
The  security  of  a  camping  troop  is  more  easily  effected, 
than  that  of  a  troop  on  march. 

The  van-guards,  composed  of  all  arms,  strength- 
ened by  light  cavalry,  will  advance  against  the  enemy, 
as  far  as  possible,  and  as  their  strength  may  admit, 


106 


.MOnn    OF     SECURITY, 


and  as  to  he  supportod  in  tiino;  llioy  orrii|)y,  if  possi- 
ble, ground  (avoralde  for  defense.  Combined  detach- 
ments will  be  posted  in  front  and  flanks  on  proper 
points.  For  these  (hities  I-},  of  tlie  trooj)s  will  be 
employed;  they  are  posted  iialf  a  mile  to  three 
miles  hom  the  main  troop,  on  <^round,  which  renders 
defense  easy. 

Detachments  are  guarded  by  pickets,  which,  ac- 
cording to  ground  are  infantry  or  cavalry;  ^  of  iheir 
strength  will  be  ordered  for  that  purpose;  the  distance 
of  the  pickets  from  the  detachment,  and  between  each 
other,  is,  for  infantry  800  paces,  for  cavalry  1500 
paces.  U  the  connection  with  the  detachments  by 
pickets  are  not  complete,  posts  are  to  be  ordered 
behind  the  intervals,  these  troops  are  taken  from  the 
main  Ix^ly  of  the  van-guards,  according  to  circum- 
stances they  niay  have  onl-guards  too. 

The  pickets,  guards,  Slc,  should  be  bcliind  cover 
and  on  ])oints  important  for  communications. 

Pickets  of  infantry  post  single  or  double  guards 
about  iiOO-400  paces  distant;  the  intervals  between 
the  guards  is  about  100-150  paces,  and  so  arranged, 
that  nothing  may  pass  unobserved;  cavalry  pickets 
post  vetlettes  400 — 600  paces  distant,  and  according 
to  circumstances  about  150-200  paces  between  them. 
The  chain  of  the  pickets  shall  be  well  connected,  and 
so  j)osted,  that  they  can  observe  the  ground  in  front 
and  between  them,  and  if  possible  covered.  Chains 
of  mountains  are  parlicularily  I'avorabie  for  these 
duties. 


MODE    OF    SECURITY.  107 

The  smaller  guards  will  be  posted,  during-  the  night 
nearer  to  the  detachments,  and  the  line  of  posts  from 
the  heiijht  a  little  backwards  on  lower  ground. 

The  duty  of  the  posts  is  :  to  observe  ;  the  resistance 
will  be  done  partly  by  the  pickets  and  detachments, 
and  partly  by  the  main-body. 

From  time  to  time  the  line  is  by  small  troops  pa- 
trolled, to  control  the  guards  and  to  keep  them  vigi- 
lant; they  serve  also  to  carry  orders  from  one  picket 
to  another;  it  is  important,  that  they  pay  attention 
to  all,  that  is  going  on,  to  scout  and  examine,  what  is 
doubtful,  and  to  report  all. 

In  spite  of  these  precautions  the  enemy  may  possi- 
bly pass  tlie  posts  unobserved,  and  attack  with  superior 
forces  ;  to  prevent  this,  patrols  of  light  cavalry  are  to 
be  ordered  from  the  detachments  or  from  the  main 
troop,  to  scout  in  those  directions,  from  which  larger 
bodies  might  possibly  approach,  and  with  order  to 
observe  the  enemy  in  his  movements  as  closely  as 
possible. 

In  attack  is  to  be  observed :  the  purpose  of  an  at- 
tack is  eitlier  to  alarm  or  to  surprise  single  posts  or 
pickets,  or  it  is  of  higher  importance. 

The  commonest  sentinel  is  not  to  be  suffered  to 
desert  his  post  without  cause. 

Vedettes  and    guards  form    the  chain  ;  the  pickets 

have  to  support.     Counter-attack  is  often  sufficient  to 

drive  back  the  enemy  ;  pickets  retreat  slowly,  covered 

by  the  ground  in  the  direction  nearest  the  support. 

The  pickets  in  the  flanks  attack   the  enemy  in  his 


108  SECURITY    0.\     :\IARCH. 

Hanks  \  witli  perseverauro  in  llio  ipsisiiinco,  tlie  purpose 
of  ihc  eueiny's  attack  ran  be  learned. 

Pickets  shall  not  rely  uj)on  their  (lelaehnicnts,  nor 
these  upon  the  main-body  of  the  van-gnard  ;  a  nmiual 
support  of  tlie  detachments  is  rarely  possible,  and  is 
advi.>>able  only,  if  lliey  are  themselves  secure  from 
attack. 

SECURITY    O.V    MARCH. 

The  det:irhine:its  are  replaced,  by  van-guards  in 
front,  and  patrols  in  the  flanks,  consisiing  of  infantry 
and  of  light  cavalry.  They  inarch  with  their  wings 
somewhat  in  the  rear,  about  1000  paces  from  each 
other.  The  distance  from  their  support  is  to  the 
utmost  the  range  ol  a  gun-shot  ;  patrols  are  iu  achaiice 
also  with  connections  between  iheni.  In  open  land 
it  is  sudicient  to  see  each  other,  in  unihdating  ground 
thev  form  a  chain,  if  the  contour  of  the  ground 
changes,  it  will  not  be  entered  before  it  is  carefully 
scouted  and  occupied.  Great  j)recaution  is  to  be  ob- 
served in  passing  deliles.  Nothing  shall  remain  un- 
scouted,  the  greatest  precaution  is  demanded,  if  the 
column  is  dee])  and  protection  in  the  Hanks  is  neces- 
sary, detachments  in  the  Hanks  and  cavalry  jialrols 
should  be  ordered  out.  For  Hank-marcii  the  van- 
guard is  in  the  direction  ol' tin;  enemy,  and  suHiciently 
str(!ngihened  ;   patrols  of  light  cavalry  are  essential. 

If  the  troops  are  engaged,  they  must  take  advantage 
of  the  ground,  and  according  to  circumstances,  they 


SECURITY  IN  QUARTERS.  109 

will  advance  or  retreat.     Van-guards  well  supported 

have  easier  duties  than  rear-guards. 

Rule  is  in  retreating  not  to  be  turned  and  cut  oft' 
The  uniformity  of  the  duties  in  march  and  in  camp 

renders  easv  the  chanore  from  one  mode  to  the  other. 


SECURITY    IN    QUARTERS. 

Security  in  extended  cantonments  cannot  be  con- 
fided to  one  closed  advanced  troop;  independent  de- 
tachments are  required.  It  is  therefore  of  importance 
to  select  a  country  for  cantonment,  which  is  covered 
by  important  obstacles,  rivers,  mountains,  bluffs,  &c., 
and  whose  approaches  are  obstructed.  The  ap- 
proaches will  be  occupied  by  independent  detach- 
ments intrenched,  and  guarded  by  vedettes  and  patrols. 
\n  mountains  several  chains  of  guards  may  be 
posted.  If  their  contour  will  admit  approach,  great 
caution  is  to  be  observed  in  order  not  to  be  turned. 

The  nearer  troops  in  cantonments  are  to  the  cordon, 
the  more  they  have  to  be  prepared  for  defense.  It  is 
conditional,  that  the  troops  are  concentrated^  before 
the  enemy  attacks. 

The  problem,  in  case  of  attack,  is  simple :  it  is  re- 
sistance ;  the  position  in  regard  to  resistance  is  select- 
ed, the  security  of  the  whole  force  consists  principally 
in  gaining  time,  therefore  the  utmost  resistance  must 
be  made. 

A  decisive  attack  is  best  to   be  made  by  masses, 
combined  with  sham-attacks. 
10 


110       iinco.NNOissANci: — DrTir:soF  patrols. 

The  rcsistaiicp  must  be  hiokon  \v\\\\  vt'lu'incnre,  if 
llie  troops  liave  forced  within  the  caiUomiu'iiis.  they 
should  prevent  by  rapidity  and  resoluteness  the  camping 
forces  from  rallyiii«r. 

RECO.WOlSAXCt: PITIES    OF     TATROLS. 

Known  objects  are  observed ;  unknown  objects, 
ground,  enemy,  are  reconnoitered.  Open-land  can  be 
observed  by  single  guards,  being  posted  on  proper 
points,  with  those,  patrols  may  be  coml)ined,  scouting 
the  ground. 

Overgrown  and  intersected  ground  will  be  occupied, 
and  if  the  approaches  ihemseives  afford  obstructions, 
thev  should  be  ornarded.  patrols  may  scout  in  front  far- 
ther ofl. 

Rivers  and  creeks  must  be  observed  by  a  cordon. 
Points,  which  rendor  easy  the  passage  ol'  trooj)s,  will 
be  intrenched  and  occujiied.  it  dej)cnds  uj)on  circmn- 
slances  how  far  an  attack  is  to  l)(!  resisted,  it  sullices 
often  to  know  the  i)resence  of  the  enemy,  often  it  is 
necessary  to  learn  the  purpose  and  strength  of  the 
en^my,  which  can  only  be  eflected  by  resistance ;  in 
order  to  observe  the  enemy,  the  troops  must  lollow 
closely,  and  unobserved;  it  requires  favorable  cir- 
cumstances to  accomplish  this.  Smaller  forces  are 
preferable  to  larger  ones. 

The  assault  of  a  fortress  belongs  to  this  class  of 
duties;  it  is  to  be  observed;  what  communications 
and  how  they  are  made,  and  how  they  can  be  checked. 


DUTIES    OF     PATROLS.  Ill 

If  a  fortress  is  completely  blockaded,  it  must  be  pre- 
vented from  sallyiiig  as  well  as  from  raising  the  block- 
ade; it  requires  therefore  a  strong  force;  strong  reserves, 
intrenched  detachments,  covered  guards,  patrols  scout- 
ing in  the  vicinity,  are  the  means. 

In  marchinor  through  a  country,  the  van-guards  and 
patrols  have  to  reconnoitre.  Tlie  reconnoissance  can 
have  a  common  or  a  special  purpose.  Circumstances 
decide  whether  this  can  be  accomplished  secretly,  by 
surprise,  or  with  combined  forces  by  attack. 

Patrols  and  detachments  are  designated  for  these 
purposes;  patrols  are  small  parties  of  infantry  or 
cavalry,  and  sometimes  composed  of  both  combined. 
Their  strength  depends  upon  the  order,  distance,  and 
can  be  from  three  men  to  one  company  or  squadron. 

Light  cavalry  is  best  for  the  duties  of  patrols,  and 
if  to  a  great  distance  is  to  be  patrolled,  its  facility  in 
movements  secures  success. 

No  rules  can  be  given  for  single  cases ;  in  general 
it  may  be  observed  that  any  separation  of  the  troops  is 
inexpedient.     '•'■  Fortune  favors  the  Brave.'''' 

Large  patrols  gain  their  purpose  more  surely  if  they 
follow  the  enemy  closely^  alarm  the  line  of  posts  and 
surprise  the  patrols.  But,  it  is  evident,  tliat  both  the 
chief  and  the  troops  must  be  possessed  of  courage  and 
wit. 

The  more  the  contour  of  the  country  is  known, and 
the  inliabitants  are  not  opposed,  the  more  can  be 
effected. 

The  duties  of  larger  patrols  resemble  the  partisan's 


llii  I'ORAniNf;    AM)    TRANSPORTS. 

war,  tlicy  are  hij^lily  intorfstiuf  and  of  jrrcat  value; 
their  streiifrili  renders  thein  oflen  indepeiideiU,  they 
are  the  best  means  to  preserve  the  comniunirations 
between  columns;  their  purpose  is  not  aliark  and  not 
the  destruction  of  the  enemy,  exce[)t  under  jxcuHar 
circumstances. 

FORAGI.XG    A\D    TRAXSPORTS. 

An  army  is  subsisted  in  a  fourfold  manner : 

1st.  Bij  magazines  ;  establislu^d  on  a  complete  thea- 
tre of  war ;  which  compels  the  troops  to  be  in  their 
vicinity. 

2nd.  lit/  regular  requisilions  ;  the  provisions  will 
be  furnished  by  the  inhabitants  on  the  line  of  opera- 
tions;  this  maimer  is  most  convenient,  but  requires 
that  the  military  authorities  are  masters  of  the  coun- 
try, and  it  also  requires  time. 

3rd.  By  foraging,  an  inevitable  evil,  and  rather  for 
small  parties ;  van-j^nards  and  jxitrols  iiave  to  be  re- 
sorted to. 

4th.  The  best  means,  and  particularly  in  settled 
countries  are.  to  be  provisioned  in  (piarters  by  the  in- 
habitants, if  tlie  troops  are  only  (inarlcrcd  for  a  short 
linw. 

The  (list  three  methods  of  sustenance  re(piire  trans- 
jKU-ts  and  measures  of  security. 

roniirJnL,^  troops  are  divided  into  two  parts,  one  part 
foraging,  the  other  part  protecting   the  foragers.     It 


FORAGl.XG    AXD    TkAXSPORTS.  113 

should  be  properly  coiulticted  and  controlled;  no  dis- 
order, no  brulal  actions,  no  plunderino;  should  be  sul- 
iered  ;   light  artillery  should  protect  the  foragers. 

TrauspnrlH ;  a  transport  should  not  be  stronger 
than  80-100  wagons;  it  should  be  well  protected,  and 
proper  measures  should  be  taken  to  prevent  any  (h>or- 
der  on  the  march  by  discipline,  regular  limes  for  rest  and 
feeding,  and  by  removing  the  obstacles  from  the  road. 

It  is  important  to  be  timely  informed  of  the  approach, 
of  the  enemy;  the  troops  being  designed  to  ofier 
resistance,  are  constantly  concentrated.  Patrols  of 
cavalry  scout  carefully  to  prevent  surprise;  the  mosi 
dangerous  moment  is  if  convoys  are  attacked  in  |)ass- 
ing  defiles. 

A  transport  of  prisoners  is  o{  singular  nature,  they 
assist  often  the  attacking  troops ;  lo  prevent  tliis,  strin- 
gent measures  are  demanded. 

It  is  a  rule  in  defense  of  foraging  parties  and  trans- 
ports to  gain  time,  and  to  prevent  any  inlliience  by  the 
enemy;  the  wagons  may  [)e  defended  like  a  redoubt, 
according  to  circumstances. 

The  attack  of  foraging  parties  and  transports  is  best 
by  surprise;  the  principal  aim:  to  attack  the  wagons 
and  not  the  convoy  ;  the  convoy  may  only  be  attacked, 
if  circumstances  compel  it. 

THE    FARTISAN''s    WAR. 

War,  in  order  not  to  be  checked  in  its  progress, 
demands  manv  necessities.     An  armvis  much  embar- 


Ill  I  111".     I'AKI1ZAN%     WAII. 

rassed,  if  any  of  llicse  iiorcssilies  should  Ix*  ciil  oil. 
One  party\s  zciil  is,  to  ruiiiisli  the  necessities  lor 
e.xistenrc,  which  deinaiul  an  nninteirupted  coininiiiii- 
Ciition  in  the  rear  of  the  army,  aiiMiIier  ])arlv  al- 
lenipts  to  check  and  counteract  theoperaiinn  of  their 
opposers;  this  is  the  reason,  that  even  in  the  rear  oi 
an  army,  nothint^  can  be  {K)ne  witliont  proiecii<>n  h\ 
delachuicjils ;  smali  forces  are  employed  for  that  ;  n 
ajfainst  those  measures  .shall  he  counleracU'd.  small 
detachments  are  also  ordered  ;  a  decision  of  impori- 
ance  can  only  he  gained  hy  the  mass.  Support 
must  he  ohtained  by  oiher  means,  and  not  Iiy  numeii- 
cal  superiority;  liy  skilU'ul  maiHeiivres  in  weak  mo- 
ments of  the  enemy. 

This  reijuires  knowledire  of  the  counlry  and  ol  the 
enemy's  intention  and  means.  'I'he  more  pt  rlicl  ihi> 
information,  the  more  chance  of  success. 

The  lroo|)s  einj)loved  for  such  (hilii's  should  be  lii^'hl, 
int(dlii;enl,  persevering  and  obdurale.  \'<)hmteers  well 
(iisci|)line(l  will  be  best  for  this  kind  of  war. 

Th(;  partisau\s  dulies  are,  to  chccl;.  lo  destroy,  to 
liarrass,  to  capluie  persons,  (•oiiricrs.  deiachments, 
traiisporls  ol"  aJI  kinds,  and  lo  ahiriii  coiislaiilly  ihc  line 
of  communications. 

Some  j)atrols  have  lo  f(»llow  the  eiieiny  (  losely  or 
to  carrv  orders  from   one   cohimn   to  another. 

Inielligence,  boldness,  sur])rise  will  lead  to  success. 

Tliis  kind  of  war  moves  in  an  atmosphere  of  secrets  ; 
its  object  is  to  surjn'ise  and  to  disaj)pear.  False  re[)orts, 
circuhited,  are  essential.     The   troo])s  sliouhl    not  be 


NATIONAL    ARMAMENT.  ilo 


separated  witliout  good  reason.  As  soon  as  anibuslied 
troops  are  discovered,  they  attack  with  vigor;  tiie 
enemy  must  not  be  allowed  to  recover  his  senses,  he 
must  be  checked,  routed.  Protracted  conflicts  must  be 
avoided;  a  sure  though  a  small  success  is  better  than 
a  great  but  an  uncertain  one;  an  active  partisan  will 
render  great  service  in  the  prosecution  of  a  war. 

NATIONAL    ARMA3IENT. 

A  national  armament  is  an  irregularly  armed  organi- 
zation of  the  people,  to  rank  not  with  the  army,  but  an 
organized  militia ;  it  is  a  defensive  orofanization,  whose 
Strength  is  more  extended,  more  marked,  and  easier 
animated  by  soul  and  good  will ;  it  is  a  co-operation 
of  the  population,  who  cannot  form  a  part  of  the 
regular  army,  but  both  pursuing  one  aim. 

Such  an  activity  can  only  be  efiective  in  those  parts 
of  a  country  v»diich  are  occupied  by  tlie  enemy,  in  the 
rear  and  in  its  strategical  flanks. 

Its  conditions  are  : 
'     1st.  The  war  is  to  be  conducted  in  the  interior  of 
the  country. 

2nd.  Its  decision  should  not  depend  upon  one  ca- 
tastrophe. 

3rd.  The  theatre  of  war  should  be  of  considerable 
extent. 

4th.  The  inhabitants  should  be  in  favor  of  par- 
tisan o|)erations. 

5th.  The  country  should    be  undulatins'i  in  some 


116 


N  A  T  I  ()  N  A  I,     A  R  M  A  M  V.  N  T. 


way  iii)jiassal)lc,  l)y  luouiitains,  woodland,  swamps, 
or  improvemcMls  and  soatleifd  selllemenls. 

The  eniployineiUof  the  armed  peoi)lc  t;liould  not  be 
against  the  enemy's  mass,  and  not  against  considerable 
corps  ;  best  to  be  employed  where  it  will  be  diiricult 
I'or  the  enemy  to  apj)ear  superior  in  forces;  they  fol- 
low closely  the  line  of  comniunication,  "the  nerve  of 
life";  they  check,  alarm,  annoy,  and  harrass  the  ene- 
my, whenever  it  is  in  their  power,  they  render  the 
roads  impassable,  and  barricade  narrow  passes. 

These  small  parlies  sur])rise  and  disappear  more 
easily  tiian  regular  troops. 

The  enemy  is  in  a  state  of  uncertainty,  but  he 
ofiers  no  resistance.  Their  t)perations  should  have  a 
strategical,  but  never  a  tactical  character  of  defense. 

The  nature  of  their  coidlicls  is  :  vehemence  in  at- 
tack, but  little  cool  blood,  and  no  duration  in  t'luhi. 
Armed  peoj)le  may  be  defeated,  driven  olK  but  they 
never  should  be  routed. 

A  nation  may  be  brave  and  valiant  in  its  habits, 
great  in  its  contcnipl  for  the  cncniy,  liivorable  the 
country  \  but  ii  i.s  uniieniable,  that  the  national  war  can 
not  e.xist  in  the  loo  dense  atmosphere  of  danger. 

liul  assisted  by  the  inhabitants,  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  will  have  means  for  defense. 

To  animate  them,  they  should  be  suj)porled  by  small 
regular  forces;  that  the  enemy  may  not  be  compelled 
to  oppose  large  forces;  so  that  the  inhabitants  may 
not  feel  themselvessafe  enough'  by  the  presence  of  reg- 
ular troops. 


NATIONAL    ARMA3IENT.  117 

Tiie  iialure  of  the  |xiilis:iii  war  is  closely  coiiiiecled 
with  the  national  war.  Supported  and  animated  by 
that,  it  may  be  conducted  everywhere,  where  the  con- 
ditions of  its  existence  are  aflorded. 

War  lives  in  la  petite  guerre^  and  in  that — is  its 
condition  of  life;  it  is  principally  of  strategical  nature, 
and  becomes  only  of  tactical  nature  by  becoming  su- 
perior in  strength,  and  if  it  should  be  compelled  to  gain 
its  purpose  by  fight. 

In  most  cases  it  will  be  conducted  with  small  forces  ; 
it  ofiers  an  interesting  field  for  independent  actions, 
and  whilst  only  officers  of  inferior  rank  are  employed 
for  these  duties,  they  will  have  opportunity  to  prove 
their  abilities,  and  to  open  to  themselves  an  infallible 
way  to  gratify  their  ambition. 

]n  a  war  with  masses  at  the  present  time,  based  on 
Ja  'petite  guerre^  lies  a  pleasant  consolation  for  the 
subalterns.  * 

//  /  have  succeeded  in  demonstrating  the  nature  of 

*  war^  and  in  enlisling  admiration  for  an  art  which,  in 

regard   to  its  importance,,  gravity  and  extent^  catmot 

be  compared  icith  any  other^  I  have  accomplished  my 

purpose. 

END. 


CONTENTS 


PART  FIRST. 

BASE    OF    .-MILITARY    OPERATIONS. 

or  war 7 

What  is  war? 7 

Purpose  and  means  of  war 8 

Of  the  qualities  required  in  a  soldier 9 

Of  the  science  of  war 9 

Tile  active  forces 11 

Cliaracteristic  features  of  single  arms   11 

Rapidity  of  movements 15 

Etfect  of  fire  arms 16 

Elementary  tactics 17 

Infantry 18 

Properties  of  the  line 20 

The  column — opened — closed 22 

Properties  of  tlie  column 22 

The  line  with  intervals  between  the  files 23 

The  three  orders  of  formations 23 

Formations  and  change  of  fronts 25 

Cavalry 26 

The  formations 27 

Artillery 30 

Battle 33 

Character  of  the  battle  of  the  present  time 34 

Significance  of  battle 36 

Duration  of  a  battle 36 

Decision  of  a  battle 37 

Victory '^7 


120 


co.N'rr.NTS. 


Retroat :{s 

Battle  in  the  night :5S 

Sii«[nificance  of  numerical  superiority  in  Torres :!S 

Reserves .'?!) 

Order  of  battle 10 

Ground  and  soil »ii 

Importance  of  elevated  positions »1 

Defense  atu)  attack \2 

Plan  and  leadinfj  to  battle J.") 

Rules  for  plans  of  battles H 

Defensive Jt» 

Tactical  niaxims 17 

Attack 17 

Employment  of  troops -IS 

Ground ts 

Villages,. touiis 5() 

PART  Si:CC)ND. 

EMIM-OV.MENT    OK    TIIK    TnooTS. 

liattles  on  level— uncovered— not  undui.iiiii;:  i,'roiind. . .  53 

Kleinentary  battles .")3 

P'xampUiS j() 

Retreat 57 

Battles  of  several  battalions 58 

Infantry  a<^ainst  and  with  cavalry 59 

Infantry  a-^ainst  and  with  artillery ()2 

Artillery  a;^ainst  artillery <J4 

Artillery  against  and  with  cavalry ()5 

Cavalry  aj^ainst  cavalry ()5 

Infantry,  cavalry,  artillery (i7 

Rules  of  disposition — tlefense  and  attack G9 

Movements  in  batile 70 

Retreat 7o 

Pursuit 71 


CONTENTS.  121 

Breaking  the  enemy *s  line 72 

Surprise  and  ambuscade 72 

Battle  in  combination  with  grou'n<} 75 

Battle  on  broken  ground 75 

Battle  on  covered  ground ^ 77 

Preparations  for  defense ,. 7S 

Battle  on  undulating^  ground 85 

Swamps ^ 8S 

Dams 87 

Ravines  and  defines 87 

Rivers — creeks 88 

Passage  of  a  river. ...  ^ SB- 
Artificial  passage 92 

Redoubts 92 

Positions,  (examples^) ^ 93: 

Mountains » .  ^ ^ 97 

APPENDIX. 

lA    PETITE    GUERRK. 

Duties  for  security 10  J 

Duties  of  advanced  corps 102 

Mode  of  security lOS 

Security  on  maFch lOS 

Security  in  quarters lOD" 

Reconnoissance 110 

Duties  of  patrol 1 10 

Foraging  and  transports 112 

The  partisan's  war 114 

National  armament. IVS 


NEW  MILITARY  WORK 


INFANTRY  CAMP  DUTY,  FIELD  FORTIFICATION,  AND 
COAST  DEFENSE. 

Prepared  and  arranged  by  Capt.  L.  r.  Btckholtz,  with  plates,  16m o. 
muslin.     Price  50  cts.  by  mail,  post  paid. 


R  E  C  0  !ini  E  N  D  A  T  I  0  N  S 


•'  This  is  a  mere  pocket-book  in  size,  but  it  is  crowded  with  instnic- 
tion  for  military  men — instiuction  gatliered  and  condensed  from  the 
gieat  bulk  of  works  on  military  science.  It  encloses  grains  of  wheat, 
threshed,  as  it  were,  out  of  the  great  stack — is  simple,  convenient  and 
Comprehensive.  It  is  from  the  ptn  of  Captain  Buck'  oltz,  of  this  city, 
a  gentleman  who  has  seen  service  on  the  continent  of  Europe,  and  who 
is  an  accomplished  officer." — Richmond  Disjyatch. 

"  We  are  always  pleased  to  meet  with  a  Southern  book,  one  written, 
jirinted  and  bound  in  our  own  section  by  our  own  peojile,  and  we  there- 
fore greet  with  i)leasure  two  military  works  now  before  us,  by  Captain 
Buckholtz.  and  published  by  J.  W.  Randolph,  Richmond. 

The  first  is  "  On  Infantry  Camp  Duty,  Field  Fortification.,  and 
Ctiast  Defense.''  Under  the  head  of  Infantry  Camp  Duty  we  are  in- 
structed in  out  guards,  patrols,  vanguard,  side-guard,  rear  guard,  am- 
buscade, surprise,  and  transports.  In  Field  Fortifieation  we  have  in- 
structions on  fortifications,  regularly  constructed  forts,  attack  and 
defense,  fortresses,  and  a  description  of  the  principal  parts  of  fortified 
works. 

The  chapter  on  Coast  Defense  is  most  excellent. 

As  an  elementary  work  on  the  subjects  treated,  this  lx)ok  has  no  su- 
perior, and  we  commend  it  to  our  military. 

The  second  book  is,  ''  Tactics  for  Officers  of  Infantry,  Cavalry  and 
Artillery.'"  This  is  a  most  complete  military  work,  comprising  in- 
struction in  the  three  dejjartments  of  the  army,  and  contains  much 
information  which  we  have  never  met  with  in  the  popular  military 
works  of  the  day." — Xorfolk  Southern  Aigus. 


Published  and  for  sale  by 

J.    W.    RANDOLPH,  Richmond,  Va. 

Also  for  sale  by  Booksellers  generally. 


PLANTATION   BOOK. 

M..\NTATinX  am.  FARM   INSTJiUrTlON, 
RKGULATIOX,  RECORD, 

LWKXTORY  AM)  ACWUXT  IU)oK. 

I'or  Ihc  use  of  Manajrcrs  of  Esstates,  and  for  the  better  ordering  and 

management  uC{>laiitat<on  an«l  farm  husincjjs  in  many  particulars, 

Hy  a  Soiitlit-rn   Planter.     "Order  is  Hoaven"s   fii-st   lawr/' 

New  and  improved  edition,  cap  folio^  half  calf,  price  $1.60.  Also  a 
larKcr  edition,  for  Cotton  I'la.ntations,  price  $2,00.  Either  sent  by 
mail,  posi  paid. 

The  author  of  this  book  is  one  of  the  most  successful  farmers  in  the 
Southern  Slates,  aiKl  tlie  .«ystieuiatic  use  of  it  has  added  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  dollars  to  his  estate. 

"  We  consider  it  as  indispensable  to  the  farmer  as  tlie  knlger  to  the 
merchant." — »V,  C.  Planttr. 

"This  book  supplies  a  real  want  on  every  plantation."" — SotUhtrn 
J'lnnter. 

"This  is  a  most  admirable  work,  and  one  which  every  farmer  should 
possess." — American  Former. 

"  Every  farmer  who  will  get  one  of  these  books^  and  rc«ulat4'  all  his 
movements  by  its  sag^estions,  c^innot  fa*!  to  realize  K«"e«t  benefits  from 
»t.  We  cannot  too  lii>,'lily  commend  it  to  the  consideration  of  agricul- 
turists."— Jiichmond   H'/iig. 

"  It  will  prove  a  most  valuable  assistant  to  the  jtlanter,  manager  or 
overseer,  and  a  work  lliat  will  facilitate  them  greatly  in  the  Iraii.sactiou 
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keep  things  straight. "^ — ,SV>«//«»;i  J'lanttr. 

"The  form  is  eoncise  and  nullio(lie:il,  while  it  em))races  everything 
aj)propriiite  to  such  records." — I'Umyh^  Loom  and  Anvil. 

"  It  is  the  result  (tf  mature  experience  and  observation."' — Methodist 
<Ju(irt<rlii  Jitri^w. 

"  It  is  full  of  useful  information. "— A'ic/(ffto7!<i  £nf  Mirer. 

"  A  frienti,  in  whose  judgment  we  have  great  confidence,  an<l  who  is 
one  of  the  best  farmers  in  \irgiuia,  assures  us  that  tins  publication  is 
one  of  real  value  lo  Southern  agriculturalists."" — tHoulhfrn  Literary 
Jiessenfier. 


Publislied  and  for  sale  by 

J.    W.    RANDOLPH,    R1CH.MONI),  Va. 
Also  for  sale  by  Booksellers  generally. 


^'  If  this  he  Treason,  make  the  uiost  of  It.'' 
ANTICIPATIONS  OF  THE  FUTURE, 

TO    SERVE    AS 

LESSONS  FOR  THE  PRESENT  TIME. 

In  the  form  of  Extracts  of  Letters  from  an  English  Resident  in  the 
United  States,  to  the  London  Times,  from  1864  to  1S70. 

With  an  Appendix  on  the  Causes  and  Consequences  of  the  Independ- 
ence of  the  South. 

By  EDMUND   RUFFIN. 

12mo.  muslin,  426  pages.     Price  $1.00  by  mail,  post  paid. 

"  A  book  entitled  '  Anticipations  of  the  Future.''  published  recently 
in  this  city,  and  eminently  disunion  in  character,  is  in  great  demand 
here  and  throughout  the  South.  The  book  is  made  up  of  letters  to  the 
London  Times,  dated  at  Washington,  the  dates  commencing  with  No- 
vember 11, 1864,  and  ending  with  May  27,  1868.  The  correspondence 
then  opens  at  Richmond,  commencing  with  May  29  of  that  year,  and 
running  down  to  September  20  of  the  same  year.  It  is  resumed  again 
at  Charleston,  October  10,  1868,  and  closes  with  the  27th  of  January. 
1870.  These  correspondences  embody,  as  it  were,  tlie  passing  events  of 
the  periods  at  which  they  are  written,  and  are  nothing  more  than  pre- 
dictions of  what  the  writer  su])poses  will  then  be  the  political  condition  of 
the  country.  The  correspondence  of  November  11, 1SC4,  opens  with  the 
announcement  that  California,  (Oregon,  Washington,  and  also  Sonora. 
(the  new  Pacific  free  State,  formed  of  territory  last  purchased  from 
^lexico),  all  have  voted  the  ticket  of  the  Republican  party,  as  called  by 
its  members,  or  the  Black  Republican  or  Abolition  partly,  as  designated 
bj'  its  opponents.  Wm.  H.  Seward,  of  New  York,  is  elected  by  a  much 
greater  majority  than  his  ])redecessor,  President  Lincoln,  obtained  in 
1860.  The  corresi)ondence  then  treats  successively  upon  the  course  of 
Lincoln's  administration;  sectional  parties  and  their  necessary  effects: 
army  land  grants;  protective  duty  system;  fishing  and  navigation 
bounties;  Southern  aspirants  to  the  Presidency  suited  to  the  Northern 
market,  ahd  their  injurious  influence  on  Southern  rights  and  interests  ; 
direction  and  policy  of  the  governifl^t  patronage;  oi)eration  of  Black 
Republican  measures  on  slaves  in  t^e  South  ;  the  Supreme  Court  sec- 
tionalized;  negro  citizens  and  negro  officers  of  government ;  negro  am- 
bassadors and  negro  diplomatic  relations.  This  book  bids  fair  to  create 
a  furor  in  the  South,  similar  to  that  caused  at  the  North  hy  the  notoii- 
ous  Helper  book.  The  work  displays  considerable  ability,  and  its  pre- 
dictions are  not  at  all  inconsistent  with  the  principles  of  the  Black 
Republican  party." — Richmond  Coi^respondent  of  the  JS'.  Y.  Herald. 

Published  and  for  sale  by 
J.    W.    RANDOLPH,  Richmond,  Va. 
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